# Refugee Crisis Advantage

## AT: Liberal Order Impact

### Liberal Order---U.S. Not Key

#### The U.S is not K/ to the Liberal Order—Doing fine without us

Ikenberry 11 (G. John, theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and International Affairs, “The future of the liberal world order”, Foreignaffairs, 6/2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2011/90/3>)

China and the other emerging powers do not face simply an **American-led order** or a Western system. They face a broader international order that is the product of **centuries of struggle and innovation.** It is highly developed, expansive, integrated, institutionalized, and deeply rooted in the societies and economies of both advanced capitalist states and developing states. And over the last half century, this order has been unusually capable of assimilating rising powers and reconciling political and cultural diversity. Seen in this light, the modern international order is not really American or Western -- even if, for historical reasons, **it initially appeared that way**. It is something much wider. In the decades after World War II, the United States stepped forward as the hegemonic leader, taking on the privileges and responsibilities of organizing and running the system. It presided over a far-flung international order organized around multilateral institutions, alliances, special relationships, and client states -- a hierarchical order with liberal characteristics. But now, as this hegemonic organization of the liberal international order starts to change, the hierarchical aspects are fading while the liberal aspects persist. So even as China and other rising states try to contest U.S. leadership -- and there is indeed a struggle over the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of the leading states within the system -- the deeper international order remains intact. Rising powers are finding incentives and opportunities to engage and integrate into this order, doing so to advance their own interests. For these states, the road to modernity runs through -- not away from -- the existing international order.

#### Even if countries fill the U.S role, they maintain the liberal order.

Ikenberry 11 (G. John, theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and International Affairs, “The future of the liberal world order”, Foreignaffairs, 6/2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2011/90/3>)

But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, **the liberal international order is alive and well.** The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other **emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic** rules and **principles** of the **liberal international order**; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become **more prosperous** and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that **system.**

#### U.S isn’t crucial to maintaining democratic deals—China proves

Ikenberry 11 (G. John, theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and International Affairs, “The future of the liberal world order”, Foreignaffairs, 6/2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2011/90/3>)

In the background, meanwhile, democracy and the rule of law are still the hallmarks of modernity and the **global standard for legitimate governance.** Although it is true that the spread of democracy has stalled in recent years and that authoritarian China has performed well in the recent economic crisis, there is little evidence that authoritarian states can become truly advanced societies **without moving in a liberal** democratic **direction.** The legitimacy of one-party rule within China rests more on the state's ability to deliver economic growth and full employment than on authoritarian -- let alone communist -- political principles. Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean intellectual who has championed China's rise, admits that "China cannot succeed in its goal of becoming a modern developed society until it can take the leap and allow the Chinese people to choose their own rulers." No one knows how far or fast democratic reforms will unfold in China, but a growing middle class, business elites, and human rights groups will exert pressure for them. The Chinese government certainly appears to worry about the long-term preservation of one-party rule, and in the wake of the ongoing revolts against Arab authoritarian regimes, it has tried harder to prevent student gatherings and control foreign journalists. Outside China, **democracy has become a near-universal ideal.** As the economist Amartya Sen has noted, "While democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed universally accepted, in the general climate of world opinion democratic governance has achieved the status of being taken to be generally right." All the **leading institutions** of the global system enshrine democracy as the **proper** and just **form of governance -- and no competing** political **ideals** even **lurk** on the sidelines.

### Liberal Order---Too Late/Can’t Solve

#### The fall of the Liberal World Order leads to a Multipolar world order. It ends US Hegemony. It is too late to go back.

Robert **Muggah** 18, 4-1-20**18**, "The global liberal order is in trouble," World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/can-the-global-liberal-order-be-salvaged/

The withdrawal of the US as a guarantor of the global order could spell the end of the global liberal enterprise. For the first time since 1945, the chief architect and custodian is no longer proactively advocating for democratic values and human-rights norms, open markets or common security arrangements. If the US strays away too long – and if Trump wins a second term in 2020 – it's hard to see the global liberal order recovering.

Even if the US somehow reverts back to old form, it is highly unlikely that the global liberal order will bounce back to its original form. According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, a new, networked global order is fast emerging. This new order moves well beyond the chessboard of inter-state affairs to one that is much more interconnected and complex. She and others believe the tectonic plates of geopolitics have altered fundamentally, and that a rougher, tougher world is on the horizon.

If current trends are any guide, the new world order will most likely be shaped by regional spheres of influence rather than any one single superpower. It seems that history has returned with a vengeance. Is it too late for the Western allies – including the US, EU countries and others – to rediscover their mojo? If the global liberal order dies, will the new world order be led by emerging powers – China, India, Russia, Indonesia and Turkey chief among them? Will the shift be accompanied by violent conflict, or can the transition managed peaceably? These are just some of the questions we ask in this new series.

### Midterms Turns Liberal Order

#### Midterms DA turns the liberal order

Francis Fukuyama 18, 2-6-2018, "How populism is poisoning the global liberal order," World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/how-populism-is-poisoning-the-global-liberal-order

There is growing consensus that populism constitutes a grave threat to liberal democracy, and to the liberal international order on which peace and prosperity have rested for the past two generations. Democracies rely on power-sharing arrangements, courts, legislatures and a free and independent media to check executive power. Since these institutions obstruct the free reign of populists, they are often subjected to blistering attack. This is especially the case with the right-wing variety of populism that is spreading across the U.S. and Western and Eastern Europe.

The liberal international order depends, in turn, on institutions such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Trade Organization, the G20, the European Union, the North American free-trade agreement and others in order to facilitate the movement of goods and investment across borders. All of them, together with the underlying principles and values giving rise to them, have been in the crosshairs of populist politicians in recent years.

Several factors are enabling the spread of this virulent strain of populism. First there are economic factors associated with the decline of the Western middle class and hyper-concentration of wealth in the hands of the elite. Next are the intrinsic political weaknesses of democracies themselves, dependent as they are on fractious coalitions and divided electorates. These shortcomings are routinely exploited by charismatic strongmen. Just as important are cultural factors related to the resentment of newcomers and the feeling by some that the country has been claimed by foreigners.

These factors explain why immigration, at least in the West, acts as a lightning rod for populism. The surge of migrants and asylum claimants over the past decade – partly a result of failed military interventions in the Middle East and flawed immigration and border controls – has exacerbated anxieties about rapid cultural change in areas of the U.S. and Europe. It is no surprise, then, that identity politics – whether over ethnicity, language, religion or sexuality – is fast displacing class as the defining characteristic of contemporary politics.

The future of the global liberal order hinges in large part on the direction of populism in the U.S. After all, the U.S. was the chief architect and custodian of the world order over the past 70 years. If the U.S. withdraws its support, then the order is likely to come unstuck. There are signs that the U.S.'s constitutional checks and balances are weathering the storm in spite of the best efforts of Mr. Trump. The real question now is whether the President and the Republican Party can maintain their hold on government after the 2018 midterms.

Notwithstanding the threats to Mr. Trump of ongoing investigations into Russian interference in the U.S. elections, there are signs that he could survive the 2018 midterm elections and maybe win a second term in office. The reasons for this can be traced to the fact that the U.S. economy is doing extremely well today. While Mr. Trump cannot claim all the credit for this, the recent Republican tax cut is likely to be seen as a positive contribution to general prosperity despite its adding to long-term fiscal deficits. The steady move of the Democrats to the left of U.S. voters, and their continued focus on identity politics, is a boon for Trump supporters. What matters are not the tweets, but the state of the economy.

It is no exaggeration to say that the fate of the global liberal order hangs precariously in the balance. If the Democrats can regain their majority in the House in 2018 and go on to win the presidency, then Mr. Trump is likely to go down in history as an unpleasant aberration. But if the Democrats lose in 2018 and Mr. Trump wins the presidency in 2020, then polarization in the U.S. will deepen and the savaging of liberal institutions will likely increase. The withdrawal of the U.S. from the global order will continue and power will diffuse from the west to the east. The shift from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world will accelerate, with dangerous fallout.

Even beyond Mr. Trump, there are other reasons why populists post a very real threat to the global liberal order. For one, they regularly play down the systemic changes that are generated by advances in technology. Faced with the massive disruptions that will come about as a result of automation, there are shallow appeals to on-shoring and careless talk of trade wars with China. There are also worrying signs that populists are banding together, as in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Serbia, with worrying implications for the integrity of institutions ranging from the UN to the EU and NATO.

One thing is for certain: The road ahead is radically uncertain.

### Liberal Order Bad/Fails

#### Liberal world order is bad—it isn’t effective and doesn’t help to solve world crises

Kim Ghattas 16, a journalist for the BBC and author who covered the US State Department, “*One person’s world order can be another’s disorder,”* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/01/28/one-persons-world-order-can-be-anothers-disorder/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.0751c8b251b6

When President George H.W. Bush spoke of a new world order, he envisioned “a world where the United Nations … is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders” and a “new partnership” of nations … based on consultation, cooperation and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations.

Twenty-five years later, we face the complete opposite. As Peter Maurer, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, said last summer, the world order is a system “that does not seem to have international institutions with the ability to negotiate solutions to conflicts or to the big, increasing and accelerating impact of crisis.”

Conflicts across the globe have created enduring humanitarian crises and a population of 60 million refugees, stretching the international system to a breaking point. The world’s new disorder, as some call it, has many parts — including the 2008 financial crisis and Russian interventionism. But nothing exemplifies the current dysfunction of the international system and the gap in empathy and understanding between the West and the rest more than the Syrian conflict and the response to the refugee crisis.

As long as the wars were far away and the refugee camps out of sight, the comfortable lifestyle in Western countries and isolationist tendencies of their leaders meant there was little empathy for the “other.” The debate about military support or intervention in Syria is a separate one, but in 2015 the United Nations received only 56 percent of the funds it needed to address the Syrian crisis.

Strangely little attention was paid even to the security consequences of a festering humanitarian problem. However, when the refugees of a distant war wash up on Europe’s shores, it becomes clear that “living apart together” doesn’t work anymore. At the World Economic Forum in Davos last week, German President Joachim Gauck said that “no other problem has divided and jeopardized the E.U. more than the refugee problem.”

And yet there is still little real leadership today on the issue, despite the threat to Europe’s borders or the security concerns about radicalized European citizens returning from Syria. At the same time, the refugee population is placing a destabilizing burden on Syria’s neighbors — Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon — which together are hosting more than 3.5 million refugees. The global summit on refugees that President Obama will host at the United Nations won’t take place until September.

The liberal world order was designed by the West and mostly for the West, but it provided great human and economic progress to other states and is still a model that many people aspire to. (After all, refugees fleeing conflict in Syria or Afghanistan aren’t flocking to Russia or Iran.)

## AT: Refugee Instability Impact

### No Refugee Instability Impact

#### The “refugee crisis” is misconstrued

Zack Beauchamp 17, 1-30-2017, a senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on covering foreign policy and international relations. "9 maps and charts that explain the global refugee crisis," Vox, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/1/30/14432500/refugee-crisis-trump-muslim-ban-maps-charts

This terrible situation often gets referred to as “the refugee crisis,” but that’s actually misleading. The majority of people who have been displaced are what’s called “internally displaced people,” or IDPs — people who have been forced from their homes but have not left their countries. Refugees and asylum seekers are people who have been forced from their homes and their countries (though they have slightly different status under international law).

This fact explains, in very simple terms, why the refugees fleeing their countries can’t just “go home.” Huge numbers of them are stuck in their own countries, often in giant camps for displaced persons. The situation in their home country is so unsettled — their country is too violent, too poor, or both — for people to go back to their home towns and cities and live normal lives.

#### The crisis is slowing

Joanne Lu 18, 1-11-2018, Joanne is a freelance journalist dedicated to covering global poverty and inequality. Her work has appeared in Humanosphere, the Guardian and War is Boring "The Number of Refugees and Migrants Coming to Europe is Now Dropping. Here's Why," UN Dispatch, https://www.undispatch.com/number-refugees-migrants-coming-europe-now-dropping-heres/

Two years after sparking an unprecedented humanitarian and political crisis, the largest influx of refugees and migrants into Europe since World War II has finally slowed down, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Last week, the IOM reported that the number of people who arrived in Europe by sea in 2017 was less than half as many as the previous year. Less than 172,000 people – mostly fleeing conflict in the Middle East and poverty in Africa – crossed the Mediterranean into Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Spain in 2017, compared to more than 363,000 in 2016. “We can tell you with confidence that the numbers from North Africa to Italy this year are under 120,000,” IOM spokesperson Joel Millman said, according to Reuters. “…That’s the lowest in the last four years for arrivals in Italy.” Greece also experienced its lowest intake in four years, according to Millman.

## AT: U.S. Leadership

### No Demand for U.S. Resettlement

#### Increase in US leadership doesn’t have any effect, refugees are incentivized to settle in other countries—Syria is one example

Stephanie Griffith 2018,

In the rather unlikely case that Syrians are disinterested in coming to the United States, it is a disinclination they’ve only come to just this year. The minuscule number of Syrian refugees admitted to the United States this year pales in comparison to the numbers who arrived in 2016 (15,000) and in 2017 (3,000) according to State Department figures.

It seems more likely that rather than disinterest, anti-Muslim immigration politics can explain why more Syrians haven’t come to the U.S. As one of the first acts after his swearing in, Trump promulgated an immigration ban that targeted mostly inhabitants of Muslim-majority countries and his administration has been tireless in its efforts to fend off legal challenges to the measure.

### No Moral Obligation

#### The US isn’t alone with moral obligations to allow refugees, other nations are rising to the occasion to fulfill theirs

Kenneth Roth 2015, American Attorney, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, “Refugee Crisis That Isn’t”, 09/03/15, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kenneth-roth/the-refugee-crisis-that-isnt\_b\_8079798.html

This is a political challenge, requiring political leadership in response — not a question of capacity to absorb the recent immigrants. Some politicians have risen to the occasion. Merkel, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, among others, have spoken out against the demagogues-- and affirmed the European values that they jeopardize. Yet there is more to be said, and more leaders who need to say it.

Europeans leaders should publicly recall how others responded generously during World War II, when Europeans were the ones facing persecution and even becoming refugees. After the war, European nations embraced international law requiring them to welcome any asylum-seekers who could demonstrate they fled persecution. True to that principle, Germany and Sweden have already said they would accept all Syrian refugees who arrive within their borders and not send them back to the first EU country they entered under the bloc’s problematic “Dublin” asylum rules. Other European nations should follow suit, and the EU should recognize a larger list of refugee-producing countries and revise the Dublin rules, which can trap asylum-seekers in EU countries that lack capacity to protect them and compel asylum-seekers to pay smugglers to escape those countries

# Refugees Neg

## Ethics adv

### 1nc

#### Sessions’ ruling would still be in place – it’s just an interpretation of the law

**Lind, 18**[covered immigration in some form for about a decade, stretching back to college (when she observed immigration court proceedings for her senior thesis)]. Jeff Sessions just all but slammed the door on survivors of domestic violence and gang violence. https://www.vox.com/2018/6/11/17450374/sessions-asylum-domestic-gang-violence(JTR)

“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum,” Sessions declared. Immigration judges and asylum officers need to tighten the standards of qualifying for asylum — or even being allowed to stay to present a case — accordingly. Sessions referred the case to himself from the Board of Immigration Appeals, the quasi-appellate body of immigration courts run out of the Department of Justice, which means Sessions’s word is now law. The ruling doesn’t flat-out say that an immigrant can’t be granted asylum on the basis of having faced domestic violence or gang violence in her home country. But it makes it clear that to the federal government, suffering either of those things — or having a credible fear that you might suffer them if returned — isn’t enough to count as persecution and allow you to stay in the United States.

#### Anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States at a high. Traditional hate groups are now transitioning to hate crimes against immigrants.

Phyllis B. **Gerstenfeld, 17** (Author of Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls, and Controversies) Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls, and Controversies.(JTR)

Anti-immigrant sentiment has always been extremely common among hate groups, who assume that immigrants are nonwhite. However, in recent years it has become one of the primary foci of white supremacist groups, and anti-immigrant rhetoric is very common in extremist literature. In 2016, for example, the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan’s web page (www.kkk.bz) included this statement as part of the group's platform: Put American troops on our border to STOP the flood of illegal aliens. America is being over run by illegal immigrants mostly from nonwhite coutries who do not share the Christian European values of our nation’s founders. Immigration should remain open to all White Christians throughout the world. There is not one single country that does not persecute it’s [sic] White Christian citizens such as in South Africa where the violent crime against Whites is at an all time high. The entire reasoning behind the forming of America was to allow one place in the world where White Christians could live together in harmony without any outside interference from those of other religions or races. Some groups focus primarily on illegal immigration, whereas others wish to stop or severely limit any kind of immigration. These groups claim that immigrants put a ﬁnancial strain on Americans and that they endanger white culture. Some organizations are also concerned with enacting English-only laws and eliminating bilingual education. Gemignani and Hernandez-Albujar (2015) examined the websites of several hate groups that target immigrants. The researchers found that the content on the websites strive to objectify and dehumanize immigrants, making them appear dangerous and criminal, and fostering distrust in government policy. According to some watchdog organizations. the racist right not only spearheaded the anti-immigration movement in America but is still strongly involved in that movement and has used it as a method of increasing its own membership {SPl.C, 2009a]. As I write this, immigration is a major issue in the 2016 presidential campaign. Republican nominee Donald Trump has advocated building a wall along the entirety of the United States-Mexican border, a proposal that the Republican party has embraced. Trump has also spoken about limiting immigration of Muslims or of people from countries with a history of terrorism.

### Ext – hate crimes – 2nc

#### 50% spike in hate crimes against Latinos because of the rhetoric of the Trump administration.

**HINOJOSA**(As the anchor and executive producer of the long-running weekly NPR show Latino USA) **and GARCIA-NAVARRO**(Lourdes "Lulu" Garcia-Navarro is the host of National Public Radio's Weekend Edition Sunday.)**, 7/15.** “Hate Crimes Against Latinos Increase In California” https://www.npr.org/2018/07/15/629212976/hate-crimes-against-latinos-increase-in-california(JTR)

In California alone, hate crimes against Latinos have increased by more than 50 percent since 2016. The administration's immigration crackdown and the president's rhetoric may help explain the spike. LULU GARCIA-NAVARRO, HOST: A man in California insults a family for listening to Spanish music while celebrating on July 4. A man in Chicago berates a woman for wearing a shirt with the flag of Puerto Rico on it. A local official ignores the woman's calls for assistance. A woman in a park scolds a Los Angeles Times reporter for speaking Spanish to her daughter - and so many more. According to a Department of Justice report, for just the state of California, Latinos and Hispanics are increasingly the subject of hate crimes with a more than 50 percent increase from 2016. To talk about this, I'm joined by Maria Hinojosa. She's the host of NPR's Latino USA. Good morning. MARIA HINOJOSA, BYLINE: Good morning, Lulu. GARCIA-NAVARRO: So some sad statistics there - I only listed some examples of the recent attacks against Latinos that have made the news. And there is a rhetoric that contributes to these kinds of hate crimes. HINOJOSA: There is a rhetoric, and we've actually witnessed some of this coming from the administration. So when you have members of the administration, including the president, calling specifically Latino/Latina immigrants infiltrators, vermin, animals, then I'm sure there are many people who say, well, wait a second - us, too. And how do you challenge that? GARCIA-NAVARRO: To be clear, the administration says that when the president uses those words or members of the administration use those words, they're talking about actual criminal elements that come into this country, like MS-13 gang members for example. HINOJOSA: Yes. But for many people, they just hear a general message that says these people are a threat - they're flooding into our country; they're scary; they're brown; they speak Spanish; they're immigrants. And I think that that's why we're seeing these high numbers. GARCIA-NAVARRO: I want to play some tape from President Trump right now. He just had a few words to say on his recent trip to the United Kingdom about immigration. Let's listen. (SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING) PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: I just think it's changing the culture. I think it's a very negative thing for Europe. I think it's very negative. I think having Germany - and I have a great relationship with Angela Merkel, great relationship of Germany. But I think that's very much hurt Germany. I think it's very much hurt other parts of Europe.

#### Hate crimes against Muslims after 9/11 caused Muslim communities to become more segregated from the rest of Americans.

Gould(Professor of Economics at Hebrew University), Eric and Klor(Esteban Klor is the Herczeg Family Associate Professor and current Chairman of the Department of Economics at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Esteban (2017) The post-9/11 backlash against Muslims reduced assimilation. USApp – American Politics and Policy Blog (09 Jan 2017).(JTR)

The 9/11 terror attacks by radical Islamic groups caused a definite backlash against the Muslim community as a whole; FBI data on the incidence of hate crimes against Muslims, show an increase from 28 reported incidents in 2000 to 481 in 2001. Did this backlash increase the cost of assimilation for Muslims in the US? We examined whether this backlash slowed the rate of assimilation by making use of variation across states in the number of hate crimes against Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. We found that the attacks induced a backlash that made the Muslim community in America more traditional in terms of marrying within the community, producing more children and having lower rates of female participation in the labour force. Analysing individual-level data from the Census and American Community Surveys between 1990 and 2010, we found that after 9/11: There was an increase in the likelihood of Muslims marrying someone also from a Muslim country: the ‘intramarriage’ rate rose by 6.4 percent and 7.3 percent for Muslim men and women respectively. The higher rate of intra-marriage came at the expense of marrying someone outside the ethnic group, rather than a general increase in the marriage rate. There was an increase in the number of children in Muslim households: by 5.7 percent and 4.5 percent for males and females respectively. There was a fall of 7.6 percent in the labour force participation of Muslim women. Muslim immigrants had lower proficiency in speaking English. Our findings raise the possibility that terror groups may intentionally induce a backlash on persons of a similar ethnic origin in the targeted country, in order to decrease their rate of assimilation. As a consequence, terror attacks against Western targets may have a long-term political and socio-economic impact, by creating a more insular and disconnected Muslim community in this generation and also the next. For example, Figure 1 shows that changes in the state-level intra-marriage rate between 2000 and 2010 are correlated with the state-level changes in Muslim hate crimes per capita. For both men and women, there is a statistically significant positive relationship, showing that the assimilation rate of Muslim immigrants was indeed slower in places that experienced a more intensive backlash

#### Immigrant and Islamic youth are experiencing bias-based harassment in the United States.

Lisa M. Jones(Corresponding author. Crimes against Children Research Center, University of New Hampshire), and Kimberly J. Mitchell(Research assistant professor of Psychology at the Crimes against Children Research Center). “Characteristics of bias-based harassment incidents reported by a national sample of U.S. adolescents”. 23 August 2017(JTR)

The findings of the current study support a growing body of research that emphasizes the significant negative consequences of youth bias-based harassment experiences. The results highlight the need for more research to understand which youth are most affected by bias victimization and how to reduce its occurrence. It is important for research to examine more closely whether risk for bias victimization is worse for certain groups of youth, in different contexts, and how that risk is changing over time. For example, although we did not find African-American youth to be at heightened risk for bias-based victimization in our national survey, as noted above, there may be particular communities in which their risk is higher. Additionally, there may be trends in understudied subgroups of youth who may not have been a significant focus of previous research. Immigrant youth and Islamic youth may be seeing heightened bias victimization in recent years, as political and cultural climates change. In general, ongoing research is needed measuring how risk for bias-based victimization for different vulnerable youth vary by local contexts (e.g., school and neighborhood climate and demographic make-up), and as a result of shifts in larger cultural and political contexts. Research is also needed to help understand how to prevent the perpetration of bias-based peer harassment and other bias victimization. For example, research is needed to understand which youth are more likely to perpetrate bias-based harassment. Research has already identified links between early homophobic name calling behavior and later sexual harassment perpetration (Espelage et al., 2017). Similarly, future research might examine whether early bias-based harassment is linked to later perpetration of more serious bias-based assaults and hate crimes. There also may be protective factors across ecological levels that, if better understood, could provide clues to developing preventive interventions to reduce victimization, or negative impact on victims (Hong & Espelage, 2012). Parent-child relationships, peer relationships, and peer group dynamics, for example, all may mediate the experience and impact of bias-based victimization. For schools and policy-makers, the findings suggest the importance of expanding the focus on youth victimization beyond just bullying (Finkelhor, Shattuck, Turner, & Hamby, 2016). Bullying has received a lot of attention from researchers, school professionals and parents, but the current study suggests that bias-based harassment can also be distressing for youth. An incident of harassment that includes bias language, may not necessarily meet the typical criteria for bullying (repeated aggression by a perpetrator who is more powerful than the victim) (Gladden et al., 2014; Olweus, 2007), and therefore could be dismissed by caregivers and school professionals. While the use of explicit racial slurs at school might attract adult intervention, many other bias-based harassment incidents may be dismissed as ‘common name-calling’. Our data suggest that the use of bias language in a harassment incident should signal to caregivers and school professionals that careful follow-up is called for and intervention may be warranted. It is critical that schools work to prevent bias-based victimization through social-emotional learning programs and diversity and inclusiveness education. Researchers must help to identify educational programs and strategies that are most effective in reducing this kind of victimization. Additionally, schools can be proactive in identifying victims of bias-based harassment by asking questions about bias language during incident inquiries. If present, this and other research suggests that the youth may need additional emotional support and assistance. Positively, there are indications that bias victimization may be declining at least for some types of victimization. The School Crime Survey finds rates of youth exposure to hate language have dropped from 12% in 2001 to 7% in 2015 (Zhang et al., 2016). Similarly, the 2015 National School Climate Survey found that the percentage of students hearing homophobic remarks dropped from over 80% in 2001 to less than 60% in 2015, although LGBTQ students reported a higher incidence of negative remarks about gender expression in 2015 compared to 2013 (Kosciw et al., 2016). This is encouraging but also emphasizes the importance of research that tracks youth experiences with bias victimization by asking detailed questions about multiple kinds of victimization experiences as part of national surveys. Bias-based harassment victimization is a common occurrence for youth, with over one-half of harassment incidents containing bias language. Study findings indicate that such incidents are linked with elevated distress and negative social and school consequences for targeted youth. Data show that these harassment incidents may not meet formal definitions of bullying, but nonetheless have significant negative impact on youth, suggesting that prevention and intervention policies need to incorporate these into bullying education efforts. Raising awareness, tracking youth bias victimization experiences across time and contexts, increasing education, and improving prevention strategies surrounding bias-involved victimization is crucial for ensuring the safety and wellbeing for youth.

#### Anti-immigrant messages affect families nationwide, making them to feel extremely unwelcome

Jessic Weiss(International Women's Media Foundation Fellow), Six months of hate: how anti-immigrant sentiment is affecting Latinos in the United States, 14, June, 2017(JTR)

Marvin del Cid wakes up to find the words "fu\*\*ing Mexicans, get out" spray painted on the side of his trailer. Dreamers Justino Mora, Iván Ceja and Belen Sisa endure weeks of threatening messages — and even death threats — online after posting on social media about being undocumented. Kids plead with their parents not to send them to school after chants of "build the wall." In recent months, hate incidents and hate crimes have targeted Latinos around the country, in small towns and big cities, coast-to-coast. Though the weeks immediately before and after the presidential election saw the most reports, incidents have continued at a steady tick. Since the presidential election, Univision has received nearly 200 reports of hate and bias perpetrated against our readers and viewers, sent to us through the Documenting Hate project. From those reports, we have interviewed dozens of Latinos who have been the victims of racist slurs and harassment, intimidation, vandalism and even assault. Here are some of the trends we've observed: "Go back to your country" "Send them back to their own f\*\*king country," a woman is heard saying in the direction of a Hispanic family in a video recorded earlier this month at a Sears in New Jersey. According to onlookers, the woman grew angry after the family used coupons and delayed the checkout line. In a climate of xenophobia, in which immigrants are often characterized as being the source of the country’s problems, calls to "go back to your country" have been among the insults most commonly reported by Univision’s audience. On a Saturday morning in February, Carlos Hernandez was at an outdoor flea market in Middletown, Pennsylvania, where he sells mobile phone accessories, when a customer approached him and lashed out with racist insults and threats. "He said to me … 'you need to go back to your country,' "you shouldn’t be here,'" Hernandez, 39 and a legal resident, told Univision. "I felt really bad," Hernandez told us. "I felt destroyed inside." Many of those who have been targeted in this way are actually American-born. "Speak English" On February 15, Ana Martinez, 46, returned a call from an unknown number. She reached a collections agency, and an automated message explaining she had an open case against her. Anxious to learn more, she requested to speak to a customer service agent in Spanish, her native language. The agent angrily told her no one was available to speak in Spanish. "He said 'I tell you what, go to school to learn English and when you speak English call us back or go ahead and get back to your country,'" Martinez told us, holding back tears. That's just one of more than a dozen reports we have received from people berated for speaking Spanish in public in recent months. "One day I went shopping with my kids and we were speaking in Spanish," wrote one woman from Sterling, Virginia. "A woman began to yell at us 'here only English' and 'go back to your country.'" Rocío Inclán, director of the Human & Civil Rights Department at the National Education Association, says the insult cuts deep for Latinos. "Language is about culture. It's about identification," she says. "We as a country really lose out when there is this reversal towards 'America first.' It incites the otherness in our country, so people think you're an other if you speak a language besides English - that you're not fully American." Inclán, who lives in Washington, D.C., was recently targeted for speaking Spanish to her mom on the phone. "I was in Whole Foods, in a very liberal area of Washington, speaking to my mom who is in Mexico," she says. "An older white woman comes up to me and says 'this is America, you need to speak English.'"

#### Trump increases anti-immigrant sentiment with “animal” language. This won’t dissipate any time soon.

Julie Hirschfeld Davis(Covering the White House for The New York Times), Trump Calls Some Unauthorized Immigrants ‘Animals’ in Rant, 5/16(JTR)

President Trump lashed out at undocumented immigrants during a White House meeting on Wednesday, warning in front of news cameras that dangerous people were clamoring to breach the country’s borders and branding such people “animals.” Mr. Trump’s comments came during a round-table discussion with state and local leaders on California’s so-called sanctuary laws, which strictly limit communication between local law enforcement and federal immigration officers, and which the Trump administration is suing to invalidate. It was hardly the first time the president has spoken in racially fraught terms about immigrants, but it underscored his anger about unchecked immigration — the animating issue of his campaign and his tenure so far — and his frustration that he has not been able to do more to seal the nation’s borders. As he has in numerous private meetings with his advisers at the White House, Mr. Trump used the session to vent about the nation’s immigration laws, calling them “the dumbest laws on immigration in the world.” He exhorted his administration to “do much better” in keeping out undesirable people, including members of transnational gangs like MS-13. “We have people coming into the country, or trying to come in — we’re stopping a lot of them,” Mr. Trump said in the Cabinet Room during an hourlong meeting that reporters were allowed to document. “You wouldn’t believe how bad these people are. These aren’t people, these are animals, and we’re taking them out of the country at a level and at a rate that’s never happened before.”

### Ext – hate crimes – 2nr

#### We shouldn’t take in immigrants fleeing from non-governmental violence, because that same violence is still perpetrated here in the United States. Both the population and the government has perpetrated anti-immigrant sentiment, and it won’t go away soon. It is not ethical to bring people into the country under the false premise that they’ll be accepted here, for they most certainly won’t be.

## Soft Power Advantage

### Soft Power Defense

#### No uniqueness – soft power is robust and resilient

Nye, Harvard Government Professor, 18 [Joseph S; 2-9-18; Gulf News; "America's soft power is robust and resilient"; https://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/america-s-soft-power-is-robust-and-resilient-1.2170982; accessed 6-3-18; PAC]

Fortunately, America is more than the government. Unlike hard-power assets (such as armed forces), many soft-power resources are separate from the government and are only partly responsive to its purposes. In a liberal society, the absence of official cultural policies can itself be a source of attraction. Hollywood movies like The Post, which showcase independent women and press freedom, can attract others. So, too, can the charitable work of US foundations or the benefits of freedom of inquiry at American universities.

It is true that firms, universities, foundations and other non-governmental groups develop soft power of their own which may reinforce or be at odds with the US foreign policy goals. And all of these private sources of soft power are likely to become increasingly important in the global information age. That is all the more reason for governments to make sure that their own actions and policies create and reinforce rather than undercut and squander their soft power.

Domestic or foreign policies that appear hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to others’ views, or based on a narrow conception of national interests can undermine soft power. For example, the steep decline in the attractiveness of the US in opinion polls conducted after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a reaction to the George W. Bush administration and its policies, rather than to the US generally.

The Iraq War was not the first government policy that made the US unpopular. In the 1970s, many people around the world objected to the US war in Vietnam, and America’s global standing reflected the unpopularity of that policy. When the policy changed and the memories of the war receded, the US recovered much of its lost soft power. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Iraq war, the US managed to recover much of its soft power in most regions of the world.

Sceptics might still argue that the rise and fall of American soft power does not matter much, because countries cooperate out of self-interest. But this argument misses a crucial point: Cooperation is a matter of degree, and the degree is affected by attraction or repulsion. Moreover, the effects of a country’s soft power extend to non-state actors — for example, by aiding or impeding recruitment by terrorist organisations. In an information age, success depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins.

One of the greatest sources of America’s soft power is the openness of its democratic processes. Even when mistaken policies reduce its attractiveness, America’s ability to criticise and correct its mistakes makes it attractive to others at a deeper level. When protesters overseas were marching against the Vietnam War, they often sang ‘We Shall Overcome’, the anthem of the US civil rights movement.

America, too, will almost certainly overcome. Given past experience, there is every to hope that the US will recover its soft power.

#### Soft power doesn’t shape foreign policy decisions of others.

Ellwood, 2014 (David Ellwood is an Associate Professor of International History at University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor in European-American Relations at Johns Hopkins University, SAIS Bologna Center – “‘Soft power’ is a flawed tool in foreign policy, but a valuable form of global leadership” – The London School of Economic’s daily blog on American Politics and Policy – Jan 18th – http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/01/18/soft-power-is-a-flawed-tool-in-foreign-policy-but-a-valuable-form-of-global-leadership/)

Leaving aside its glibness and air of casuistry, the ‘soft power’ concept is fundamentally flawed at just the point where Nye insists on its usefulness: as a tool of foreign policy. The more states attempt consciously to project the force of example they see in their nations and its ways, the more the rest will see manipulation and propaganda. Two US analysts who commented on the prospects for British foreign policy in a new book, Influencing Tomorrow: Future Challenges for British Foreign Policy, were happy to say that ‘the BBC may be a more effective tool of British foreign policy than the Royal Navy or the British Army’. But they also warned against the temptations and risks of leverage: ‘when you reach for the tool of soft power, you find it evaporates in your hand’. In the American case in particular, the temptation seems to be to try to mobilize the charismatic nature of so many successful American inventions and people as though they are resources at the disposal of the state. But they are not; they are the values and products of that society in the most diffuse sense, and its creative industries in particular, with all their talent for absorbing and re-configuring the inventions of the world then re-launching them for a global market.

#### Soft power doesn’t work – it won’t shift minds of nations that weren’t already inclined.

Adegbite, 2011 (Saheed Adegbite, completed his MA in International Studies and Diplomacy at The Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, the University of London in 2011. He currently works as a Senior Officer with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “How crucial is soft power to the successful conduct of diplomacy?” – International Relations and Diplomacy – Sunday, 13 March 2011 – http://thenewdiplomats.blogspot.com/2011/03/how-crucial-is-soft-power-to-successful.html)

One difficulty in attempting to decide conclusively that soft power is crucial is in the vague way it is measured by many. As defined soft power is the ability to get someone to do what they would not otherwise do by attraction. As such this can only be measured where we have established firstly the context that the other party wouldn’t have done it anyway. If I ask or persuade my daughter to jump, I can only claim to my soft power being crucial with the assurance that she doesn’t love jumping. The context of measuring goes also into determining if there are already shared values or cultures which serve in themselves to facilitate. The power relationship is therefore always changing and how crucial soft power is in diplomatic negotiation is also fluid. One recent phenomenon that underlines soft power essence especially in the last two decades is the proliferation of non-state actors including NGO’s and their growing importance in diplomacy in general. As a result of this there are a growing number of new issues that face nations and their foreign services such as Climate Change, Human rights, HIV and their securitization which has minimum to do with hard power alone. States consistently have to weld soft power for legitimacy in these issues closely adopting what is in essence important stages of implementation i.e. In conclusion therefore, soft power in isolation does not seem to dominate in its importance in diplomacy. The contemporary political landscape means it is growing in importance with need however for economic military power to implement it. The limitations remain though in it cannot be a replacement for good policy and contradiction can be counterproductive along with the fact that ‘bounce’ can create competition. The degree to which soft power has played a role positively in any diplomatic negotiation remains dependent on the nature of the power relationship, shared values and culture amongst

### Uniqueness Overwhelms – Trump

#### Trump has already wrecked US global leadership – plan can’t save it

McCoy 2017 [Alfred McCoy is a professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison who specializes in global political research in the politics of Southeast Asia, “The Demolition of U.S. Global Power. The Accelerated Collapse of American Global Hegemony”, Tehran Institute For International Studies, 7-16-2017, <http://tiis.org/index.php/2018/02/15/the-demolition-of-u-s-global-power-the-accelerated-collapse-of-american-global-hegemony/> // wyo-rrt]

While it’s reasonable to argue that Washington had by then become history’s greatest global power, its hegemony, like that of all the world empires that preceded it, remained surprisingly fragile. Skilled leadership was required to maintain the system’s balance of diplomacy, military power, economic strength, and technological innovation. By the time President Trump took his oath of office, negative, long-term trends had already started to limit the influence of any American leader on the world stage. These included a declining share of the global economy, an erosion of U.S. technological primacy, an inability to apply its overwhelming military power in a way that achieved expected policy goals on an ever more recalcitrant planet, and a generation of increasingly independent national leaders, whether in Europe, Asia, or Latin America. Apart from such adverse trends, Washington’s global power rested on such strategic fundamentals that its leaders might still have managed carefully enough to maintain a reasonable semblance of American hegemony: notably, the NATO alliance and Asian mutual-security treaties at the strategic antipodes of Eurasia, trade treaties that reinforced such alliances, scientific research to sustain its military’s technological edge, and leadership on international issues like climate change. In just five short months, however, the Trump White House has done a remarkable job of demolishing these very pillars of U.S. global power. During his first overseas trip in May 2017, President Trump chastised stone-faced NATO leaders for failure to pay their “fair share” into the military part of the alliance and refused to affirm its core principle of collective defense. Ignoring the pleas of these close allies, he then forfeited America’s historic diplomatic leadership by announcing Washington’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord with all the drama of a reality television show. After watching his striking repudiation of Washington’s role as world leader, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told voters in her country that “we must fight for our future on our own, for our destiny as Europeans.” Along the strategic Pacific littoral, Trump cancelled the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact on taking office and gratuitously alienated allies by cutting short a courtesy phone call to Australia’s prime minister and insulting South Korea to the point where its new president won office, in part, on a platform of “say no” to America. When President Moon Jae-in visited Washington in June, determined to heal the breach between the two countries, he was, as the New York Times reported, blindsided by “the harshness of Mr. Trump’s critique of South Korea on trade.” Just days after Trump dismissed Moon’s suggestion that the two countries engage in actual diplomatic negotiations with Pyongyang, North Korea successfully test-fired a ballistic missile potentially capable of reaching Alaska or possibly Hawaii with a nuclear warhead (though experts believe Pyongyang may still be years away from effectively fitting such a warhead to the missile). It was an act that made those same negotiations Washington’s only viable option — apart from a second Korean War, which would potentially devastate both the region and the U.S. position as the preeminent international leader. In other words, after 70 years of global dominion, America’s geopolitical command of the axial ends of Eurasia — the central pillars of its world power— seems to be crumbling in a matter of months. Instead of the diplomacy of presidents past, Trump and his advisers, especially his military men, have reacted to his first modest foreign crises as well as the everyday power questions of empire with outbursts akin to Anthony Eden’s. Since January, the White House has erupted in sudden displays of raw military power that included a drone blitz of unprecedented intensity in Yemen to destroy what the president called a “network of lawless savages,” the bombardment of a Syrian air base with 59 Tomahawk missiles, and the detonation of the world’s largest non-nuclear bomb on a terrorist refuge in eastern Afghanistan. While reveling in the use of such weaponry, Trump, by slashing federal funding for critical scientific research, is already demolishing the foundations for the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower’s successors, Republican and Democratic alike, so sedulously maintained for the last half-century. While China is ramping up its scientific research across the board, Trump has proposed what the American Association for Advancement of Science called “deep cuts to numerous research agencies” that will mean the eventual loss of the country’s technological edge. In the emerging field of artificial intelligence that will soon drive space warfare and cyber-warfare, the White House wants to reduce the 2018 budget for this critical research at the National Science Foundation to a paltry $175 million, even as Beijing is launching “a new multi-billion-dollar initiative” linked to building “military robots.”

#### Uniqueness overwhelms – Trump unpredictability ruins US soft power

Toosi, Politico, 16 [Nahal; 11-13-16; "Lawmakers fear Trump will undercut America's 'soft power'"; https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/trump-america-soft-power-231253; accessed 6-4-18; PAC]

"Under Donald Trump ... I would be very concerned about the importance of soft power," said Sen. Ben Cardin of Maryland, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a top promoter of human rights legislation. "It does affect our national security, and it’s a challenge even under ideal circumstances."

"Soft power" is a loosely defined term that covers how a country amasses influence without coercion or payment. It can include promoting pop culture or offering earthquake relief. Some stretch it to include democracy promotion and offering development aid, if the purpose or side effect is to gain goodwill. Proponents argue that, used properly, U.S. soft power can help reduce potential threats facing America.

Christian Whiton, an informal adviser to Trump, dismissed worries that the Republican president-elect would undercut America's international influence. Trump, Whiton insisted, would fight for human rights and democratic movements in the face of radical Islamists in countries such as Iran.

"I wouldn’t expect to see drastic cuts or elimination of foreign aid, but I would expect to see it redirected toward what the incoming president sees as our key national interests," added Whiton, who stressed that he was not officially speaking on behalf of the president-elect's team.

The aid community, for one, has little confidence that Trump will make it a priority. The United States provides more than $30 billion a year to other countries in foreign assistance, much of it in humanitarian aid and on global health efforts. Some in the field worry Trump will gut the U.S. Agency for International Development and other foreign assistance programs in favor of his stated "America First" ideals.

Many of the aid programs are concentrated in struggling Muslim-majority countries that Trump has cast as hotbeds of extremism whose citizens should be barred from the United States.

"People just don’t know what to expect," said a State Department official familiar with aid programs. He insisted there's some hope, however, because, despite the disdain among many on the right for foreign aid, "there’s a lot of bipartisan support in Congress for a lot of the work that USAID does. That’s been the case for the past two administrations."

The mere fact that Trump won the election has already hurt America's ability to promote democracy. Trump's fondness for budding autocrats such as Russia's Vladimir Putin and Egypt's Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, and some of his statements during the campaign, have enhanced existing perceptions that the U.S. is hypocritical.

Trump's win "has exposed and encouraged tendencies the world never used to associate with the U.S.: xenophobia, misogyny, pessimism, and selfishness," Shashi Tharoor, a former U.N. official, wrote in a Friday column titled "The End of U.S. soft power?" "A country that confidently counsels others on democratic practice has elected a president who suggested that, if he lost, he might not recognize the result."

### Decline Good

#### U.S. global leadership is a threat to world peace – decline is good

Street 2018 [Paul Street is the former VP for research and planning of the Chicago Urban League, author of numerous books about the U.S. empire and global democracy and holds a doctorate in U.S. history from Binghamton University, 2-20-2018, “The World Will Not Mourn the Decline of U.S. Hegemony”, truthdig, <https://www.truthdig.com/articles/world-will-not-mourn-decline-u-s-hegemony/> // wyo-rrt]

I recently reviewed a manuscript on the rise of Trump written by a left-liberal American sociologist. Near the end of this forthcoming and mostly excellent and instructive volume, the author finds it “worrisome” that other nations see the U.S. “abdicating its role as the world’s leading policeman” under Trump—and that, “given what we have seen so far from the [Trump] administration, U.S. hegemony appears to be on shakier ground than it has been in a long time.” For the purposes of this report, I’ll leave aside the matter of whether Trump is, in fact, speeding the decline of U.S. global power (he undoubtedly is) and how he’s doing that to focus instead on a very different question: What would be so awful about the end of “the American Era”—the seven-plus decades of U.S. global economic and related military supremacy between 1945 and the present? Why should the world mourn the “premature” end of the “American Century”? It would be interesting to see a reliable opinion poll on how the politically cognizant portion of the 94 percent of humanity that lives outside the U.S. would feel about the end of U.S. global dominance. My guess is that Uncle Sam’s weakening would be just fine with most Earth residents who pay attention to world events. According to a global survey of 66,000 people conducted across 68 countries by the Worldwide Independent Network of Market Research (WINMR) and Gallup International at the end of 2013, Earth’s people see the United States as the leading threat to peace on the planet. The U.S. was voted top threat by a wide margin. There is nothing surprising about that vote for anyone who honestly examines the history of “U.S. foreign affairs,” to use a common elite euphemism for American imperialism. Still, by far and away world history’s most extensive empire, the U.S. has at least 800 military bases spread across more than 80 foreign countries and “troops or other military personnel in about 160 foreign countries and territories.” The U.S. accounts for more than 40 percent of the planet’s military spending and has more than 5,500 strategic nuclear weapons, enough to blow the world up 5 to 50 times over. Last year it increased its “defense” (military empire) spending, which was already three times higher than China’s, and nine times higher than Russia’s. Think it’s all in place to ensure peace and democracy the world over, in accord with the standard boilerplate rhetoric of U.S. presidents, diplomats and senators? Do you know any other good jokes? A Pentagon study released last summer laments the emergence of a planet on which the U.S. no longer controls events. Titled “At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk Assessment in a Post-Primary World,” the study warns that competing powers “seek a new distribution of power and authority commensurate with their emergence as legitimate rivals to U.S. dominance” in an increasingly multipolar world. China, Russia and smaller players like Iran and North Korea have dared to “engage,” the Pentagon study reports, “in a deliberate program to demonstrate the limits of U.S. authority, reach influence and impact.” What chutzpah! This is a problem, the report argues, because the endangered U.S.-managed world order was “favorable” to the interests of U.S. and allied U.S. states and U.S.-based transnational corporations. Any serious efforts to redesign the international status quo so that it favors any other states or people is portrayed in the report as a threat to U.S. interests. To prevent any terrible drifts of the world system away from U.S. control, the report argues, the U.S. and its imperial partners (chiefly its European NATO partners) must maintain and expand “unimpeded access to the air, sea, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum in order to underwrite their security and prosperity.” The report recommends a significant expansion of U.S. military power. The U.S. must maintain “military advantage” over all other states and actors to “preserve maximum freedom of action” and thereby “allow U.S. decision-makers the opportunity to dictate or hold significant sway over outcomes in international disputes,” with the “implied promise of unacceptable consequences” for those who defy U.S. wishes. “America First” is an understatement here. The underlying premise is that Uncle Sam owns the world and reserves the right to bomb the hell out of anyone who doesn’t agree with that (to quote President George H.W. Bush after the first Gulf War in 1991: “What we say goes.” It’s nothing new. From the start, the “American Century” had nothing to do with advancing democracy. As numerous key U.S. planning documents reveal over and over, the goal of that policy was to maintain and, if necessary, install governments that “favor[ed] private investment of domestic and foreign capital, production for export, and the right to bring profits out of the country,” according to Noam Chomsky. Given the United States’ remarkable possession of half the world’s capital after World War II, Washington elites had no doubt that U.S. investors and corporations would profit the most. Internally, the basic selfish national and imperial objectives were openly and candidly discussed. As the “liberal” and “dovish” imperialist, top State Department planner, and key Cold War architect George F. Kennan explained in “Policy Planning Study 23,” a critical 1948 document: We have about 50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. … In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity. … To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. … We should cease to talk about vague and … unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better. The harsh necessity of abandoning “human rights” and other “sentimental” and “unreal objectives” was especially pressing in the global South, what used to be known as the Third World. Washington assigned the vast “undeveloped” periphery of the world capitalist system—Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia and the energy-rich and thus strategically hyper-significant Middle East—a less than flattering role. It was to “fulfill its major function as a source of raw materials and a market” (actual State Department language) for the great industrial (capitalist) nations (excluding socialist Russia and its satellites, and notwithstanding the recent epic racist-fascist rampages of industrial Germany and Japan). It was to be exploited both for the benefit of U.S. corporations/investors and for the reconstruction of Europe and Japan as prosperous U.S. trading and investment partners organized on capitalist principles and hostile to the Soviet bloc. “Democracy” was fine as a slogan and benevolent, idealistic-sounding mission statement when it came to marketing this imperialist U.S. policy at home and abroad. Since most people in the “third” or “developing” world had no interest in neocolonial subordination to the rich nations and subscribed to what U.S. intelligence officials considered the heretical “idea that government has direct responsibility for the welfare of its people” (what U.S. planners called “communism”), Washington’s real-life commitment to popular governance abroad was strictly qualified, to say the least. “Democracy” was suitable to the U.S. as long as its outcomes comported with the interests of U.S. investors/corporations and related U.S. geopolitical objectives. It had to be abandoned, undermined and/or crushed when it threatened those investors/corporations and the broader imperatives of business rule to any significant degree. As President Richard Nixon’s coldblooded national security adviser Henry Kissinger explained in June 1970, three years before the U.S. sponsored a bloody fascist coup that overthrew Chile’s democratically elected socialist president, Salvador Allende: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people.” The U.S.-sponsored coup government that murdered Allende would kill tens of thousands of real and alleged leftists with Washington’s approval. The Yankee superpower sent some of its leading neoliberal economists and policy advisers to help the blood-soaked Pinochet regime turn Chile into a “free market” model and to help Chile write capitalist oligarchy into its national constitution. “Since 1945, by deed and by example,” the great Australian author, commentator and filmmaker John Pilger wrote nearly nine years ago: “The U.S. has overthrown 50 governments, including democracies, crushed some 30 liberation movements and supported tyrannies from Egypt to Guatemala (see William Blum’s histories). Bombing is apple pie.” Along the way, Washington has crassly interfered in elections in dozens of “sovereign” nations, something curious to note in light of current liberal U.S. outrage over real or alleged Russian interference in “our” supposedly democratic electoral process in 2016. Uncle Sam also has bombed civilians in 30 countries, attempted to assassinate foreign leaders and deployed chemical and biological weapons.

### No Impact to Decline

#### No impact to heg – exhaustive studies prove.

Fettweis 2011 [Christopher J. Fettweis is an associate professor of Political Science at Tulane University, has written several books about U.S. foreign policy and hegemony and is known for his expertise on American foreign relations, “Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy”, *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 316-332, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2011.605020, Taylor & Francis Group // wyo-rrt]

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

### No Great Power War

#### No great power war – costs for global powers are too high

Aziz 2014 [John Aziz is a political analyst for The Week, 3-6-2014, "Don't worry: World War III will almost certainly never happen", The Week, theweek.com/articles/449783/dont-worry-world-war-iii-almost-certainly-never-happen

Next year will be the seventieth anniversary of the end of the last global conflict. There have been points on that timeline — such as the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and a Soviet computer malfunction in 1983 that erroneously suggested that the U.S. had attacked, and perhaps even the Kosovo War in 1999 — when a global conflict was a real possibility. Yet today — in the shadow of a flare up which some are calling a new Cold War between Russia and the U.S. — I believe the threat of World War III has almost faded into nothingness. That is, the probability of a world war is the lowest it has been in decades, and perhaps the lowest it has ever been since the dawn of modernity. This is certainly a view that current data supports. Steven Pinker's studies into the decline of violence reveal that deaths from war have fallen and fallen since World War II . But we should not just assume that the past is an accurate guide to the future. Instead, we must look at the factors which have led to the reduction in war and try to conclude whether the decrease in war is sustainable. So what's changed? Well, the first big change after the last world war was the arrival of mutually assured destruction. It's no coincidence that the end of the last global war coincided with the invention of atomic weapons. The possibility of complete annihilation provided a huge disincentive to launching and expanding total wars. Instead, the great powers now fight proxy wars like Vietnam and Afghanistan (the 1980 version, that is), rather than letting their rivalries expand into full-on, globe-spanning struggles against each other. Sure, accidents could happen, but the possibility is incredibly remote. More importantly, nobody in power wants to be the cause of Armageddon. But what about a non-nuclear global war? Other changes — economic and social in nature — have made that highly unlikely too. The world has become much more economically interconnected since the last global war. Economic cooperation treaties and free trade agreements have intertwined the economies of countries around the world. This has meant there has been a huge rise in the volume of global trade since World War II, and especially since the 1980s. Today consumer goods like smartphones, laptops, cars, jewelery, food, cosmetics, and medicine are produced on a global level, with supply-chains criss-crossing the planet. An example: The laptop I am typing this on is the cumulative culmination of thousands of hours of work, as well as resources and manufacturing processes across the globe. It incorporates metals like tellurium, indium, cobalt, gallium, and manganese mined in Africa. Neodymium mined in China. Plastics forged out of oil, perhaps from Saudi Arabia, or Russia, or Venezuela. Aluminum from bauxite, perhaps mined in Brazil. Iron, perhaps mined in Australia. These raw materials are turned into components — memory manufactured in Korea, semiconductors forged in Germany, glass made in the United States. And it takes gallons and gallons of oil to ship all the resources and components back and forth around the world, until they are finally assembled in China, and shipped once again around the world to the consumer. In a global war, global trade becomes a nightmare. Shipping becomes more expensive due to higher insurance costs, and riskier because it's subject to seizures, blockades, ship sinkings. Many goods, intermediate components or resources — including energy supplies like coal and oil, components for military hardware, etc, may become temporarily unavailable in certain areas. Sometimes — such as occurred in the Siege of Leningrad during World War II — the supply of food can be cut off. This is why countries hold strategic reserves of things like helium, pork, rare earth metals and oil, coal, and gas. These kinds of breakdowns were troublesome enough in the economic landscape of the early and mid-20th century, when the last global wars occurred. But in today's ultra-globalized and ultra-specialized economy? The level of economic adaptation — even for large countries like Russia and the United States with lots of land and natural resources — required to adapt to a world war would be crushing, and huge numbers of business and livelihoods would be wiped out. In other words, global trade interdependency has become, to borrow a phrase from finance, too big to fail.

#### No great power war – nuclear weapons, globalization and interdependence all check

Deudney & Ikenberry 2009 [Daniel Deudney is a professor of political science at John Hopkins and John Ikenberry is a professor of international affairs at Princeton and is a well-known global politics writer, Jan/Feb 2009, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail”, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2009-01-01/myth-autocratic-revival>]

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities of pushes and pulls-that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge.

## LGBTQ+ adv

### 1nc

#### *Immigration Detention Centers Bad for LBGTQ+ Immigrants*

Tabak and Levitan 14 Jan 27, 2014 “LGBTI Migrants in immigration Detention Centers” Shana Tabak shanatabak@gmail.com is a Practitioner-in-Residence at American University’s International Human Rights Law Clinic. Rachel Levitan rslevitan@gmail.com is Senior Counsel (Refugees and Migration) at HIAS [http://harvardjlg.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2014.1.pdf //](http://harvardjlg.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2014.1.pdf%20//) VA

Increasingly, states detain irregular migrants as a means, they believe, to control migration flows and deter further irregular migration. Despite this trend, detention has not deterred migrants from crossing borders. Furthermore, conditions in immigrant detention facilities have been widely criticised as violating international law. Sexual minorities in detention often face social isolation, physical and sexual violence directed at them because of their gender identity, and harassment by both facility staff and other detainees. In most prison settings, sexual minorities face a heightened risk of targeted physical and sexual violence. Transgender women1 are particularly vulnerable to this abuse because they are usually housed with men; in the US, for instance, they are thirteen times more likely to be sexually assaulted than other detainees. LGBTI detainees are often placed in ‘administrative segregation’ in response to complaints of sexual or physical violence or as a preventive measure. Although segregation may seem to be the only available means of protecting sexual minority migrants from violence, in many detention centres it is indistinguishable from solitary confinement, involving confinement for 23 out of 24 hours a day in a tiny cell with extremely limited access to the outdoors, exercise or other people. This practice can lead to severe mental health after-effects and may exacerbate Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or other conditions developed in response to violence in the country of origin or during migration. (In some cases, LGBTI detainees may selfisolate so as to avoid stigmatisation by refugees from their countries of origin.) Such solitary confinement is held by international human rights bodies as amounting to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment when it deprives detainees of meaningful access to detention centre services or, although it is widely termed ‘non-punitive isolation’, is tantamount to conditions of penal solitary confinement. The medical needs of sexual minorities in detention, whether or not they require a regular regimen of HIV medication or hormone therapy, are rarely met. In many migrant detention facilities, only urgent medical care is provided; interpreters are rarely provided during medical procedures; there are insufficient private spaces for medical consultations; and medical expenses are borne by the detainees. LGBTI migrants in detention face significant risk of HIV infection and exposure to other sexually transmitted infections (STIs). Some arrive in detention infected, often due to a history of sex work or exposure to sexual violence. Others are infected in detention, where rates of HIV, AIDS and other STIs tend to be higher than the rate in the general population. Infection as a result of sexual violence in detention is of particular concern to transgender women, who are often housed with men. Detention also increases exposure to other infectious diseases, which heightens risk of HIV-related morbidity. The lack of medical care available is also evidenced by the limited access of transgender detainees to hormone and other treatment associated with gender transition. In the US, however, according to recent guidelines, transgender immigrant detainees may receive hormone treatment but only if they were undergoing such treatment prior to being detained. Transgender migrant detainees also report invasive and voyeuristic medical examinations by officials who are unfamiliar with their medical needs or have had little exposure to individuals with gender non-conforming identities. Sexual minority migrants, who experience high levels of physical and sexual violence in countries of origin, often suffer serious mental health after-effects. Detention conditions – including the loss of physical liberty (particularly when segregated), staff abuse, marginalisation by other detainees, lack of access to appropriate medical care, substandard hygiene, combined with the often indefinite nature of immigration detention – exacerbate mental illness. Voyeuristic or offensive questioning of LGBTI migrants by migration authorities also detrimentally affects their mental health. Since access to mental health counselling in migrant detention is extremely rare, sexual minorities not only suffer ongoing after-effects of harm experienced in countries of asylum but also are often retraumatised by experiences in detention. While LGBTI detainees – particularly those who are transgender – are often so visible in immigration detention systems that they are put at grave physical risk, they remain invisible where their protection concerns matter most: in the policies and guidelines that are designed to protect all detainees from harm and process migrants equitably and with dignity under international law. The core elements of protection in human rights law that relate to detainees include the prohibition on torture, the prohibition on arbitrary detention, limits on detention time, non-discrimination clauses, and the right to liberty. Both the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN General Assembly have confirmed that these tenets of human rights law must be applied without discrimination to all peoples, including migrants. Other refugee-specific legal standards promulgated by UNHCR prohibit penalising migrants for illegal entry or presence, and assert that detention of asylum seekers should only be contemplated as a last resort. In October 2012, UNHCR issued new guidelines governing the detention of refugees. Intended as guidance to governments, legal practitioners, decision-makers and others, they provide valuable leadership on the special concerns of LGBTI asylum seekers in detention. Guideline 9.7 states that: Measures may need to be taken to ensure that any placement in detention of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or intersex asylum-seekers avoids exposing them to risk of violence, ill-treatment or physical, mental or sexual abuse; that they have access to appropriate medical care and counselling, where applicable; and that detention personnel and all other officials in the public and private sector who are engaged in detention facilities are trained and qualified, regarding international human rights standards and principles of equality and non-discrimination, including in relation to sexual orientation or gender identity. Where their security cannot be assured in detention, release or referral to alternatives to detention would need to be considered. In this regard, solitary confinement is not an appropriate way to manage or ensure the protection of such individuals.2 Although extremely welcome, UNHCR’s new Detention Guidelines alone are insufficient to address the severe problems that characterise the detention of sexual minority migrants. Ultimately, states must provide alternatives to detention for all self-identifying sexual minorities – establishing non-custodial measures and alternative sentencing procedures.3 In addition, migrant detention facility staff and management must be trained on and sensitised to the protection needs of LGBTI migrants. Access to appropriate health-care, welfare and contact with the outside world – including legal counsel, medical attention and external LGBTI support systems – must be ensured. LGBTI detainee safety and the ending of discrimination and abuse, both by other detainees and by prison officials, must be the highest priority.

#### Outing DA: people who have to hide their identity aren’t granted asylum

Hanna ’05 Fadi Hanna 01/01/05 Fadi holds a law degree from Yale Law School, and a B.S from Duke University. Fadi served as a Legal Intern for Immigration Equality in 2003 and has a personal appreciation for the challenges faced by LGBTQ immigrants. <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol114/iss4/5/> /]] // VA

Under the Refugee Act of 1980, a successful asylum applicant must establish a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of' a protected characteristic, which includes "membership in a particular social group."2 The BIA's decision in In re Toboso-Alfonso,3 later made binding precedent by then-Attorney General Janet Reno, designated homosexuals as a "particular social group" within the meaning of the Act. Since then, several hundred applicants have been awarded asylum based on sexual orientation. 5 Applying the "well-founded fear" standard, the BIA recently denied the asylum application of a thirty-three-year-old gay man, Jorge Soto Vega, adopting in full the opinion of the immigration judge (1J).6 While accepting that Soto Vega was homosexual, the IJ reasoned that he was not stereotypically gay enough to objectively fear identification as such, remarking that "I didn't see anything in his appearance, his dress, his manner, his demeanor, his gestures, his voice, or anything of that nature that remotely approached some of the stereotypical things that society assesses to gays."7 In other words, Soto Vega's homosexuality was invisible to an ordinary person with no prior knowledge of it: "[I]t would not be obvious that he [is] homosexual unless he made . . . it obvious himself., 8 Based on this lack of visibility, the IJ concluded that Soto Vega had failed to "demonstrate[] a reasonable fear of future persecution" 9 on the basis of his homosexuality, and therefore denied asylum. 10 Other recent IJ opinions that have been affirmed by the BIA and federal courts echo, albeit more subtly, the Soto Vega IJ's reasoning.1 Jorge Soto Vega freely admitted his homosexuality in both the United States and his native Mexico but, in the eyes of the IJ, skillfully concealed his orientation on a day-to-day basis-in essence, by acting "normal" rather than "queer." This is homosexual covering: the process by which gay individuals alter their conduct by, for example, displaying only gendertypical traits to allow others to ignore their sexual orientation. 12 Reverse covering, on the other hand, occurs when "[s]traights . . . ask gays to perform according to stereotype., 13 The demand that gay asylum applicants reverse cover in order to obtain asylum is eerily explicit in Soto Vega. In articulating a demand to reverse cover, Soto Vega is not an outlier so much as the continuation of a disquieting trend in sexual-orientation-based asylum law. The case employs elements of the reasoning used in the landmark decision Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, in which the Ninth Circuit distinguished between subsets of the Mexican homosexual population. 14 The court granted the asylum application of a man who began dressing and acting like a woman at age twelve.' 5 It characterized his "'particular social group'" as "[g]ay men with female sexual identities," which it called a "subset of the gay male population,"'16 and based its decision on the claim that female-acting homosexual men are subject to higher levels of abuse than male-acting homosexual men.' 7 The Ninth Circuit has since reconfirmed this reasoning, in Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft. 1 8 In granting asylum to an effeminate gay man precisely because he was so effeminate, the Hernandez-Montiel court rewarded reverse covering. Standing alone, that decision said nothing about gay men who did cover; effeminacy simply helped to articulate the social group narrowly.19 But when the IJ in Soto Vega actually punished covering, the other shoe dropped. Taken together, Hernandez-Montiel and Soto Vega suggest that courts perceive gay asylum applicants on a covering spectrum stretching from those who "act straight," or cover, to those who "act gay," or reverse cover. Grants of sexual-orientation-based asylum increasingly depend on where the applicant lies on this covering spectrum. Soto Vega involved a gay man with a male sexual identity who was thus denied asylum. In Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes, on the other hand, the applicants were effeminate, and so the courts looked on them more favorably.2 The rest of this Comment will argue that the covering-spectrum framework incorrectly assumes that homosexual men who cover are less vulnerable to persecution and unjustifiably treats gays who cover as a social group distinct from those who don't. The covering spectrum is fundamentally about visibility. Among asylum applicants, those who do not or cannot cover are more visibly gay, and are thus seen as more vulnerable to persecution and ultimately more deserving of asylum than those who cover. The visibility requirement is neither unique to asylum law21 nor, within it, to sexual-orientation-based asylum. Of the four enumerated grounds for asylum-race, nationality, religion, and political opinion22-the last two are likely to be invisible characteristics. Yet political asylum cases have considered it important that an individual was "a highly visible member" of the party or group whose opinions were disfavored.23 Similarly, for religious asylum, courts have considered whether the petitioner's religion can be "readily identified., 24 Importing this reasoiing to the ill-defined social group category, 2 courts have observed that, like "race, religion, nationality and political opinion[,] the attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable., 26 Visibility is not an independent requirement for asylum but a means of ascertaining whether persecution occurs "on account of" the protected characteristic.27 In asylum cases, a nexus must exist between an asylum applicant's persecution and his protected characteristic. To satisfy this requirement, courts have suggested that at a minimum, it is necessary that "the persecutor could become aware" of the protected characteristic. 28 Visibility is the most obvious and convenient way of showing that this possibility exists. Thus, in cases such as Reyes-Reyes, appearance becomes the requisite nexus between fear of persecution and homosexuality.29 It seems superficially reasonable to conclude that, for a gay individual who appears and acts heterosexual, sexuality will never trigger persecution. However, well-founded fear of persecution is the central inquiry in any asylum claim. Denying asylum to gays who cover overlooks the possibility that they hide their sexual identity out of fear of the persecution that would result if they did not. For many homosexuals, gay visibility is inversely related to fear; when fear increases, visibility decreases. 30 A study of homosexual persecution in Egypt documents how an increasing public awareness that "colored underwear, long hair, and tattoos were all telltale signs" of homosexuality led the gay community to avoid these things.31 In another case, fear of persecution led a homosexual couple in Bangladesh to "conduct[] themselves in a discreet manner," 32 because being conspicuous would lead to "the possibility of being bashed by the police. 33 In these cases, invisibility, not visibility, serves as a nexus between the individual's fear of persecution and his homosexuality.34 When covering is the result of fear,35 denial of asylum based even in part on gay visibility contravenes the central goal of asylum law. Sexualorientation-based asylum seeks to protect a person's right to be homosexual when threatened by fear of official persecution.36 If we accept that covering is burdensome for gay individuals, 37 any voluntary assumption of this burden is then arguably evidence that a well-founded fear exists. Covering motivated by fear-what I call "reactionary covering"-is, in fact, more than mere evidence of fear of persecution: It constitutes persecution. Although the cases discussed thus far have dealt with "gay" traits (such as effeminate dress or bearing), "gay" acts (such as homosexual sex) can also reveal one's sexual orientation. As a result, covering can lead to the avoidance of all emotional and physical contact with the same sex, both public and private. When fear forces a gay individual to live like a straight one, covering approaches outright conversion, which has been seen by American courts as persecution that meets the fear-based standard.38 The High Court of Australia has taken the next logical step and recognized reactionary covering as grounds for granting asylum. 39 Treating covering as grounds to deny asylum, as in Soto Vega, is a troubling anomaly that needs to be undone. That the visibility requirement for sexual-orientation-based asylum overlooks the possibility of reactionary covering is reason enough to abandon it. More fundamentally, however, the problem with the visibility requirement is that it conceptualizes homosexual identity in a way that is inconsistent with the immutability element of asylum law. In Soto Vega and other cases that apply the covering spectrum, judges assume that sexual orientation is expressed through action-through the doing of all those "stereotypical things that society assesses to gays. 4 ° In placing applicants along a covering spectrum, the absence of gay behavior becomes indicative of a fundamental difference in gay identity. Within the framework of asylum law, however, one is either gay or not. Homosexuality is not treated as a behavior that is subject to gradations, but as an immutable trait. Several circuits, along with the BIA, have held that an immutable characteristic is sufficient to establish a particular social group.41 It is on this basis that homosexuals are recognized as a particular social group: homosexuality is immutable.42 An immutability-based legal standard for those persecuted on the basis of their sexual orientation must recognize that while some gay people are capable of resisting any expression of that orientation, they are still gay and not necessarily immune from fear of persecution. While the link between action and identity has been emphasized in other contexts,43 it has no place in sexual-orientation-based asylum. A "performative model"' 4 4 of identity would suggest that someone cannot be eligible for asylum on the grounds of sexual orientation unless he manifests his orientation through his appearance or behavior. This is not how homosexuality has been treated in asylum law. In In re Acosta, the BIA defined an immutable characteristic as one that individuals "either cannot change, or should not be required to change. 45 It is their core sexual identity, separate from action, that immigration courts have long recognized the inability of gay men to change.46 When courts deny asylum to gay individuals who do not act gay, using a performative model, they wrongly assume that homosexual identity is constituted by action.47 When gender-conforming homosexuals are less intensely persecuted in a specific country, it does not negate the fact that they are fundamentally persecuted for their homosexuality. 48 Crucially, immutable homosexual identity is distinct from social perception of what is "gay." A performative model contravenes the immutability standard because it relies on variable social and cultural perceptions 49 of what actions characterize homosexuality. American courts, driven by the immutability requirement, should focus on that which is temporally and culturally constant-an applicant's core homosexual identity. The sexual identity that asylum law seeks to protect is unchanged by covering and unrelated to visibility.

### Ext – detention turn

\*\*\*assuming no detention centers plank

#### Detention centers break rules to abuse LGBTQ folks – no solvency and turn

Gruberg 18

5-30-18 Sharita Gruberg is the associate director of the LGBT Research and Communications Project at the Center for American Progress. “ICE’s Rejection of Its Own Rules Is Placing LGBT Immigrants at Severe Risk of Sexual Abuse” https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2018/05/30/451294/ices-rejection-rules-placing-lgbt-immigrants-severe-risk-sexual-abuse/

Laura Monterrosa is a queer asylum seeker from El Salvador. After being targeted by homophobic gang violence and having her life threatened, she decided to seek safety in the United States. In May 2017, she presented herself at the border, seeking asylum, and was detained at the T. Don Hutto detention center, an all-women immigration detention facility run by the private prison company CoreCivic. In November, she reported to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that a guard had sexually abused her on multiple occasions. After ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility and the local sheriff’s office looked into the allegations, ICE closed her case, saying that her account “could not be corroborated” and “lacked evidence to pursue any further action.” Laura’s attorney reported investigators even asked if the relationship with the guard was consensual. After ICE closed the case, the FBI intervened and picked up the investigation. Despite a pending FBI investigation into these incidents, ICE would not release Laura—nor would it fire the guard. Laura remained trapped inside Hutto with her alleged abuser. Desperate, Laura ingested 51 prescription pain pills in an attempt to kill herself. In February 2018, ICE reportedly placed her in isolation for three days, during which time she claimed ICE tried to get her to recant her accusation of sexual abuse. A month later, Laura was finally released from detention after a judge ordered ICE to provide mental health care outside the detention facility. The Center for American Progress received information about ICE’s treatment of LGBT immigrants in detention for fiscal year 2017 from a congressional letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen from Rep. Kathleen Rice’s (D-NY) office. This information reveals that LGBT immigrants are being held in detention for long periods of time, in unsafe conditions, and at a far greater risk of sexual violence than the general population. These facts indicate that Laura’s story is not unique under the Trump administration’s policy of treating every unauthorized immigrant as a deportation priority. LGBT immigrants in detention report high rates of sexual assault and sexual abuse ICE’s 2014 Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) regulations require an annual publication of sexual assault data. Making the data publicly available is important as a means of helping advocates hold ICE accountable for its response to sexual assault in detention. While ICE has not yet publicly released any of the required annual data since 2014, Rep. Rice requested data from ICE on sexual assault of people in detention, and these findings are staggering—even compared with the high rate of sexual victimization of LGBT people in U.S. jails and prisons. ICE reported to Rep. Rice that it received 227 reports of sexual abuse and assault in FY 2017. Twenty-eight of these reports involved an LGBT victim. In FY 2017, ICE detained 323,591 people. ICE reported to Rep. Rice that in FY 2017, 467 immigrants disclosed being LGBT during intake to a detention facility. This means that although LGBT people were 0.14 percent of the people ICE detained in FY 2017, they accounted for 12 percent of victims of sexual abuse and assault in ICE detention that year. In other words, assuming each report of sexual violence is substantiated and involves a separate victim, LGBT people in ICE custody are 97 times more likely to be sexually victimized than non-LGBT people in detention. ICE is housing transgender immigrants in unsafe situations ICE is placing LGBT immigrants in harm’s way by not releasing them from detention when they should be and has reverted to its practice of detaining transgender women with men or in solitary confinement, contrary to its own rules. In recognition of their heightened vulnerability to sexual abuse, DHS’ PREA rule requires an individualized placement determination for transgender people. In its response to Rep. Rice, ICE claims it is making these assessments. However, the custody data that Rep. Rice received indicate this is not the case. Despite the continued existence of an Obama-era memo on caring for transgender immigrants, not one of the nearly 250 facilities ICE detains immigrants in is bound to comply with this guidance. Rather than automatically applying across DHS detention facilities, this guidance requires a contractual agreement with the facility. ICE opened a pod for transgender immigrants in Cibola County, New Mexico, but that facility’s contract with ICE does not include a requirement that it comply with the transgender care memo. ICE reported to Rep. Rice that it detains transgender women in 17 facilities. Four are all-male facilities. Thirteen have a mix of male and female populations. Except for the transgender pod at Cibola, ICE has not provided information about whether ICE detained transgender women with other women, with men, or in isolation in these facilities. The average amount of time transgender people were detained in FY 2017 was 99 days, more than double the 43.7 day average all immigrants spent in ICE custody. With nearly 80 countries criminalizing LGBT people, the extended period of time they spend in detention may be due to waiting for a judge to review their cases for relief from deportation, such as asylum. Rep. Rice’s office also obtained information about the use of solitary confinement for LGBT immigrants in detention. In recognition of the risks that come with placing vulnerable populations, such as LGBT people, in solitary confinement, ICE’s own rules stipulate that solitary should only be used as a last resort. In those cases, solitary confinement should “not ordinarily exceed a period of 30 days.” According to Rep. Rice’s office, 1 in 8 transgender people detained by ICE were placed in solitary confinement in FY 2017. The United Nations recognizes the placement of LGBT people in solitary confinement for their own protection as a form of torture. After 15 days, solitary confinement may cause irreversible psychological damage. According to the information that ICE provided Rep. Rice, LGBT immigrants who were detained in solitary for more than 14 days spent an average of 52 days in solitary confinement.

#### Abuse is rampant – the aff’s mechanism is amoral

Hananel 18

5-30-18 Sam Hananel - Associate Director of Media Relations at Center for American Progress. “RELEASE: LGBT Immigrants in Detention Centers at Severe Risk of Sexual Abuse, CAP Analysis Says” https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release/2018/05/30/451380/release-lgbt-immigrants-detention-centers-severe-risk-sexual-abuse-cap-analysis-says/

Disturbing new government data shows that LGBT immigrants held at federal detention centers are 97 times more likely to be sexually assaulted than other detainees, according to an analysis by the Center for American Progress. The CAP analysis is based on data from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that was requested by Rep. Kathleen Rice (D-NY). Although LGBT people accounted for just 0.1 percent of ICE’s detained population in fiscal year 2017, they accounted for a staggering 12 percent of victims of sexual assaults reported in ICE detention, the data shows. “These actions are reckless and unacceptable and will only lead to more LGBT people being sexually victimized on ICE’s watch,” said Sharita Gruberg, associate director of CAP’s LGBT Research and Communications Project and author of the analysis. Not only is ICE placing LGBT immigrants in harm’s way, but the agency has also reverted to its practice of detaining transgender women with men or in solitary confinement, contrary to its own rules. ICE data show that 1 in 8 transgender people detained in FY 2017 were placed in solitary confinement. Placing LGBT people in solitary confinement for their own protection is considered a form of torture by the United Nations. A letter today signed by more than three dozen members of Congress calls on Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen to ensure that in the absence of extenuating circumstances, LGBT people are released from custodial detention. The letter suggests that parole or alternatives to detention, such as supervised release and community placements, be used instead to ensure the safety of this population throughout immigration proceedings.

### Ext – outing turn

\*\*\* if the planks that solve “gay tests” aren’t read, the proving gay impacts can be read as turns.

#### The aff violently forces visibility, abuses applicants in detention centers, and denies them necessary resources once they’re out of detention

Lopez 17

6-28-17 Oscar Lopez is a Mexican-Australian writer and journalist based in New York. Oscar is a regular contributor to Newsweek magazine, where he often writes about LGBT rights. His work has also been featured on Huffington Post, Narratively, and Posture Magazine. “For LGBTQ Refugees in the United States, “Visibility is a Two-Sided Sword”” http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/06/28/for\_lgbtq\_refugees\_to\_the\_u\_s\_newfound\_visibility\_can\_be\_problematic.html

Growing up in a small town in Nigeria, Oliver Anene had always tried to make his sexuality invisible. “Kissing a guy on the street would be suicide,” says the 33-year-old on the phone from New York City, where he now lives. “It was difficult to hide.” Still, that didn’t stop him from fighting for equality: When he moved to the capital city of Abuja, he began to campaign for LGBTQ rights with a local organization called Alliance Rights Nigeria. But the anonymity of a being in a big city didn’t last long: During World AIDS Day in 2005, Anene says Nigeria’s then-president was visiting a health fair in Abuja where ARN had a booth. “One of the reporters yelled ‘Are you gay?’ ” Anene recalls. “The head of our organization admitted ‘Yeah, I’m gay’ on national TV. That was the beginning of the backlash.” Anene says that this moment of queer visibility ignited a national movement to crackdown on LGBTQ expression, despite the fact that gay sex was already illegal. The campaign culminated in the Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition Act of 2014, which imposes a 10-year prison sentence on anyone who “registers, operates or participates in gay clubs, societies, and organization.” The public persecution made Anene’s work increasingly risky: “I tried to keep a low profile,” he says. “But when you show up on the news, it starts to get really dangerous.” After being harassed and receiving multiple death threats, Anene says he began to fear for his life. So, during a visit to the United States five years ago, he reached out to Immigration Equality, a New York–based nonprofit organization that provides free legal representation to LGBTQ people, and began the process of seeking asylum. “My mom has a saying,” he says. “ ‘He who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day.’ ” Like Anene, thousands of people around the world are forced to flee their home country every year because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and an increasing number end up in the United States. According to a 2012 report from the Heartland Alliance, an estimated 3,500 LGBTQ refugees arrive in the U.S. annually: Every year, 1,250 queer people are granted asylum. But attaining refugee status is a complex and difficult journey, throughout which asylum-seekers like Anene must constantly negotiate visibility. Because while being out back home could get you killed or thrown in jail, during the asylum process, visibility can be the only way to prove you need protection. And even if their claim is successful, LGBTQ refugees are forced to confront the reality of a country that can often be hostile to immigrants, queers, and people of color. “Visibility is a double-sided sword,” says Siobhán McGuirk, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University whose research focuses on migration and sexuality. “Being visible becomes necessary for a case, but it also puts people at risk.” Under international asylum law, to qualify for refugee status, asylum-seekers need to prove that they are members of a minority group and have a “well-founded fear of persecution.” To prove their membership to this marginalized group, in this case being LGBTQ, refugees have to show both visibility and immutability—the fact that their status is unchanging. “I don’t know what ‘looking gay’ means—it’s ridiculous.” Oliver Anene But for LGBTQ asylum-seekers, both of these criteria can be problematic. Immutability often discounts people that are bisexual or sexually fluid, says McGuirk, and as for visibility, “Why would anyone be visible if visibility means persecution or death?” But in an interview with an adjudicator, asylum-seekers are required to offer evidence of their sexuality or gender identity. “You might be asked for photos of you and your partner,” says Jackie Yodashkin, Public Affairs Director at Immigration Equality. “But often people don’t take them, and why would you keep them when it’s so dangerous?” Anene, from Nigeria, was lucky. While the visibility of his activism made him a target in Nigeria, it afforded him ample evidence for his asylum case, and his refugee status was approved relatively quickly. But for many people, the process can be much longer and more difficult. “Sometimes it hinges on telling your story,” says Yodashkin. “People get asked really invasive questions. It can be a harrowing process of recounting persecution.” Marja, 33, is a gay woman from Eastern Europe, where she was constantly trying to hide who she was: “I became a master of deflection,” she says. But eventually, the fear of being found out became too much. “I had to find an escape to save myself, to save my sanity, my life.” Diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder, she is seeking asylum in the U.S. But putting together her case has meant reliving the trauma she was trying to leave behind. “I came here to forget and to heal, so it’s hard to go through everything again,” she says. “It’s emotionally exhausting. The burden on top of the mountain of burdens.” McGuirk, the Georgetown professor, says asylum-seekers must also confront preconceived notions of what an LGBTQ person looks like in the interview process: “Being out and proud is understood in a very homonormative, mainstream way,” she says. According to Anene, such attitudes mean asylum-seekers may try to conform to an adjudicator's stereotyped expectations. “The other day a friend was asking me if he should wear makeup or a dress to the interview to look more gay,” he says with a laugh. “I don’t know what ‘looking gay’ means—it’s ridiculous.” While attitudes like these are improving in places like New York or San Francisco with large queer communities, McGuirk says that in the South, it can be more challenging to get past these kinds of outdated ideas about queer visibility: “The differences can be quite shocking,” she says. “There’s no consistency across asylum adjudication.” According to the report from Heartland Alliance, in 2010, there were 4,168 LGBT asylees living in California, versus just 263 in Texas. And while the national average for asylum approval is 48 percent, in states like Georgia it can be as low as 2 percent. This disparity disproportionately affects Latinx asylum-seekers, who are more likely to arrive as undocumented by crossing into the U.S. over land, and it privileges more financially stable refugees who can fly into places like New York. Among those undocumented LGBTQ people who do make it into the U.S., McGuirk says that all too often, they are thrown in detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents before even knowing that asylum is an option. “They’re immediately forced into the defensive,” she says. A report from the Center for American Progress titled "ICE Officers Overwhelmingly Use Their Discretion to Detain LGBT Immigrants" found that “LGBT immigrants were detained with startling regularity regardless of legal requirements, vulnerability to abuse, or even the absence of flight risk or risk to public safety.” Immigration activists fear this could get worse under the Trump administration’s immigration crackdown. “People are scared to go to Pride this year,” says Yodashkin. “They’re scared to be visible.” If detained, trans women especially face much greater dangers than cisgender immigrants: A November 2013 Government Accountability Office report found that one-fifth of confirmed sexual assault cases between 2009 and 2013 in detention facilities involved trans immigrants. “It’s dangerous for anyone to be in an immigration detention center,” says Yodashkin. “But trans folks are especially targeted for violence. It’s just not a safe place.” ICE has attempted to address this issues by placing trans people in special individual pods, but this can lead to isolation, and, according to the CAP report, “even with this precaution, abuse persists.” The Trump administration’s travel ban, recently reinstated by the Supreme Court until it can consider the order’s constitutionality in October, is another major concern for LGBTQ asylum-seekers. The executive order, which bars entry to anyone from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen and places a 120-day ban on refugees, could be particularly damaging to LGBTQ people, who may be fleeing anti-gay laws and persecution in these countries. “It disproportionately affects queer people,” says Yodashkin of the travel ban. “And it could leave people stuck in countries where it’s not safe. We’re talking about life or death here.” “People get asked really invasive questions. It can be a harrowing process.” Jackie Yodashkin But even for those asylum-seekers lucky enough to gain entry to the U.S. and have their asylum claim filed, meaning they can legally remain in the U.S. during processing, the hardship is far from over: Unlike in countries like the U.K., the U.S. government doesn’t offer any kind of financial support during the asylum process, and without legal access to work, asylum-seekers often end up on the street. “People are forced into being visible by the system,” says McGuirk. “But they’re not given the kind of complex support they need.” With nowhere to go after filing his asylum claim, Anene, the Nigerian refugee, ended up in a homeless shelter in New York. “It was terrifying,” he says. “The term ‘faggot’ was thrown around a lot. I was fleeing Nigeria so I could stop hiding who I was, and here I was again trying to pretend to be straight.” Marja was lucky: She got taken in by a lesbian couple for her first few months in the U.S. “Seeing how they as a couple were so accepted by society, in a church setting, was extremely beneficial,” says Marja. “The beginning of stopping to hate myself for being gay. To see that you can be loved.” Once she got her work permit, Marja was able to find a steady job and move into her own place: She now lives with a gay Russian couple who are also applying for asylum. But working hasn’t been without difficulties. “I have a lot of coworkers who come from countries with similar views towards gay people,” she says. “I’m not comfortable being out and proud.” This, too, is common: According to Scott Pohl, Senior Community-Based Protection Advisor for UNHCR, LGBTQ refugees can often face discrimination even within immigrant communities: “When people flee, the stigma that they experienced prior to their flight can come with them.” After spending three months in the homeless shelter, Anene’s asylum application was accepted: that year, he marched in New York Pride for the first time. “To say we are Nigerians and we’re gay in public was so overwhelming,” he says. “To represent Nigerians and other Africans was elating.” He’s gone to every New York Pride since. But according to Yodashkin, marching in Pride and being so visible may be too big a step for some asylum-seekers: “A lot of people just aren’t ready,” she says. “It can feel like you’re lining up to be a target.” Marja says that she went to Pride in Washington, D.C. this year, and while she enjoyed watching it, she didn’t feel comfortable marching in the parade. “I guess I’m not OK with being gay—it’s part of the healing process,” she says. “I feel part of the gay community, but the part that’s not loud and proud.” Others face even greater challenges at Pride events that have become increasingly mainstream. McGuirk says she’s spoken to many LGBTQ Muslims who are “appalled by the comments made to them” at Pride events. “LGBTQ Muslims do want to engage and talk about transphobia and homophobia in their community,” she says. “But they’re also forced to talk about Islamophobia and transphobia in the gay community, and that can be very draining.” Anene, too, admits that “gay culture can be overwhelming.” But for him, the most difficult part of living in the U.S. has been confronting racism. “When you grow up in Africa as a gay man, that’s the only difference you have,” he says. “The color of your skin isn’t important. Then you move here and you start to see the inequality that’s happening.” For McGuirk, this is a part of the conversation on asylum that too often gets left out. “Being a black immigrant who is also LGBT, the U.S. is not a safe place for you,” she says. Yodashkin agrees: “There are so many different levels of discrimination that people have to navigate. It’s always a dance.” Despite his background in activism, Anene and his Nigerian friends found it hard at first to relate to the Black Lives Matter movement: “We don’t consider ourselves African American,” he says. “We didn’t feel like we should engage in the conversation.” But after experiencing discrimination firsthand too many times, Anene began to realize that racism doesn’t discriminate. “The system is rigged to deprive people of color of a healthy life,” he says. “A police officer isn’t going to be like ‘Oh, you’re from Africa, you’re OK.’ It’s not going to happen.” Still, Anene’s main focus continues to be LGBTQ rights, and he is working with and volunteering at several organizations in New York. But ultimately he wants to return to Nigeria, as soon as he gets American citizenship. “Going with a U.S. passport will offer me some protection, so I can get more involved, be louder,” he says. “Hopefully one day Nigeria will become more accepting. But people have to fight for it. That’s why I have to go back.”

## Stability Advantage

### Impact Defense

#### No war – leaders have incentives to contain escalation – any claim to the contrary assumes the old guard

Malin 12 [Martin Malin is the Executive Director on Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, 5-28-2012, “Unconventional Wisdom”, The Bulletin, http://thebulletin.org/unconventional-wisdom]

As negotiations with Iran over the future of its nuclear program inch toward a possible deal, another intractable Middle East problem with a nuclear dimension is likely to start getting more serious attention. It is the question of whether there is any chance that Israel, Iran, and their Arab neighbors will agree to discuss establishing a regional zone free of all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems.¶ Earlier this month in Vienna, Jaakko Laajava, a Finnish diplomat and the facilitator of the proposed 2012 Middle East WMD-Free Zone Conference, reported to the Non-Proliferation Treaty preparatory committee meeting that although he had conducted more than 100 meetings -- both inside and outside the region -- he had yet to secure an agreement from all relevant states on participation. News of Laajava's no-news statement was met with another round of eye-rolling and finger-pointing: The likely holdouts are Israel and Iran, with a major question mark hanging over Syrian participation.¶ After decades of backsliding, proliferation, and conflict in the Middle East, the conventional wisdom says the current round of efforts will fail. I think the conventional wisdom is wrong.¶ In the past, many leaders in the Middle East have seen chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons as an attractive answer to their problems. But this logic is changing. Developments in the region are creating conditions that make progress on arms control and disarmament more possible, not less.¶ Reviewing matters within. Internal conditions throughout the Middle East are becoming less conducive for either sparking or sustaining WMD programs. Arab protesters are demanding less corruption and more government accountability. Large, secretive WMD programs supporting unaccountable military-industrial cliques will be harder to support in the region's emerging political economies. The domestic political struggles underway across the Middle East have both leaders in power and their opponents focusing inward on reform, not outward toward old enemies.¶ If democratic processes begin to take root (and, admittedly, it is premature to say that they will), what effect will this have on the perceived role of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons? Research by political scientists Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt suggests that democratizing states, in need of international acceptance and support, are particularly sensitive to nonproliferation norms and loathe to violate them.¶ Regional evolution. The region's historic military rivalries have receded and the security rationale for WMD is receding with them. Iraq, which was once Iran's bitterest enemy and in US crosshairs for its WMD programs (real and imagined), now closely coordinates its policies with both Tehran and Washington. Tension in the Saudi-Iranian relationship requires the attention of leaders in Riyadh and Tehran, but in no way resembles the military rivalry that once existed between Iran and Iraq.¶ Inter-Arab animosity has also moderated. In April, when demonstrations erupted outside its embassy in Cairo, Saudi Arabia quickly withdrew its ambassador, Ahmed Qattan. But within a week, Riyadh reinstated Qattan and promised a major aid package to Egypt. Contrast that incident with Saudi-Egyptian relations in the 1960s, when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser deployed his country's troops in Yemen to defeat Saudi proxies and used poison gas to do the job. Times have changed¶ The Arab-Israeli conflict, the original driver of Israel's nuclear weapons program, has been reduced to two issues: the core question of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the future of the Golan Heights. Although each problem is vexing, neither is any longer the spark that can ignite region-wide conflict and threaten Israel's very existence. Israel's peace with Egypt may cool even further, but neither of Egypt's presidential candidates calls for abrogating the treaty because the treaty is as much an anchor of Egypt's national security as it is of Israel's.¶ Israeli and Iranian calculations. As Israel considers how best to secure its future, it must choose among three strategic options.¶ Israel can try to extend its nuclear monopoly by attacking or sabotaging the nuclear projects of Iran and perhaps other states down the road. This option, Israel's policy for the past several decades, is becoming increasingly untenable. In the short- to medium-term, bombing carries the risk of retaliation, and the unintended consequence of fueling the nuclear ambitions it is trying to stamp out. And Israel can only bomb what it knows about. But the long-term problem is more profound: Can Israel sustain a policy of militarily preventing nuclear development in a neighborhood of growing interest in nuclear power and a progressive diffusion of technology?¶ Israel's second option -- deterrence -- carries the price of eventually abandoning nuclear ambiguity, since maintaining an active deterrent through periods of crisis and change in Iranian capabilities will require explicit statements and even demonstrations of Israeli capability. Such demonstrations will threaten and provoke Arab states in a way that Israel's nuclear weapons now do not, further raising the costs and risks of deterrence.¶ In light of the above choices, Israel may come to see the third option as the least unpalatable: Entering into negotiations with its neighbors to establish rules for limiting the possession of WMD across the region, eventually putting its own capabilities on the negotiating table. Discussing a WMD-free zone would allow Israel to prolong its nuclear weapons monopoly with the fewest challenges for an interim period, while negotiating the terms of a transition to a nuclear and WMD free Middle East. It can also use a forum on regional arms control as a venue to raise its concerns about proliferation elsewhere in the region.¶ Iran has important security interests in pursuing a WMD-free zone. Tehran has a long-term strategic interest in denuclearizing Israel, and, odious as it might seem to Iran's leaders, direct negotiations with Israel on regional security and a WMD ban are the only way to do that. Iran would find other security benefits from engaging diplomatically on the issue: Regional security discussions can help Iran break out of its isolation. In WMD-free zone discussions, Iran can split the US-Arab coalition against it and focus attention on Israel's nuclear weapons. The creation of a zone -- if it were to occur in the next several years -- would leave Iran far ahead of its Arab neighbors in its nuclear knowledge and experience, preserving an important security hedge, while reducing the incentives for its neighbors to attempt to match its expensive fuel-cycle investment.¶ Wild cards. If the current P5+1 negotiations with Tehran collapse and Israel or the United States attack Iran, then both the political and security justifications for proliferation will be reinforced across the region. Voices within Iran calling for an operational deterrent will gain traction. And similar arguments will reverberate in Riyadh, Cairo, and possibly elsewhere. Failure of the proposal to hold a conference in 2012 on a Middle East WMD-free zone will be the least of concerns.¶ Syria also presents potential problems. In the short-term, having suspended its membership in the Arab League for its violent crackdown on protesters, many Arab states would prefer not to reward the Assad regime with a platform at a conference to discuss weapons of mass destruction. In the long-term, competitive external intervention in a Syrian civil war could help reverse the trends supporting the move toward WMD disarmament. Syrian behavior, together with its chemical weapons stocks, should remind everyone why the discussion of a WMD-free zone and regional security more broadly in the Middle East is urgent. The short-term political costs of Syrian participation are trivial by comparison.¶ Predictions. In capitals across the Middle East, policy makers will soon be pressed for their responses to a proposal to meet in Finland to discuss a regional WMD ban, possibly in December. Though Tehran and Jerusalem will grasp at old arguments to insist that the idea is foolish or unnecessary, a cold, hard look at emerging security interests in the new Middle East will take a bite out of old dogmas. Invitations to Helsinki will bring Israel and Iran to the negotiation table. Undoubtedly, the process will be long and frustrating. But the conventional wisdom will be overturned.

#### No regional war escalation – empirics prove time and time again

Drum 7[Kevin Drum is a political staff writer for the Washington Monthly, 9-9-2007, “The Chaos Hawks”, Washington Monthly, <https://washingtonmonthly.com/2007/09/09/the-chaos-hawks/>]

Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos Hawks nonetheless insist that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave the entire Middle East will become a bloodbath. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe. Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.

### Efforts Fail

#### Not working within the region guarantees instability

Martini, Multifaith Alliance for Syrian Refugees Humanitarian Relief Director, and Heras, Center for a New American Security Middle East Senior Fellow, 18 [Shadi; Nicholas; 5-23-18; Foreign Policy; "The One Place in Syria That Works"; foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/23/the-one-place-in-syria-that-works/; accessed 6-18-18; PAC]v

It is important to emphasize that this is a Syrian-driven process, not directed by the Israelis, and although Israel provides the territorial link for the assistance to flow into Quneitra, it is the Syrians who make everything work on the ground. What is key in this region of Syria is the close coordination between the Syrians operating on the ground themselves once the assistance has safely been distributed from Israel into Quneitra and its surrounding areas. The local Syrians, in the moderate armed opposition and local security forces, civilian organizations, and the local councils, all work relatively effectively together to ensure that assistance is distributed efficiently, and in a way that it does not end up in the hands of extremist actors.

The claim that humanitarian aid is critical to stability isn’t controversial. The failure to exercise soft power, such as humanitarian aid, can leave voids that extremist actors will ultimately fill. In 2013, now-Defense Secretary James Mattis, then the ranking U.S. general in the Middle East, concluded that proposed cuts to the foreign aid budget would simply mean that, “I need to buy more ammunition, ultimately.” He was correct that the failure to help simply risks prolonging and intensifying conflict. The Trump administration should learn from Operation Good Neighbor that stabilization funding — which includes support for organizations such as the “White Helmets” that support local communities with emergency services — should be a vital component of the U.S. strategy toward Syria.

### Iran Spoiler

#### Iran spoils stability in the region – international cooperation is necessary to solve the impact, but the US refuses

Frantzman, Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis Executive Director, 18 [Seth J: 5-31-18; As Iran and Assas move in southern Syria, US and Russia must discuss response"; thehill.com/opinion/international/389951-as-iran-and-assad-move-in-southern-syria-us-and-russia-must-discuss-response; accessed 6-18-18; PAC]

A more serious threat is rising tensions between Israel and Iran. Israel has threatened Assad about the presence of Iranian-backed militias and Iranian bases in Syria. In April, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, said Iran has trained 80,000 fighters in Syria supporting the government. In his May 21 speech at the Heritage Foundation, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Iran launched salvos of rockets at Israel and that the United States supports Israel unequivocally in its defense against Iran.

The question is what Iran’s moves in southern Syria mean for Washington’s broader strategy. Iran wants to stay in Syria when the conflict ends and continue building bases. However, the Syrian government knows it will pay a price for this from Israel, which has vowed not to allow Iran’s encroachment to continue. Russia, the major power backing Assad, has a different agenda than Iran. It has amicable relations with Israel and wants Assad’s government stabilized. That means every Iranian base undermines Russia’s goal.

In the past week, Russia and Israel reportedly have discussed what might happen in southern Syria, and Russia appeared to provide guarantees that no foreign forces would move into areas taken from the rebels. Iran is the wild card in all this. It won’t agree to any deals that involve Israel. Similarly, the Syrian rebels have not agreed to give up territory. This means that southwestern Syria has very real potential to become a tinderbox through one false move by one of the players.

Washington could leverage the fact that Israel, Jordan and Russia have the same agenda — to see stability in southern Syria — to bolster its own interests in reducing Iranian influence in the region. For the past few years, the United States largely has conducted its own policy in eastern Syria while Russia and Turkey have worked through their allies in the rest of Syria.

The United States must find a role that brings it back to the table to discuss the rest of Syria. This is difficult, given the state of its recent relations with Moscow. Israel has found a way to discuss Syrian issues quietly with the Russians, in a way that appears to increase security in southern Syria. Now is the time for Washington and Moscow to recognize that regional stability is important and that managing any regime offensive in southwestern Syria must be done in a way that meets the needs of all involved, including the rebels’ fears of human rights violations by Assad’s regime.

### Lebanese Instability Inevitable

#### Lebanese instability inevitable – debt and governmental tensions are alt causes

Wheatley, Financial Times, 18 [Jonathan; 4-4-18; "Lebanon battling to maintain stability"; https://www.ft.com/content/331697b0-381a-11e8-8b98-2f31af407cc8; accessed 6-18-18; PAC]

Rivalry between competing powers in the Middle East is piling pressure on the economy of Lebanon, already under severe strain from one of the world’s biggest debt burdens and the damage wreaked by the seven-year war in neighbouring Syria.

A conference to be hosted by Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, in Paris on Friday is expected to produce a show of support from European governments and multilateral institutions, concerned about the estimated 1m Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the risk of a further wave of migration to Europe if the situation deteriorates further.

But Lebanon’s traditional supporters in the Gulf are less willing to help than before, analysts say.

“I don’t think it is in anyone’s interests to see more instability in Lebanon,” said Farouk Soussa, chief Middle East economist at Citi. “But if Lebanese instability is the price one has to pay to confront Iran, that’s a price the Gulf countries increasingly believe is worth paying.”

Tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran — backers, respectively, of the Sunni and Shia Arabs who, along with Maronite Christians, dominate Lebanese politics — has come close to toppling the government in Beirut.

Last November, Saad Hariri, the Sunni prime minister — who by convention shares power with a Shia speaker of parliament and a Maronite president — resigned while on a visit to Riyadh, an apparent consequence of Saudi Arabia’s unhappiness with Iran’s perceived rising influence in the country.

Mr Hariri later withdrew his resignation but the shock was a blow to confidence in the economy. The Banque du Liban — whose role stretches far beyond the usual remit of a central bank — has been battling to restore confidence since then.

Lebanon has one of the world’s biggest piles of public debt, equal to about 150 per cent of its GDP. Debt service absorbs almost half of government revenues, making Lebanon’s the biggest debt burden in the world by this measure, according to the World Bank. The IMF expects Lebanon to run a budget deficit equal to 10 per cent of GDP for the foreseeable future, and a current account deficit of more than 20 per cent of GDP.

## Util framing

### Ext - util 1st

#### Categorical appeals to “ethics coming 1st“ are wrong. Utility is net more ethical

Williams ‘5

(Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 174-176)

A **commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism**, of 'self-clarification', and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a 'reflexive principle'. In the wilful Realist vision, **scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just** a more substantial vision of **political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it**. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. **The ethic** of responsibility in wilful Realism **thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits**. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. **Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the 'reality' of contextual conditions and likely outcomes** of action **is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one's views**. The blithe, self-serving, and **uncritical stances of abstract moralism** or rationalist objectivism **avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world 'as it is'. Reducing the world to an expression of their** theoretical models, political platforms, or **ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility**. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable 'object' that is not reducible to one's wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 Objectivity is not a naive naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one's will. **A recognition of the limits imposed by 'reality' is a condition for a recognition of one's own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one's own will. But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings** within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. **Limits upon understanding** provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also **provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the precondition for freedom. The** ultimate **opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities** which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

#### Deontology is violent and doesn’t contextualize to public policy decisionmaking.

#### Woller ‘97

(Gary, Economics Professor at BYU, Policy Currents, June, http://apsapolicysection.org/vol7\_2/72.pdf , p. 11)

At the same time, deontologically based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse. For example, a moral obligation to preserve the environment by no means implies the best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, just as there is no a priori reason to believe that any policy that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. Any number of policies might work, and others, although seemingly consistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That deontological principles are an inadequate basis for environmental policy is evident in the rather significant irony that most forms of deontologically based environmental laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian manner by street-level enforcement officials. Moreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy and their attendant incentive structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at cross purposes to environmental preservation. (There exists an extensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse outcomes of regulatory policy. See, for example, Ackerman, 1981; Bartrip and Fenn, 1983; Hawkins, 1983, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984.) Even the most die-hard preservationist/deontologist would, I believe, be troubled by this outcome. The above points are perhaps best expressed by Richard Flathman, The number of values typically involved in public policy decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above all, the scope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so conclusively that they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case that only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest (1958, p. 12). It therefore follows that in a democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives and the problems they address, and the public must be reasonably assured that a policy will actually do something about an existing problem; this requires the means-end language and methodology of utilitarian ethics. Good intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient, though perhaps at times a necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy.

#### Ethical obligations are tautological- the only coherent rubric is to maximize lives

Greene ‘10

Joshua Greene, Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University, 10, “Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”, [www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf](http://www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is anyrationallycoherentnormativemoral theory that can accommodateourmoral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstoodwhatKant and like-minded deontologistsare all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are notdistinctivelydeontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people asmereobjects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-beingin the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. Some will betautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about thembecause they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

#### Even ethical frameworks would conclude we should prevent existential risks

Bostrom ‘11

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We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. … Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or average) quality of life of a population-at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it, in Adams’ view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is plausible, that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.[24] We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25] We might also consider the issue from a less theoretical standpoint and try to form an evaluation instead by considering analogous cases about which we have definite moral intuitions. Thus, for example, if we feel confident that committing a small genocide is wrong, and that committing a large genocide is no less wrong, we might conjecture that committing omnicide is also wrong.[26] And if we believe we have some moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a small number of people, and a stronger moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a larger number of people, we might conjecture that we have an even stronger moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire human population.

### Ext - util impact outweighs

#### Extinction outweighs moral norms

Bostrom ‘2

Existential Risks, Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards, Nick Bostrom, Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, Published in the Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002) http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html

The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: · Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. · We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. · Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. · If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16].

### AT - “No Value To Life”

#### There’s inherent value to living.

Coontz’1

Phyllis D. Coontz, PhD Graduate School of Public and International Affairs University of Pittsburgh, et al, JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING, 2001, 18(4), 235-246 – J-Stor

In the 1950s, psychiatrist and theorist Viktor Frankl (1963) described an existential theory of purpose and meaning in life. Frankl, a long-time prisoner in a concentration camp, re- lated several instances of transcendent states that he experienced in the midst of that terri- ble suffering using his own experiences and observations. He believed that these experi- ences allowed him and others to maintain their sense of dignity and self-worth. Frankl (1969) claimed that transcendence occurs by giving to others, being open to others and the environment, and coming to accept the reality that some situations are un- changeable. He hypothesized that life always has meaning for the individual; a person can always decide how to face adversity. Therefore, self-transcendence provides mean- ing and enables the discovery of meaning for a person (Frankl, 1963). Expanding Frankl's work, Reed (1991b) linked self-transcendence with mental health. Through a developmental process individuals gain an increasing understanding of who they are and are able to move out beyond themselves despite the fact that they are ex- periencing physical and mental pain. This expansion beyond the self occurs through in- trospection, concern about others and their well-being, and integration of the past and fu- ture to strengthen one's present life (Reed, 1991b).

#### Death outweighs value to life claims- there is nothing to assign value if we are all dead

Wapner ‘3

Leftist Criticism of "Nature": Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age, Wapner, Paul, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Dissent50.1 (Winter 2003): 71, http://search.proquest.com.mutex.gmu.edu/altpresswatch/docview/227259976/365B5D1D0A1A4369PQ/1?accountid=14541

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions--except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world--in all its diverse embodiments--must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

#### Preventing death is the first ethical priority- it’s the only impact you can’t recover from.

Bauman ‘95

Zygmunt Bauman, University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71

The being‑for is like living towards‑the‑future: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other,as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The self stretches towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching‑toward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not‑yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly an‑other Other, that life can be lived ‑ not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all‑too‑familiar unsure‑of‑itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' ‑ both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of *being fu filled,* but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its *unfu filment.* One may say that the paradox *of hope* (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being‑for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self‑defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a *mystery.* And being‑for‑the‑Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view ‑ makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place ‑ but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being‑for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is *unspoken,* the responsibility undertaken is *unconditional;* it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery ‑ noted Max Frisch ‑ (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed ‑ soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to the musical‑chairs game of the real and the potential ‑ it once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly open and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the *must* of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of being‑for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition ‑ an end to itself. Without knowing ‑ without being capable of knowing ‑ that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness ( the being‑for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre‑empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place. The togetherness of being‑for is always in the future, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The being‑for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted. This is the tragedy of being‑for ‑ the reason why it cannot but be death‑bound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love. The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end, and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. Morality, like the future itself, is forever not‑yet. (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being‑with) that we turn into moral selves. And it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally, and sometimes even of being good, in the present.

## AT: Solvency

### 1NC – U.S. Not Key

#### US has never led the fight for refugee’s – global leadership is dead and impossible at this point

Bouie 2015 [Jamelle Bouie is Slate’s chief political correspondent, 11-17-2015, "We Are a Nation of Immigrants and Refugees. And We Always Fear Who Is Coming Next.," Slate Magazine, [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/history/2015/11/america\_s\_long\_tradition\_of\_fearing\_refugees\_the\_united\_states\_ has\_always.html //](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2015/11/america_s_long_tradition_of_fearing_refugees_the_united_states_%20has_always.html%20//) wyo-rrt]

For many liberals at least, it’s tempting to embrace the former as “American values” and dismiss the latter as all-too-typical pandering to our fears and public opinion. When 52 percent of Americans believe Syrian refugees will make the country less safe, it’s easy to demagogue against their entry. But this is self-deception, albeit a well-meaning one. If our history shows anything, it’s this: The United States is a nation that fears immigrants and refugees as much as it’s a nation of immigrants and refugees. In 1848, Europe saw turmoil. On the continent, democratic and nationalist uprisings swept through France, Germany, and its neighbors, as reformists joined with middle- and working-class agitators to overturn monarchy and despotism. They won a few victories, but the reactionaries weren’t weak—in short order, forces led by Prussia and the Habsburgs in Vienna would crush the revolts and scatter these liberal movements to the winds. Meanwhile, in Ireland, a blight destroyed the potato crop and threatened millions with starvation, as British officials refused to help or intervene. Both events sparked mass migrations to the United States, as hundreds of thousands of Germans and Irish left their homes to escape political persecution, conflict, and famine. They followed a decade of similar but more modest immigration, stretching back to the 1830s, when the first major waves of German and Irish immigrants reached American shores. The Americans who met them were conflicted. On one hand, they believed in the Christian universalism, democratic equality, and its attendant faith in assimilation—the conviction, writes late historian John Higham in Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925, “that this new land would bring unity out of diversity as a matter of course.” On the other, however, these migrants were alien, possessed of a religion—Catholicism—that seemed incompatible, if not hostile, to republican government. More than 3 million people came to American shores in the decade after 1845—the greatest increase in our history, relative to the overall population—and they exerted an immediate impact on American life and institutions, transforming cities across the Northeast and bringing a new wave of aggressive nativism, culminating in the anti-immigrant “Know-Nothing” movement, which spawned a political party. Its platform? “Repeal of all naturalization laws … War to the hilt, on political Romanism … Hostility to all Papal influences, when brought to bear against the Republic … The sending back of all foreign paupers.” The Know-Nothings burned hot—affiliated candidates swept several state legislatures in the 1854 elections—and quickly died out. By the end of the decade, sectional conflict over slavery had overcome immigration as the central issue of American politics. In the South, the Know-Nothing “American Party” dissolved in the face of Democratic dominance, and in the North, anti-slavery Know-Nothings were pulled into the nascent Republican Party. Despite the end of the Know-Nothings, nativism persisted in national life, as part of the deep ambivalence and fear Americans have felt towards migrants, immigrants, and refugees of various stripes. You saw it in violent form, for example, during the waves of Chinese immigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when Chinese immigrants faced exclusion, discrimination, and outright pogroms from mobs of angry, resentful European Americans (some, no doubt, descended from Irish and German immigrants). You saw it in the late 1930s, when Americans faced Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany, and had to choose: Would we take the victims of Hitler’s anti-Semitism, or reject them? On the question of refugee children, at least, Americans said no: 67 percent opposed taking in 10,000 refugee children from Germany, according to a 1939 poll from Gallup. They were similarly unmoved by earlier groups of Jewish refugees, and their fears evoked the anxieties of their predecessors in 1848 and beyond. Americans, and their counterparts in Western Europe, feared foreign influence and dangerous ideologies like communism and anarchism. (Just a few decades earlier, in the living memory of many adults at the time, an anarchist killed an American president.) Again and again, when faced with the question of refugees and immigrants, Americans are ambivalent and sometimes hostile. In 1975, for example, 62 percent said they feared Vietnamese refugees would take their jobs. Four years later, just as many said they didn’t want to admit “boat people” from Vietnam, who were fleeing the country’s repressive communist government. Americans said the same for Cuban refugees in the 1980s, Haitians in the 1990s, and most recently, the wave of refugee children from South America, which brought protests and fears of disease and infection. You can even apply this dynamic to the Great Migration, the huge movement of black Americans from the South to cities and towns across the country. These Americans were internal refugees, fleeing lawlessness and racist terrorism. When they reached their destinations—cities like Detroit and Chicago—they faced deep hostility from existing residents, who blamed them for crime and economic disadvantage. The broad point—the reason to focus on the these patterns of hostility—is to emphasize the extent to which they are part of the American tradition. In calling for acceptance of Syrian refugees, President Obama, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, the Conference of Catholic Bishops, and others are voicing one set of American values—the ones we want to hold ourselves to. But the same goes for Sen. Ted Cruz, Gov. Greg Abbott, and the other Republican governors and presidential candidates who want to reject them—those too are American values.

### 1NC – No Economic Infrastructure

#### Integration infrastructure is weak

Reynolds 2017 [Oliver Reynolds, leading economist at Focuseconomics, "Bounty or burden? The impact of refugees on European economies is far from clear," FocusEconomics Economic Forecasts from the World's Leading Economists, 21 August 2017, [https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/impact-of-refugees-on-european-economies //](https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/impact-of-refugees-on-european-economies%20//) wyo-rrt]

The economic impact is likely to be slightly positive in the short-term. All the refugees arriving in the European Union need to be housed and fed. Their medical needs must be addressed, and both children and adults have to be educated in preparation for entry into local labor markets. Before they are ready to work, financial support is also necessary. The ensuing boost to government spending and fiscal transfers will give domestic demand a shot in the arm. According to estimates from the IMF, by the end of 2017 GDP in Austria, Germany and Sweden—three countries which have received large numbers of refugees per capita—will have been boosted by 0.5%, 0.3% and 0.4%, respectively. In Germany, by far the largest recipient in absolute terms, refugee-related expenditure amounted to more than EUR 20 billion last year. In the longer term, the picture becomes far murkier. This isn’t just because little is known about the current cohort of refugees, such as their average level of education or how long they will remain in their host countries. It is also because the long-term economic impact of refugees rests largely on how successful countries are at weaving them into the economic fabric of their societies. The more refugees who find jobs, and the better paid these jobs are, the greater the positive impact on labor supply, the public coffers and economic growth. Upon arrival, however, asylum seekers face myriad problems which hinder their integration into the labor market. Many find that the qualifications they held in their home countries are no longer recognized, and even those who hold valid qualifications are faced with a language barrier; the vast majority of the refugees who have reached the European Union in the last few years lack basic competence in their host country’s language. The process of applying for and being granted asylum is also a protracted one, often lasting around six months. In some European nations, it is even longer, as the sudden influx of refugees has led to a huge backlog of unprocessed claims. In many countries, asylum seekers are not normally allowed to work while their claims are being processed, increasing the risks of demotivation and deskilling. Even in Germany, which is known for the efficiency of its bureaucracy and labor market, only around 500,000 of the 1.2 million refugees had completed the first stages of the integration process and signed up as job seekers by March 2017. Of these refugees, a mere 12% had found employment. If past experience is anything to go by, the full economic integration of refugees will prove an arduous task. Studies from many developed countries have repeatedly shown that refugees tend to earn less, have worse employment prospects and hold lower occupational status than native workers or economic migrants. Even in Sweden, a country with a relatively strong track record of integrating refugees, a study of those arriving between 1997 and 2010 found that fewer than 20% had found employment after one year. Ten years down the line, only between 50% and 60% were working, significantly below the corresponding figure for Swedish natives. However, there is much that nations can do to help refugees integrate more seamlessly into society. For instance, Germany’s integration law, which was approved by its parliament in 2016, provides culture and languages classes for newcomers. This policy is similar to Sweden’s longer-standing introduction program, which includes an interview with the Public Employment Service (PES) in order to create a tailored action plan for each refugee, and provides personalized training, employment assistance, and financial and housing support. Special measures in the labor market could also be considered, in order to overcome any initial jitters employers may have about hiring refugees. Wage subsidies for firms who hire refugees have proven effective in several Nordic countries. The experience of refugees in the Netherlands has shown that work at temporary agencies can be another useful stepping stone, helping new arrivals adjust to labor market conditions. Enabling asylum seekers to hit the ground running and apply for jobs upon arrival, provided certain conditions are met, would also help; this is currently the case in Sweden, for example. Policies which boost the labor market participation rate more generally will likely have an outsized effect on refugees. Improving the geographical mobility of migrants, making labor markets suppler and thus more adaptable to tumultuous technological change, and avoiding welfare traps due to an overlap between the benefit system and the tax system would all help refugees get their foot on the employment ladder.

### 1NC – Several Problems

#### Influx of refugees creates a litany of constraints and issues for host countries

Shellito 2016 [Kevin Shellito, University of Pennsylvannia, 2016 "The Economic Effect of Refugee Crises on Host Countries and Implications for the Lebanese Case," *Joseph Wharton Scholars*, https:// repository .upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=joseph\_wharton\_scholars // wyo-rrt]

Refugee crises may also bring negative economic consequences. Although this view is commonly heard in political punditry, existing academic literature has also identified many mechanisms in which these consequences occur, three of which are discussed below. First, refugees can strain the services systems of host countries. These strains occur in the task of processing and receiving refugees as well as integrating them into the host country. Examples of expenses include housing, healthcare, education, food, water, and utilities (Aiyar et al. 2016). Understandably, the quality of a specific service may go down as it becomes strained to accommodate more people. For example, in Turkey, increases in Syrian refugees have been associated with declines in quality of education and healthcare services (Goksel and Ozturkler 2015). Similarly, in Europe, the IMF estimates that refugees will cost EU countries nearly 0.1 percent of GDP on average (Aiyar et al. 2016). The heavy amount of literature (on the 1990s Balkan crisis, for example) that discusses “burden-sharing”—the cooperative process of one state taking responsibility for refugees that would usually fall under the purview of a different, but currently resource-strained, state—also suggests that this public service strain is a serious and relevant concern. (Suhrke 1998; Shimizu and Sandler 2002; Hartley and Sandler 1999; Barutciski and Suhrke 2001). Similarly, in today’s crisis, those countries facing the largest strain 17 from refugees (for example, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon) have called upon the international community for more support and diffusion of financial responsibility (Lowe 2016; “In Jordan…” 2015). And while this paper earlier highlighted that some public expenditures may strengthen the long-term infrastructure of a country, this does not come without the short-term cost, namely increased taxation to pay for the project as well as the opportunity cost of foregoing other potential investment opportunities (Zetter 2012). Second, and related to strained services, is the issue of overcrowding in the host nation. When hundreds of thousands of refugees arrive in a concentrated area, disease can quickly break out (Caldwell 2015). The UN has reported that overcrowding has turned refugee camps—in South Sudan, for example—from a welcoming refuge to a squalid encampment teeming with outbreaks of Hepatitis, cholera, malaria, and jaundice (Sinha 2012). This has immediate negative economic effects, but can also have long-term economic effects by negatively impacting maternal and early childhood health (Baez 2011). In line with this idea of a lack of physical space, refugees may also crowd out natives in local economic markets—from food to housing—and distort prices (Hatton and Williamson 2003). Turkey, for example, has seen dramatic increases in rental prices for housing as a result of the refugee crisis (Orhan and Gundogar 2015). In some cases, unscrupulous—but opportunistic—landlords have kicked out lower income Turkish tenants in favor of Syrians, many of which may have a higher willingness and capacity to pay (Orhan and Gundogar 2015). Additionally, while the aforementioned study of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi in Tanzania showed that an increase in food prices benefitted local producers, it hurt local net-consumers of food, often requiring them to rely heavily on food aid from organizations such as the UN World Food Programme (Alix-Garcia & Saah 2010). 18 Further, overcrowding can lead to environmental degradation, which has become a serious concern in areas faced with a large influx of refugees. The UNHCR concedes that refugee-affected areas may face increased issues of “deforestation, soil erosion, pollution, and depletion of water resources” (“Refugees and the Environment” 2001). Jayna Smith notes that these environmental consequences also have spillover effects, stating that “In a refugee situation, excessive damage to the environment not only causes deterioration of refugees' welfare but also leads to competition with local communities over scarce resources” (Smith). This idea of competition can lead to a toxic “us against them” mentality, which is the kind of social strife that the next paragraph of this paper seeks to address. A third concerning implication for refugee crises is the disruptive negative economic impact that can emerge as a result of societal strife and potential civil conflict. On a broader level, refugees may increase the potential for internal conflict and war in the host nation (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). For example, in the Horn of Africa, famine-driven refugee crises have often led to conflicting tribal and ethnic groups confined to a small geographic area (Salehyan 2008; Bakewell 2007; De Largy 1990). On a smaller scale than all-out war, refugees can create social tensions, especially in cases where the refugees have distinct religious, political, or ethnic identities from the citizens of the host country (Tornkvsit 2015). This has been seen most recently in Sweden—a fairly homogeneous nation—through the torching of refugee shelters (Traub 2016). Aside from the refugee-native dynamic, societal strife grow between factions of the native population over how to deal with the refugees. This can most recently be seen in the case of the European Union, where countries like Sweden and Germany have adhered to more of an open door policy, while some, like Hungary, have completely closed off their borders (Traub 19 2016). This has resulted in a lack of burden-sharing that has frustrated the more open countries. In the process, these countries have violated the multilateral Schengen Agreement for a “borderless” Europe, potentially undermining the very credibility of the European Union as a unified institution (Traub 2016). As a perennially divisive issue, refugee crises are liable to cause this kind of social strife no matter where they occur. Even in countries where the refugees have roughly similar (vis-à-vis the above Sweden example) identities to the citizens of the host country, resentment, and sometimes even violence, may still surface among the natives. For example, Peshawar, a Pakistani city located near the border with Afghanistan, is home to thousands of Afghan refugees. Fleeing the Soviets, the Taliban, and the American war, these refugees have settled in nearby Pakistan. However, despite the close geographic proximity, shared languages, and similar religious backgrounds, Afghan refugees have been subject to police brutality, discrimination, and lack of access to basic medical resources. They’ve also faced backlash and blame for Taliban attacks, such as the 2014 shooting at a Peshawar school that killed over 130 schoolchildren (Abid 2015; Saifi and Botehlo 2014). This potential for—and realization of—conflict and hostility can destabilize a host country and prevent meaningful economic development from gaining any traction: the World Bank estimates that any kind of extended civil conflict can deprive a developing country of up to the equivalent of 30 years of GDP growth (World Development Report 2011)

#### Refugee’s bear a large cost on U.S. tax payers – status squo humanitarian aid is a better option and helps more than just a few

Krikorian 2015 [Mark Krikorian is a nationally recognized expert on immigration issues and has served as the Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies since 1995, 11-18-2015, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Impact on the Security of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program”, Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), [https://cis.org/Testimony/Syrian-Refugee-Crisis-and-Its-Impact-Security-US-Refugee-Admissions-Program //](https://cis.org/Testimony/Syrian-Refugee-Crisis-and-Its-Impact-Security-US-Refugee-Admissions-Program%20//) wyo-rrt]

In addition to the security threats that refugee resettlement poses, any effort to extend humanitarian assistance to refugees must consider how effective it will be. This question also has two facets. A) More can be helped abroad. Bringing refugees into our country makes us feel good about ourselves. Newspapers run heart-warming stories of overcoming adversity; churches embrace the objects of their charity; politicians wax nostalgic about their grandparents. But the goal of refugee assistance is not to make us feel good. It is to assist as many people as possible with the resources available. And resettling a relative handful of them here to help us bask in our own righteousness means we are sacrificing the much larger number who could have been helped with the same resources. The difference in cost is enormous. The Center for Immigration Studies has calculated that it costs 12 times as much to resettle a refugee in the United States as it does to care for the same refugee in the neighboring countries of first asylum, namely Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.11 The five-year cost to American taxpayers of resettling a single Middle Eastern refugee in the United States is conservatively estimated to be more than $64,000, compared with U.N. figures that indicate it costs about $5,300 to provide for that same refugee for five years in his native region. In other words, each refugee we bring to the United States means that 11 others are not being helped with that money. Faced with 12 drowning people, only a monster would send them a luxurious one-man boat rather than 12 life jackets. And yet, with the best of intentions, that is exactly what we are doing when we choose one lucky winner to resettle here. Some will object that we can do both – relocate some refugees here and care for others in their native region. But money is not infinite. Every dollar the government spends is borrowed and will have to be paid back by our grandchildren. What's more, the U.N. estimates that there are 60 million refugees and internally displaced people around the world. Clearly, whatever amount we allocate to refugee protection will provide for only a fraction of the people in need. Given these limitations on resources, I submit that it is wrong — morally wrong — to use those resources to resettle one refugee here when we could help 12 closer to their home. There is little we can do to minimize the costs of resettling refugees. True, the private contractors the State Department pays to oversee the process are making a good living off of refugee resettlement, but reining them in won't make much difference. Most of the costs come from social services; according to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, more than 90 percent of refugees from the Middle East receive food stamps and nearly three-quarters are on Medicaid or some other taxpayer-funded health care. This dependence on taxpayer handouts should come as no surprise. Refugees arrive destitute and often traumatized. They have little education (those from the Middle East have an average of only 10.5 years of schooling), which means that even if they find work, it will pay little. And because they're poor – almost all have incomes only slightly above the poverty line – they pay little in taxes. Of course, we don't resettle refugees for economic reasons but for humanitarian ones. And since the goal is humanitarian, a wise steward must use his resources so that they generate the greatest humanitarian return. It's also true that refugees brought here will live better than those even in well-run refugee camps in the region. But the goal of refugee protection is to provide people adequate succor until they can return home, not maximize opportunity for a select few.

# \*\*\*NEG OFFCASE

## Immigration court clog DA

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#### Backlog being reduced now, but the system is fragile

Quesenberry 18

1-8-18 RAVEN QUESENBERRY for the Bipartisan Policy Center. “Slamming the Gavel on the Immigration Case Backlog” https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/slamming-the-gavel-on-the-immigration-case-backlog/

The Department of Homeland Security has recently released data on its immigration enforcement efforts during fiscal year (FY) 2017, noting a significant increase in the number of arrests of undocumented immigrants in the interior of the United States. However, the total number of deportations has not increased as much. In fact, the total number of pending cases in immigration courts nationwide has increased steadily since 2006, in a judicial backlog that immigration advocates and enforcement hawks alike agree is an inefficient system. In November 2017, the backlog ticked up to 650,411 pending immigration cases, a number which has increased nearly 25 percent in this fiscal year alone, and tripled since former President Barack Obama took office in 2009. As a result, the average number of days a case must currently wait to be heard is 691 days, although in several states such as Colorado and Illinois the waiting period to receive a final ruling is closer to 3 years. At this rate, the average immigration judge has a caseload of about 1,900 cases per year. For comparison, the average caseload of district court judges is around 440 cases per year. Although the Department of Justice has increased its hiring this year, growing the corps of immigration judges to approximately 330, officials have indicated that it would take nearly 700 total judges before witnessing a significant shift in the number of pending cases. In demonstrating its efforts to “slash the backlog,” the DOJ has cited a 16 percent increase in efficiency of final decisions since FY2016. In a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Jeff Sessions claimed that in the last 2 or 3 months, DOJ has “almost” not added to the immigration court backlog, and that by January 2018 the department will be reducing the backlog. Despite these advances, to effectively reduce and manage its pending cases, the immigration court system must undergo much greater reform than simply hiring additional immigration judges. To address this ~~crippling~~ backlog, DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has outlined a series of initiatives for FY2018. These include initial pilot testing of the long-awaited electronic filing and adjudicating system, expanding the efforts of the Fraud and Abuse Prevention Program under a new fraud attorney and investigator to eliminate frivolous and fraudulent cases, hiring additional field supervisors to improve oversight and communication, establishing an EOIR Office of Policy, and introducing a streamlined hiring process which is expected to bring in 61 new immigration judges in early 2018. The Trump administration has also proposed establishing performance metrics and numerical quotas for immigration judges as part of its larger immigration reforms. Despite backlash from both the advocacy community and the National Association of Immigration Judges claiming that these proposals threaten judicial independence, EOIR has not commented on reports that they would be imposing case-completion quotas on judges. In a November 2017 congressional hearing before the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, Acting EOIR Director James McHenry did not reject claims that the EOIR would be using numerical and time-based quotas to assess immigration judges’ performance. Democratic members of the subcommittee pressed McHenry on the controversial nature of these completion quotas, arguing they would further exacerbate the challenges judges face in deciding more difficult cases. McHenry defended EOIR’s right to do so by referring to the quotas set by the Immigration Nationality Act as well as standards set by the Government Performance and Results Act in assessing the efficient completion of court rulings. He also affirmed that EOIR was “looking into” implementing numerical metrics for individual judges’ performance with unions like the National Association of Immigration Judges. In the weeks after the subcommittee hearing, Sessions issued a memo publicly affirming the DOJ’s emphasis on increased productivity. The memo criticized unnecessary delays in case rulings, and encouraged EOIR personnel to prioritize “timely and efficient adjudication of immigration cases.”

#### Increasing asylum applications overwhelm immigration courts, creates massive backlog.

Andrew Becker / June 4, 2017 Reveal “Nearly 600,000 immigration cases clog courts, study finds” <https://www.revealnews.org/blog/nearly-600000-immigration-cases-clog-courts-study-finds/> Becker's reporting has appeared in The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, Newsweek/The Daily Beast and on National Public Radio and PBS/FRONTLINE, among others. He received a master's degree in journalism from UC Berkeley. Becker is based in Reveal's Emeryville, California, office. (JM)

Racked with a backlog approaching 600,000 cases, the nation’s 58 immigration courts over the last decade have taken longer to rule on deportations, asylum claims and other matters despite hiring more judges and more than doubling their annual budget, according to a new Government Accountability Office report. Government auditors said that the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review, which oversees the immigration court system, has been plagued by inefficiencies, its own foot-dragging in hiring new judges and an increasingly complex and changing legal landscape spurred by recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions and lawsuits brought by immigrants facing deportation. Between 2006 and 2015 the court system’s caseload more than doubled, growing steadily each year under the Obama administration, while judges completed nearly one-third fewer cases, the report states. The study was conducted at the request of congressional Republicans and Democrats. That spells bad news for President Donald Trump as he pushes his central political agenda to crack down on illegal immigration and beef up border security. The report underscores that the already bogged-down immigration courts could become a major obstacle to his objective of removing 2 million to 3 million people from the country. But the good news for immigrants is that judges are ordering deportation for a smaller percentage of immigrants, down to 52 percent in 2015 compared to 77 percent in 2006. Judges are also more frequently ending cases, or ruling in an immigrant’s favor. Overall, judges now decide fewer cases based on the actual merits of arguments than they did a decade ago. Despite smaller individual caseloads for judges, immigration hearings are being scheduled years into the future, including five years out in at least one court, according to the report. Such delays also put a strain on immigrants’ legal rights by making it more difficult to produce witnesses or documents in their defense, potentially jeopardizing their legitimate claims to avoid deportation. Sometimes people who may have had a good claim against deportation lost their eligibility over time because their circumstances changed, the report states. In other instances, immigrants who don’t have a solid argument to stay in the country avoid deportation longer because their hearings are delayed. “The effects of the case backlog are significant and wide-ranging, from some respondents waiting years to have their cases heard to immigration judges being able to spend less time considering cases,” the report concludes, adding that technology could help the court tackle the backlog. A surge of unaccompanied children arriving at the border starting in 2014 has also exacerbated the challenges faced by immigration judges. Those cases, which usually take longer because of different legal options, are given priority over matters that may be resolved faster. The median number of days to complete a deportation case, accounting for nearly all of the court system’s caseload between 2006 and 2015, grew 700 percent from 42 days to 336 days. Auditors concluded that those delays are also due to judges delaying decisions more by continuing cases. Continuances are grouped into about 70 different categories, including more time needed because of illness of an immigrant, their witness or attorney, delays in background investigations or security checks, and insufficient time to complete a hearing. While apprehensions of border jumpers have ebbed to their lowest point in decades, immigration enforcement jumped 37.6 percent in the first 100 days of the Trump administration compared to the same time period a year before, according to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Deportations, however, were down about 12 percent. Although the Trump administration has called for hiring dozens of additional judges, the mounting caseload could be further intensified by a wave of judges retiring. Almost 40 percent of immigration judges are now eligible for retirement. The office’s budget is about $440 million for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, up from $199 million in 2005. The study also explored the question of whether an independent immigration court could better handle deportation cases, appeals, immigration-related discrimination complaints and other matters than the current system run by the Justice Department. The association that represents immigration judges for years has advocated for such independence, but has not persuaded a federal judicial panel to make the change. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who earlier this year directed prosecutors to prioritize immigration offenses for prosecution, announced recently the appointment of an acting director to take over the 1,000-person immigration office. James McHenry, who had served as deputy associate attorney general with a focus on immigration litigation, replaces Juan Osuna, who ran the office for much of the Obama administration.

#### Clogged courts forces waiting immigrants into detention centers indefinitely, regardless of their innocence/legitimacy

Jonathan Blitzer June 20, 2017 The New Yorker, “What Will Trump Do with Half a Million Backlogged Immigration Cases?” <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-will-trump-do-with-half-a-million-backlogged-immigration-cases> Jonathan Blitzer is a staff writer at The New Yorker. He won a 2017 National Award for Education Reporting for “American Studies,” a story about an underground school for undocumented immigrants. He has twice been a finalist for a Livingston Award. (JM)

In April, Attorney General Jeff Sessions travelled to Nogales, Arizona, to make an announcement. “This is the Trump era,” he said. “The lawlessness, the abdication of the duty to enforce our immigrations laws, and the catch-and-release practices of old are over.” While his tone was harsh, and many of the proposals he outlined were hostile to immigrants, he detailed one idea that even some of his critics support: the hiring of more immigration judges. U.S. immigration courts are facing a backlog of over half a million cases—and each one, on average, takes almost two years to close. These delays mean that everyone from asylum seekers to green-card holders faces extended stays in detention while awaiting rulings. Speaking about the problem, one immigration judge recently told the Times, “The courts as a whole lose credibility.” Much of the backlog can be traced back to the Obama Administration, when spending on immigration enforcement went up, while Congress dramatically limited funds for hiring more judges. The number of pending cases grew from a hundred and sixty-seven thousand, in 2008, to five hundred and sixty thousand, in 2017, according to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. The broader trend, though, goes back farther. Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, in 2002, the increase in resources allocated for border security and immigration policing has always significantly outpaced funding for the courts. (Immigration courts are part of the Department of Justice.) As more and more people have been arrested, detained, and ordered deported, the courts have remained understaffed and underfunded. “We’ve always been an afterthought,” Dana Leigh Marks, the president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, told me. Roughly three hundred judges nationwide are responsible for the entire immigration caseload, and hiring is slow—filling a vacancy typically takes about two years, according to the Government Accountability Office. In Nogales, Sessions said that he would try to streamline the hiring process. But until that happens the Administration has been relocating judges to areas where they’re deemed most necessary. “We have already surged twenty-five immigration judges to detention centers along the border,” Sessions said, as if talking about military troop levels. Since March, New York City, for example, has had at least eight of its twenty-nine immigration judges reassigned, at least temporarily, to Texas and Louisiana, WNYC has reported. But in relocating them the federal government is exacerbating the city’s own significant backlog: roughly eighty thousand pending cases and an average delay of six hundred and twenty-five days per case. “Letting political forces impact the courts’ docketing strategy disrupts our system,” Marks said. “The temporary assignments to the border courts have been extremely problematic. There’s no one to backfill those slots.” The situation reminded her of a move made by the Obama Administration in 2014, when tens of thousands of unaccompanied children showed up at the U.S. border seeking asylum. The Department of Justice sent immigration judges to the border states to handle the sudden spike in cases, leaving their home states in the lurch. “We cleared the desks,” Marks said. “We pushed back cases that were ready to be heard, and we heard cases that weren’t ready to be brought to completion. There’s only so fast you can go and still allow due process.” The Trump Administration’s significant enforcement push is putting another sudden strain on the system. So far this year, federal immigration authorities have made forty per cent more arrests than they did at an equivalent point in 2016, and the Department of Homeland Security has eliminated all the guidelines for how Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ice) is supposed to prioritize the people it targets for arrest. “The largest federal law-enforcement agency in the country, which is seeking more funding and less accountability, is given carte blanche to go after who it wants,” Avideh Moussavian, a lawyer at the National Immigration Law Center, said of ice and Customs and Border Protection. “It’s creating this ballooning problem of subjecting so many more people to detention, with no interest from the federal government in providing resources to insure that they have fair proceedings.” Immigration proceedings are civil matters rather than criminal ones, so the protections generally afforded to criminal defendants don’t apply to individuals with cases before immigration judges. If a defendant wins in a criminal case, the government can’t appeal. Nor can authorities hold a person in prison after an exonerating ruling. In immigration court, however, ice can appeal if a judge decides to close a case, and often an individual will remain in detention while that process runs its course. The Supreme Court is currently weighing a case in which a large class of litigants are seeking mandatory bond hearings every six months for anyone in immigrant detention. As it stands now, individuals are held indefinitely while they wait for a judge to rule on their situation, whether it’s an asylum claim or a contested deportation order. (Being detained doesn’t mean their cases are weak; according to Justice Department figures, roughly twenty per cent of all deportation cases resolved in 2016—some twenty thousand cases—ended in the immigrants’ favor, with the deportation orders being dropped.) In immigration cases, Anthony Enriquez, a lawyer with the Immigrant Defense Project, told me, people “wear the same jumpsuits as criminal defendants. They’re put in the same cells. Still, they don’t have the same protections.” Earlier this month, in the Bronx, I met Christian Yarleque, a forty-seven-year-old lawful permanent resident who came to the U.S. from Peru three decades ago, when he was fourteen. In 2008, he was arrested for drug possession, a misdemeanor, and he served six months in jail. One morning, seven years after his release, ice agents showed up at his apartment, in the Bronx, with a deportation order. He let the agents inside because they told him they were with the police. “They deceived me,” he said. When they arrested him, he told them that he’d already served his time. “Not with us,” they responded. (An ice spokesperson told me, “ice deportation officers will identify themselves appropriately on each arrest.”) After three and a half months in detention, an immigration judge heard the case and decided to close it, effectively quashing ice’s order of deportation. ice decided to mount an appeal. Because of the court backlog, it took more than a year before another judge ruled on the appeal, and though the judge set bond, it was well beyond what Yarleque could afford to pay. During that time, Yarleque remained in a detention center, in Newark, while his family struggled—he had been the family’s primary breadwinner. Each week, his wife came to visit him, bringing him money for food and phone time, so that he could speak to his kids regularly. On Tuesdays, ice officers came to meet with inmates who were considering accepting a deportation order just to escape detention. “I thought about throwing in the towel at one point,” he said. “I had no idea when I’d be able to get out.” Yarleque was comparatively fortunate: through a program called the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, he had a lawyer. Most immigrants in detention across the country don’t. One study, done by an appellate judge, in 2011, found that roughly twenty per cent of immigrant detainees with lawyers won their cases, compared to just three per cent of immigrant detainees without lawyers. In April, after almost two years in detention, Yarleque won his appeal, and the judge ordered ice to drop the case. He was released, and is now back in the Bronx with his family; soon he’ll begin a new job, as a janitor at a local hospital. He can start work just as soon as D.H.S. returns his green card. When I asked him when that would be, he turned to his lawyer, who had joined us for the conversation. “It’s hard to know,” he said. “There are bureaucratic delays.”

#### Privately run, for-profit detention centers present deplorable conditions for immigrants awaiting trial by utilizing opaque fraudulent contracts issued by ICE – turns case

Robin Urevich June 28, 2018 Capital and Main, “The Rise and Fall of an Immigration Detention Empire” <https://capitalandmain.com/the-rise-and-fall-of-an-immigration-detention-empire-0628> Robin Urevich is a journalist and radio reporter whose work has appeared on NPR, Marketplace, the San Francisco Chronicle and the Las Vegas Sun. (JM)

In 2016 two immigrant detainees died after receiving care at facilities run by Emerald Correctional Management, a small Louisiana-based for-profit prison firm that at the time managed detention centers for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. A Russian asylum seeker, 46-year old Igor Zyazin, died of a heart attack several days after medical staff at Emerald’s San Luis Regional Detention Facility near Yuma, Arizona failed to adequately treat his severe chest pain. (See “Could an Undocumented Russian’s Life Have Been Saved?”) Olubunmi Joshua, 54, passed away after enduring eight months of medical errors and treatment delays at the Rolling Plains Detention Center in Haskell, Texas. (See “Anatomy of an ICE Death.”) Emerald operated three ICE detention centers and a county jail before going out of business in early 2017. A Capital & Main investigation has found Emerald took in millions of government dollars as it skimped on essential expenses and damaged detainees, its own employees and, likely, taxpayers while ICE officials looked the other way. Like other for-profit prison companies, Emerald did business with ICE through secretive no-bid contracts using city governments as middlemen. Critics charge these contracts allow ICE to avoid legal responsibility—for deaths, injuries and sexual abuse that occur in detention—and play a role in the government’s see-no-evil approach to detention abuses. Since 2003, 183 detainees have died in ICE custody. The federal government depends on profit-driven prison companies, including smaller firms like Emerald and corrections giants, such as CoreCivic and the Geo Group, to run its sprawling, 200-plus-prison detention network. At Emerald, chaos reigned in the form of wage theft, poor medical care and crowded, unsanitary conditions. But ICE officials didn’t intervene, and it’s rare that it does at other facilities with serious problems. Between 2010 and 2017, just two of more than 200 detention centers received failing or “deficient” ratings from ICE inspectors. The government’s failure to act against these facilities is partly the result of an insatiable hunger for lockups, said Mark Fleming, an attorney with the National Immigrant Justice Center. Fleming contended that without the capacity to warehouse thousands of immigrants in facilities run by private prison companies, the government would face “an existential crisis.” In a rush to create detention space, ICE has used opaque noncompetitive contracts called Intergovernmental Service Agreements to quickly bring beds online. Now, as ICE seeks to expand family detention, it is likely to turn to IGSAs just as it did in 2014, when a wave of Central American children and families sought asylum in the U.S. It is reportedly planning to house families at the Fort Bliss Army base in Texas. Critics argue that the sole purpose of some of these agreements is to avoid public protest and federal contracting rules that officially are aimed at ensuring transparency and avoiding overpayment by the government. Immigration detention has expanded fivefold in the past 23 years, and with the Trump administration’s deportation surge, is growing larger. But when Emerald got its start in 1997, the immigration detention system was just ramping up, and immigration detention contracts were a reliable source of business for the company – even as Emerald’s blunders were getting it ousted from county jails and knocked out of the running for state and local bids to operate jails and prisons nationwide. The company drummed up some of its business by convincing small towns that jails and prisons would revive their dying economies. In the 1980s and ’90s, Raywood J. LeMaire, one of the company’s four partners, learned firsthand as the five-term Vermilion Parish sheriff that there was money to be made in renting out jail beds to relieve state-prison overcrowding. Louisiana sheriffs like LeMaire generated money and power for their offices by housing state prisoners in their jails—often on the cheap and in poor conditions. “As long as you didn’t feed them too well – grits and beans and cold bologna — you could make some money,” alleged Keith Nordyke, a Louisiana attorney who has long represented prisoners. Asked about his partnership in Emerald, LeMaire, now in his late 70s, told Capital & Main, “I got out of it in January,” before refusing to talk further and hanging up the phone. Emerald’s other partners, Glenn Hebert, who also once worked for the Vermilion Parish Sheriff’s Office, Clay Lee, W.T. Lee and former CEO Steve Afeman couldn’t be reached for comment. Hull Youngblood, an attorney who represented the company, didn’t return calls or answer emails. Red flags had warned of trouble inside the company at least since 2003, when Emerald took over operations at the Rolling Plains Detention Center from another private firm. “We saw things go to hell,” said Judy Morrell, who worked as a guard at Rolling Plains. Food for detainees was scarce, she alleged: “They would feed these people chicken bones and rice. If you don’t feed them, they’ve got to get money to buy [from] the commissary.” Morrell noted that Emerald profited from its in-prison store. “But you take people who didn’t have money, by God, they didn’t eat. They’d get to stealing and thieving.” Now 70, Morrell said that when she started with Emerald she knew how prisons were supposed to run, having put in five years with the Texas prison system. Morrell publicly complained about bad food and overcrowding, and quit her job in 2004. Federal officials were quoted in local media at the time as pledging to investigate her accusations. Three years later, a habeas corpus petition filed on behalf of five members of a Palestinian family alleged they were the victims of sexual harassment, inadequate medical treatment, excessive use of solitary confinement and religious intolerance. Over the years at Rolling Plains, Texas Commission on Jail Standards inspectors found repeated incidents of overcrowding, unsafe and unsanitary conditions, failure of medical staff to follow doctors’ orders, understaffing and failure of staff to perform regular checks on detainees. (ICE inspectors became more critical of the facility only in its later years, noting dozens of violations of its standards but, based on available inspection reports, never appears to have given Rolling Plains an overall deficient rating.) Cases of egregious neglect by Emerald have included: — The 2016 suicide of a 77-year-old county inmate, Kennie Moore, who hanged himself using his boxer shorts as a noose. — Emerald’s 2012 ousting, by a Louisiana sheriff, from the Riverbend Detention Center when his officers discovered a mother lode of drugs, cellphones and shanks during a shakedown. — A lawsuit filed by workers at the West Texas Detention Facility against Emerald that alleged they were forced to work off the clock and weren’t paid for overtime; it was eventually settled out of court. By 2016 the company had abandoned or been fired from more detention contracts than it maintained. As early as 2005, local and state governments in Florida, Vermont and Texas began to turn down the company’s bids to house prisoners or build facilities, citing its record. What’s more, the prison building boom was winding down as states tried to reduce their prison populations. But ICE was Emerald’s ace in the hole. In 2016, Emerald finished construction on the $60 million Prairieland Detention Center in Alvarado, Texas and began managing the 700-bed facility for the agency. Prairieland replaced Rolling Plains, whose location was too remote for adequate staffing and transportation of detainees, said one former ICE official. Perhaps ICE could overlook the company’s checkered history because technically the federal agency wasn’t in business with Emerald. Emerald’s contract was not with the government, but rather with Alvarado, a town of 4,000 near Fort Worth, which has no actual role in running the detention center. ICE spokesman Carl Rusnok didn’t address Capital & Main’s questions about whether it reviewed Emerald’s record before approving it as the operator of the Prairieland facility. He wrote in an email that new facilities contracts must meet the latest ICE standards, which require that all facilities “vigorously investigate all claims of abuse, and mistreatment of detainees by staff and other detainees.” Like all Intergovernmental Service Agreements, the deal was made without the transparency that federal contracting rules dictate. ICE signed the agreement with Alvarado city officials, but city officials have no role in operating Prairieland. “If you told me today that I’d have to start running the jail tomorrow, that wouldn’t work,” said Rick Holden, Alvarado’s city manager. “We’re not set up for that.” Holden is new on the job, having arrived in early May. Still, he said that after six weeks in office he hadn’t visited Prairieland. “We don’t manage it from here. Nobody out there reports to me,” Holden said. “ICE is the agency that has the facility.” If Holden would find it daunting to manage a detention center in his backyard, imagine the task that would face city officials in Eloy, Arizona. On paper, Eloy manages the 2,400-bed South Texas Family Residential Center, which is located more than 900 miles away in Dilley, Texas. But last February, the Department of Homeland Security’s inspector general found that Eloy doesn’t actually run the detention center, and didn’t even negotiate the agreement with ICE. Private prison operator CoreCivic did. CoreCivic appears to have engineered the whole deal by asking the Eloy City Council to modify an existing ICE contract to also include the South Texas facility. The town of Eloy was simply a middleman that was paid more than $400,000 annually by CoreCivic for the job, the inspector general concluded. The IG noted that a lack of accountability is built into this particular contracting arrangement: “Because ICE’s agreement and legal relationship is with the city of Eloy, CCA’s [Core Civic’s] performance is effectively insulated from government scrutiny.” The absurdity of a small city like Eloy overseeing a massive detention center in another state may be apparent, but the basics of its contract don’t differ much from a number of other IGSAs between ICE and local governments: Cities are routinely paid fees to act as middlemen between ICE and private companies. Still, for the most part, the inspector general’s office limited its criticism to the Eloy agreement. But it did express its disapproval of ICE’s handling of IGSAs in general. “ICE has no assurance that it executed detention center contracts in the best interest of the Federal Government, taxpayers, or detainees,” the report observed. Eloy isn’t the only city supposedly overseeing detention operations from afar. In California, the city of Adelanto, in San Bernardino county, signed a 2014 agreement to provide guard services for a family detention center in New Mexico for a year. The services were provided by the for-profit prison firm, the GEO Group, not the city of Adelanto. The small San Joaquin Valley town of McFarland has a long-standing IGSA with ICE to operate the Mesa Verde Detention Center in Bakersfield, nearly 30 miles away. The legitimate purpose of IGSAs is to allow government agencies to fill urgent needs by piggybacking onto services a local government already offers. In many cases, ICE does exactly that by signing an agreement with a local sheriff to rent beds in a county jail. However, in other cases, ICE has used IGSAs only to rapidly bring detention facilities online by skirting federal contracting rules, which require an open bidding process that ensures transparency and competition. About a third of all immigrant detainees are housed under these sort of agreements between ICE and cities. Attorney Mark Fleming believes these are sham contracts, especially in cases where the city doesn’t even own the facility, much less operates it. “These are fraudulent contracts to allow ICE to float money to a private company to avoid federal procurement laws,” Fleming said. “That’s a fraudulent contract because the locality has nothing to offer.” For example, the Adelanto Detention Center in San Bernardino County is operated under an IGSA between the city of Adelanto and ICE. The city, however, doesn’t run the detention center. The for-profit GEO Group does.

### Ext - UQ

#### Backlog stabilizing now

Sacchetti 17

11-3-17 Maria Sacchetti covers immigration for The Washington Post. She previously reported for the Boston Globe. “DOJ details plan to slash immigration court backlog” https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/doj-details-plan-to-slash-immigration-court-backlog/2017/11/03/03fcef34-c0a0-11e7-959c-fe2b598d8c00\_story.html?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.4605372796ca

The Department of Justice said Friday it is aiming to slash the massive immigration court backlog in half by 2020 by adding judges, upgrading technology and refusing to tolerate repeated delays in deportation cases. Officials, who briefed reporters on condition that they not be identified by name, said the effort is part of the Trump administration's broad plan to more efficiently handle cases of undocumented immigrants, who number 11 million nationwide. The administration has reversed Obama-era policies that allowed prosecutors to indefinitely postpone low-priority cases, which the Justice Department officials said allowed some immigrants to delay "inevitable" deportations. In other cases, they said, immigrants who deserved to win their cases were delayed for years because of the backlog. The immigration court backlog has tripled since 2009, the year former president Obama took office, to more than 630,000 cases in October. "That is what this administration is committed to, getting this done right, ensuring that we're never in this place again," a Justice Department official said. "Really and truly, when you look at the numbers . . . it reflects the fact that the last administration likely wasn't as committed to ensuring that the system worked the way that Congress intended it to." The agency, which oversees the administrative immigration courts, said it plans to hire new immigration judges, use technology such as videoconferencing, and increase judges' productivity by setting case-completion guidelines, though officials would not give details. The department also will have a "no dark courtrooms" policy, the officials said, explaining that there are at least 100 courtrooms nationwide that are empty every Friday because of judges' alternate work schedules. The Justice Department is tapping retired judges to fill those courts. The immigration court overhaul comes as the Trump administration is carrying out policies that could generate even more cases in coming months. Arrests and deportations from the interior of the United States are rising sharply, and the Trump administration has ended Obama-era protections for some undocumented immigrants, including 690,000 undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children. By Monday, the Trump administration is also expected to say if it will renew temporary protected status for thousands of longtime immigrants from Honduras and Nicaragua whose permits expire next year. The Justice Department officials said they are no longer widely using certain protections for undocumented immigrants, including a tool known as prosecutorial discretion that allowed the government to set aside low-priority deportation cases. DOJ officials criticized immigration lawyers, saying they "have purposely used tactics designed to delay" immigration cases. As of 2012, the officials said, there were an average of four continuances for each case before the court. Gregory Chen, director of government relations for the American Immigration Lawyers Association, said the administration's plan to cut the backlog would "undermine judicial independence" in the immigration courts. "This administration has been extremely hostile toward the judiciary and the independence of immigration judges, as well as other judges," Chen said. Speeding up cases depends partly on congressional funding. It also rests partly on the actions of immigration judges, who have expressed concerns about due process for immigrants, many of whom are facing deportation to some of the world's most violent countries. Immigrants are not entitled to a government-appointed lawyer in these courts and often handle cases on their own. The Justice officials would not comment on reports that they will impose case-completion quotas on judges, which raised an outcry from the judges' union. But the officials said they would give judges clear standards to complete cases and add more supervisors. Officials say they are already seeing results from efforts this year to improve efficiency. From February to September, judges ordered 78,767 people to leave the country, a 33 percent jump over the same period in 2016. The total number of final decisions, which includes some immigrants who won their cases, is 100,921.

### Ext - links

#### Rise in credible fear applications creates backlogs in other parts of the asylum process, clogging immigration courts

Scialabba and Chaffetz December 12, 2013, Congress of the US, “ASYLUM ABUSE: IS IT OVERWHELMING OUR BORDERS?” Serial No. 113–56 Speaking at a a House Judiciary Committee hearing. Jason Chaffetz, a Representative in Congress from the State of Utah, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary. (JM)

Ms. SCIALABBA. No. I mean, we—no, it’s not. We have requirements on how quickly we want to move cases through the process, but someone’s rating is not based on the number of cases that they are doing or not doing. We have goals. We definitely have goals. 216 Mr. CHAFFETZ. In your ideal world, how long should it take to move a case through the system, and what is the reality of how long it is actually taking? Ms. SCIALABBA. Which system are you referring to? Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, the one you just referred to. Ms. SCIALABBA. Expedited removal? Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes, sure. That one. Ms. SCIALABBA. Expedited removal. On average, it’s about 19 days before a case is referred to us for a credible fear interview. We’re doing them within 8 days. We do the interview for credible fear and then refer the case back to ICE. Mr. CHAFFETZ. And is there a goal that you said you are going to add 100 new officers or 100 new people to this. I am trying to get the metric that says this is how big the backlog is. Ms. SCIALABBA. We don’t have a backlog on credible fear. Where we’re suffering is in the affirmative asylum process because we’ve devoted the resources to the credible fear process. Mr. CHAFFETZ. So how, again, you are hiring 100 new people, and you have 270, did you say? Ms. SCIALABBA. Two hundred seventy, yes. Mr. CHAFFETZ. So what is the backlog or why—I think I understand why. But I want to hear from you, why are you hiring 100 new people where 270 was insufficient? Ms. SCIALABBA. Because we were devoting people who would normally be doing affirmative asylum applications to the credible fear process because of the spike that you’re seeing there of people applying for credible fear. And we need to add the asylum officers to stay current with the affirmative asylum process also.

#### More asylum seekers and refugees pressure the immigration courts, creating even more backlog

Kate Morrissey December 26, 2017 San Diego Union-Tribune, “Asylum seekers overwhelming US processing in San Diego ports” Kate Morrissey, originally from Atlanta, came to The San Diego Union-Tribune in March 2016. She worked first on the DataWatch team before taking on the immigration beat in August 2016. She has a master's degree from Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism. She interned at The Star newspaper in Johannesburg, South Africa, where she covered the start of the #FeesMustFall movement. (JM)

So many people fleeing persecution in their home countries have asked for help in San Ysidro in recent weeks that federal officials have not been able to process all of them, leaving some stranded and running out of money while they wait in Tijuana. U.S. border officials are trying to work through the backlog, but they can go only as fast as migrants can be processed and moved from temporary holding cells to immigration detention. An official with U.S. Customs and Border Protection said the agency remains committed to meeting the care and safety needs of people in custody, and is working actively with partners, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to resolve the backup. “There are potentially a number of reasons causing the San Diego area ports of entry to reach capacity; we do not have a definitive reason to offer at this time,” the official added. Because of the backlog, close to 100 migrants lined up last week in the plaza outside the walkway that leads to PedWest, the pedestrian border crossing that opened earlier this year, Tijuana media outlets reported. Migrants slept in line, afraid of losing their places and having to wait longer for CBP to process them. Then, Mexican officials told them they couldn’t stay in the plaza. On Monday of last week, about 25 migrants were jailed overnight for waiting in the plaza outside the port, according to several Eritrean migrants. In the days since, some found refuge in Tijuana’s migrant shelters, particularly the Casa del Migrante. Each morning, they return to the port to ask if there is room in CBP’s processing area. When they’re turned away, they walk over to a nearby plaza and wait until shelters open for the night. “We can’t give up. We don’t have option,” said Mesfin Tesfaldet, a 33-year-old man from Eritrea seeking asylum in the U.S., who has been waiting to be processed for at least a week. He was again shooed out of El Chaparral plaza on Friday along with about a dozen others from Eritrea and Cameroon. When someone arrives at a port without documents for entry, CBP officials interview that person, take photographs and fingerprints and check law enforcement databases for records. If that person reports being afraid to go back to his or her home country, CBP is required by law to transfer that migrant to other federal agencies for a potential asylum case. Most of the asylum process happens once the person has been transferred to Immigration and Customs Enforcement — or ICE — custody, and back-ups in that transfer system can leave CBP with limited space in its temporary holding cells at the border. Large groups of migrants arriving at once can also clog the system. In the fall of 2016, San Diego’s ports were overwhelmed by thousands of Haitian migrants. In partnership with Mexican officials, CBP established a ticketing system that scheduled appointments for migrants to be processed. As of November, the most recent data available from CBP, arrivals hadn’t reached the levels of the wave of arriving Haitians. In October 2016, more than 6,000 people came to San Diego’s ports of entry asking to come in despite not having documents permitting entry to the U.S. That number included asylum seekers — CBP does not distinguish between those seeking asylum and other “inadmissibles” in its data collection. (In addition to asylum seekers, inadmissibles are those looking for better economic opportunities or anyone else who has asked to enter the U.S. at a port without the proper documents.) In November 2017, the number of people deemed inadmissible was 2,824, more than double the low of 1,313 reached in March of this year. Under current policy, asylum seekers are detained by ICE until they get results from credible fear interviews, which determine the likelihood that they will win their cases in immigration court. If asylum seekers don’t pass the interviews, they are sent back to their home countries. If they do pass, many stay in detention for the remainder of their cases, which can take a year or more to finish. Some are released from detention on parole or by paying bond while they wait for their turns to tell their stories to immigration judges. Asylum seekers, like refugees, must prove that they’ve been persecuted or fear persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Tesfaldet said he fled Eritrea to Sudan after he was jailed for his political views. In Sudan, he said, he couldn’t go to a refugee camp because the two governments were working together to send Eritreans back to their home country. He hid for several years before finding a way to fly to Brazil. From there, he followed a grueling and potentially fatal migrant trail up to Tijuana. “It was hard. It’s very bad, that jungle. Many people is dying, especially in the river,” Tesfaldet said. “We sacrificed ourselves already. We don’t expect to have a problem when we get here.” He saw children swept away by the water at river crossings — pulled right out of their mothers’ arms, he said. He left his 5-year-old daughter in hiding in Sudan while he made the journey because he didn’t want to risk losing her on the way. He hopes that if he is able to win his asylum case in the U.S., he’ll be able to bring her to join him. He thinks about his daughter every day, he said. He doesn’t care where he lives in the U.S. as long as he is allowed in. “I want safe. I want peaceful,” Tesfaldet said. Some of the migrants from African countries expressed frustration that they were the ones left outside after Mexican officials intervened. “We are human beings,” said one man from Eritrea. “They don’t respect. I’m feeling racism here, a big discrimination here. We don’t want to be here in Mexico. Our target, our way is USA.” When Tijuana media first reported the line of migrants, many of those interviewed were Mexican asylum seekers fleeing gang violence in other parts of the country. By Friday, most of them did not appear outside the port. An official from Mexico’s immigration agency told a Mexican media outlet that his agency had asked CBP to find a way to take in more people because of concerns about how migrant children waiting in line could be affected when temperatures drop overnight. The group of Eritreans and Cameroonians outside El Chaparral on Friday said many of those who didn’t make it into the U.S. had traveled on to Mexicali or even Texas to try at other ports. Friday afternoon, several of the remaining Eritrean men decided to try their luck in Mexicali as well.

### Ext - intl links

#### Clogged courts turn USCIS into an enforcement agency, creates more clog and deportations

Joshua Breisblatt July 9, 2018 Immigration Impact, “USCIS Is Slowly Being Morphed Into an Immigration Enforcement Agency” <http://immigrationimpact.com/2018/07/09/uscis-guidance-immigration-benefit/> Joshua Breisblatt is a Senior Policy Analyst at the American Immigration Council, where he focuses on immigration enforcement, immigration courts and due process, and border issues. He engages with Capitol Hill and the immigration agencies. (JM)

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued new guidance to initiate deportation proceedings for thousands of applicants denied for any immigration benefit. This policy change will have far-reaching implications for many of those interacting with the agency, but also signals a major shift in how USCIS operates. USCIS was never meant to be tasked with immigration enforcement. Their mandate has always been administering immigration benefits. With its distinct mission, USCIS was created to focus exclusively on their customer service function, processing applications for visas, green cards, naturalization, and humanitarian benefits. The new USCIS guidance instructs staff to issue a Notice to Appear (NTA) to anyone who is unlawfully present when an application, petition, or benefit request is denied. This will include virtually all undocumented applicants, as well as those individuals whose lawful status expires while their request is pending before USCIS. An NTA (Form I-862) is a charging document issued to individuals when there are grounds for deporting them from the United States. The NTA is issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and USCIS. It must be served to the individual and presented to the immigration court for removal proceedings to be triggered. When someone receives an NTA, they must appear before an immigration judge at an assigned date and location to determine if they are eligible to remain in the country legally or should be removed. NTAs are traditionally issued under certain situations, such as terminations of conditional permanent residence, referrals of asylum cases, and positive credible fear findings. Beginning immediately, NTAs will also be issued by USCIS: For denials of an initial application or re-registration for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) or a withdrawal of TPS when the applicant has no other lawful immigration status. When fraud, misrepresentation, or evidence of abuse of public benefit programs is part of an individual’s record, even if the application or petition has been denied for other reasons. When someone is under investigation or arrested for any crime, regardless of a conviction, if the application is denied and the person is removable. When USCIS issues an unfavorable decision and the individual is not lawfully present in the United States. A second policy memorandum issued at the same time as the new NTA guidance makes applicants for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) the exception to this new NTA policy. This move essentially ends all prosecutorial discretion, a key tool used by law enforcement and prosecutors all over the country to effectively prioritize cases. In the past, immigration agencies used prosecutorial discretion when deciding under what circumstances to issue NTAs. Past leaders of USCIS have issued memos against the practice of widespread NTA issuance, noting it was impractical, would divert scarce resources, create longer wait times, and clog the immigration courts. Further, denials of immigration benefits applications are often reversed upon reconsideration or appeal. This means that thousands of cases that will ultimately be approved will be needlessly tossed onto the dockets of an already overburdened court system. If an immigration benefit request is approved on appeal, the individual must then seek termination of proceedings, which consumes even more court resources. With over 700,000 cases already in the court backlog, it’s inconceivable for the agency to manage many thousands more. This new NTA policy is both overbroad and short-sighted, not taking into account the practical effects on government resources or the chilling effect it will have on noncitizens needing to apply for or renew benefits. Our complex immigration system will become even more inefficient, burdensome, and confusing.

#### In an effort to address backlogs, the Trump administration looks to revoke due process for immigrants and asylum seekers, opening the door for deportation without trial.

LAURA ZIEGLER • JAN 23, 2018 High Plains Public Radio, “Immigration Court Backlog Raises Due Process Concerns In The Era Of Trump” <http://hppr.org/post/immigration-court-backlog-raises-due-process-concerns-era-trump> Laura Ziegler began her career at KCUR as a reporter more than 20 years ago. She became the news director in the mid 1980's and in 1988, went to National Public Radio in Washington, D.C. as a producer for Weekend Edition Saturday with Scott Simon. (JM)

Five days after he was inaugurated as president, Donald Trump issued an executive order cracking down on illegal immigration. It included money for tighter security at the border, plans for a border wall with Mexico and tougher standards for becoming a U.S. citizen. With additional hundreds of thousands of cases expected to further clog an already overburdened immigration court system, the Justice Department is releasing new guidelines on how to move cases through the system more efficiently. Immigration attorneys and advocates are concerned these new policies risk denying those in the country without legal status due process of law. One man’s story Darwin Rivas illegally crossed over into the United States in March 2016 from Honduras. He now lives in mid-Missouri with his mother and sister. Honduras is one of the most violent countries in the world. Rivas says he’s been targeted multiple times by violent Honduran gangs. “I thought I could be killed, I couldn't finish my studies,” he says through an interpreter. “I wanted my mom to send for me [from the U.S] ... because they came and looked for me many times." After being detained by immigration authorities, Rivas was released and told to show up at the immigration court closest to where he’d be staying, which was Kansas City. Like more than half the people facing immigration charges, Rivas couldn’t afford an attorney. A friend accompanied him to court, where he said he was always confused. “I never really understood. ... The only reason I do now is because I have a lawyer,” he says. Rivas had a police report to prove he’d gone to authorities in Honduras. Doing that was risky in Honduras; Rivas says he's certain that's why he was targeted by his attackers. But he never gave his report to the immigration judge because he says the judge didn’t ask him for it. After several hearings, none lasting more than a few minutes, his asylum request was denied. Facing deportation, he saved up money to hire a lawyer to appeal. Immigration court The immigration court where Rivas' case was heard is in a Crown Center office building in Kansas City that houses the law firm of Lathrop & Gage and other businesses. It's about two hours from where Rivas lives. On a recent morning in January, the nondescript court's small lobby is packed with others also facing removal from the United States. Security guards pass mothers and children, couples or individuals through a metal detector. A handful of lawyers, readily identifiable by their dress and demeanor, escort their clients into the small courtrooms. Recording in the courtroom isn't permitted. But if you could record, you’d hear Judge Jayme Salinardi or one of the two other immigration judges whipping through their dockets. The mostly first-time hearings last no more than three minutes each. Almost all are postponed — some for years. “Please state your name,” Judge Salinardi asks for the record. “Is Spanish your first language?” If so, he says, a translator will be provided. He verifies a few facts about the case. “Will you be available on August 18th of 2021?” The immigration courts — there are more than 50 nationwide — have had big backlogs since well before Trump took office. But immigration judges and lawyers agree the problem has only gotten worse in the last year. Pending cases nationwide increased from 516,031 in fiscal 2016 to 629,051 in fiscal 2017, according to TRAC, a database research center at Syracuse University. Right now, the backlog stands at 658,728. “This is a new era. This the era of Trump,” Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced last year in remarks at the U.S. Mexican border. President Trump’s executive order expands the authority of immigration officials to deport non-U.S. citizens at the border. It also limits the discretion of prosecutors to prioritize cases as more or less urgent and takes away the ability of judges to close some cases temporarily to make room for more pressing ones. The push to move more cases through the immigration court pipeline concerns Genevra Alberti with The Clinic at Sharma-Crawford Attorneys at Law. She's one of a handful of pro bono immigration attorneys in the Kansas City area. “Due process is apparently not really a concern of the Trump administration,” she says. “If (non-citizens) are not being given due process of the law, they’re not being given a meaningful opportunity to present their cases and potentially stay here in the United States." She adds: “So not only are they picking up more and more people who generally would have fallen under the radar in the past, but also people who have had their cases administratively closed and put on the back burner. And courts are being suddenly asked to put them back on their docket just because.” For many people who appear in immigration court, the stakes couldn’t be higher. Yet more and more of them have no legal representation. Like Rivas, they can’t afford an attorney or don’t have the time to find one. Pro-bono lawyers are maxed out. Alberti herself has 175 cases right now. Many of those who represent themselves find the convoluted tangle of U.S. immigration laws confusing. Bradley Jenkins, a pro bono attorney with the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, says there’s a good reason for that. “Immigration law is complex,” he says. “It’s more complex than the tax code.” “Many conscientious judges are very worried about getting it right and afraid of getting it wrong (with) these pressures to get through increased cases,” he adds. Justice Department spokesman Devin O’Malley says the administration inherited a massive number of deportation cases. “In 2010, longstanding immigration court benchmarks for non-detained cases were abruptly abandoned, and since that time — perhaps not coincidentally — the caseload has tripled," O’Malley explained in an email. Prioritizing cases that "can be resolved more quickly in favor of cases that often take longer to complete" will reduce the caseload, he says. The administration also is bringing back previously abandoned performance goals for courts and judges, another way to address the backlog, O'Malley says. He describes the administration's measures as "a series of common-sense reforms that aim to reduce the so-called "backlog" by realigning the agency towards completing cases, increasing both productivity and capacity and changing policies that lead to inefficiencies and waste." Retired immigration Judge John O’Malley, a former Jackson County judge who became the first immigration judge in Kansas City in 2009 (and no relation to Devin O'Malley), is concerned about how that will play out. Back when he started, there were about 180,000 pending cases nationwide. "So it's triple the number of cases pending, which already was staggering," he says. "It's just a straight line up." Before, O'Malley says, if an undocumented immigrant had been living in the country for 30 years "minding his own business and never been in trouble," that case "would have been moved to the back of the drawer." "You just said we're going to go after the criminals and crooks, you haven't hurt anybody. ... And that's not happening now." O'Malley says the Constitution doesn’t specifically address immigration issues, but it does hold out certain promises and protections. “And that includes always, of course, due process,” he says. “Which means simply the right to know what you’ve been charged with and the right to come in and defend yourself." As the pressure ramps up to move cases more quickly through the pipeline, the question is whether it’s possible to ensure those promises are kept.

#### Trump wants to end due process for undocumented immigrants, would allow ICE to deport any/all they suspect

Katie Rogers and Sheryl Gay Stolberg June 24, 2018 New York Times, “Trump Calls for Depriving Immigrants Who Illegally Cross Border of Due Process Rights” <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/us/politics/trump-immigration-judges-due-process.html> Katie Rogers is a White House correspondent for The New York Times. She started at The Times in 2014 and has since focused on features and breaking news. Sheryl Gay Stolberg is a congressional correspondent. In 21 years at The Times, she has been a science correspondent, national correspondent, political features reporter and White House correspondent. (JM)

President Trump unleashed an aggressive attack Sunday on unauthorized immigrants and the judicial system that handles them, saying that those who cross into the United States illegally should be sent back immediately without due process or an appearance before a judge. “We cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country,” Mr. Trump tweeted while on the way to his golf course in Virginia. “When somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them back from where they came.” It was another twist in a head-spinning series of developments on immigration since the administration announced a “zero tolerance” policy two months ago, leading to the separation of children from parents who cross the border illegally and an outcry from Democrats and many Republicans. Mr. Trump signed an executive order to end the separations last week, but the sudden shifts have led to confusion along the border about how children and parents will be reunited and to turmoil in Congress as the House prepares to vote on a sweeping immigration bill this week. Still, the president, who has always dug his heels in when criticized, has not backed back down from his hard-line talk, even amid a national outcry over a detainment policy that has resulted in the separation of more than 2,300 children from their families. He has instead gone on the offensive, complaining to aides about why he could not just create an overarching executive order to solve the problem, according to two people familiar with the deliberations. Aides have had to explain to the president why a comprehensive immigration overhaul is beyond the reach of his executive powers. And privately, the president has groused that he should not have signed the order undoing separations. “Our system is a mockery to good immigration policy and Law and Order,” Mr. Trump tweeted Sunday, adding, “Our Immigration policy, laughed at all over the world, is very unfair to all of those people who have gone through the system legally and are waiting on line for years! Immigration must be based on merit.” But Mr. Trump’s call to ignore due process faced both constitutional questions and dissension from Republicans in Congress, some of whom have insisted that the number of judges be increased so migrant families can have their cases heard more quickly. Federal immigration courts faced a backlog of more than 700,000 cases in May, and cases can take months or years to be heard. Senator Ted Cruz, Republican of Texas, has proposed doubling the number of judges to roughly 750, while Senator Ron Johnson, Republican of Wisconsin and chairman of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, said Sunday on CNN’s “State of the Union” that he believes an additional 225 judges are needed. He noted that only 74 of the current immigration judges are serving at the border. “We need to increase that,” Mr. Johnson said. “The Trump administration is going to try and come up with another 15,000 beds for family units. But none of this is easy.” The House bill up for a vote this week would beef up border security and provide a path to citizenship for the young undocumented immigrants known as Dreamers, while also effectively codifying Mr. Trump’s executive order by allowing migrant families to be detained together indefinitely. Many on Capitol Hill believe legislation is necessary to deal with the order, since it allows indefinite detentions. Under a 1997 consent decree known as the Flores settlement, migrant children can be detained for no more than 20 days, leaving the order’s status in court in doubt. But the president’s conflicting statements are complicating legislative efforts, said Senator Jeff Flake, Republican of Arizona. “It makes it very difficult,” Mr. Flake said on ABC’s “This Week,” continuing, “It’s difficult in any event, right, in an election year where the president has decided to have this at the forefront of the Republican election strategy to paint the Democrats as soft on immigration.” He added: “I don’t know how in the world we’re going to fix this in the short term, given the Flores decision and given the lack of infrastructure, judges to process these claims. It’s really a big mess.” Mr. Trump’s tweets on Sunday threw new legal questions into the puzzle. Laurence H. Tribe, a constitutional law professor at Harvard, said in an email that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “the due process requirements of the Fifth and 14th Amendments apply to all persons, including those in the U.S. unlawfully.” “Trump is making the tyrannical claim that he has the right to serve as prosecutor, judge and jury with respect to all those who enter our country,” Mr. Tribe said. “That is a breathtaking assertion of unbounded power — power without any plausible limit.” The Fifth Amendment mandates the due process of law, and the 14th Amendment, in part, expanded due process rights for immigrants, with case law asserting those rights dating back to 1886. But Justice Department lawyers under both Democratic and Republican administrations have argued that noncitizens apprehended at the border lack due process protections, said Adam Cox, a law professor at New York University, and the Supreme Court has never clearly resolved the dispute. Since Mr. Trump was elected, his administration has been working to expand the terms of a 1996 statute that allows immigration officials to quickly deport undocumented immigrants as well as those whose papers are believed to be fraudulent. The Trump administration has the ability to expand the statute to encompass the entire country and apply it to any noncitizen who has not been in the country for more than two years, Mr. Cox said. “One of the things that is being considered is an expanded expedited removal to the full statutory limit,” he said, adding that “it is already true that a lot of people show up at the border get removed with no access to immigration courts or the judicial process.” Mr. Cox said the president could be reacting to seeing a high number of people held in detention centers claiming they face harm back home. The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment on whether the president knew the legal ins and outs of his demand. “Many members of the administration seem to think that the high rate necessarily means a lot of fraud,” Mr. Cox said of asylum claims, “so what they could like to do is remove that process.” Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who has made illegal immigration a focus of his career, has moved to back up the president’s words with action in recent months. In April, Mr. Sessions announced a “zero tolerance” immigration policy, which set off the mass separation of families that the president sought to end with his executive order last week. Criminal prosecutions for illegally crossing the southwestern border jumped to 8,298 in April, the month Mr. Sessions announced the zero-tolerance policy, an increase of 30 percent from March, according to data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, a research institute at Syracuse University. Last week, the Defense Department lent 21 lawyers to the Justice Department to focus on prosecuting a backlog in border crossing cases. And on Sunday, the defense secretary, Jim Mattis, said the Pentagon was looking at using two bases to hold an unknown number of migrants, though he would not comment on their location or whether they would house children. Omar Jadwat, director of the Immigrants’ Rights Project at the American Civil Liberties Union, called the president’s demand to dispense with due process illegal. “Any official who has sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution and laws should disavow it unequivocally,” he said. Mr. Trump’s call to end due process is not a total surprise — he has alluded to taking similar measures for weeks. While in Las Vegas on Saturday, Mr. Trump told supporters that he thought the immigration system needed fewer judges. Mr. Trump also suggested last week that he opposed adding judges because many of them could be corrupt. He has long been a critic of immigration judges, saying they were not effective in stopping the flow of people coming into the country, sometimes using incorrect numbers to make his point. “We have thousands of judges. Do you think other countries have judges?” Mr. Trump said during a round-table discussion in May. “We give them, like, trials. That’s the good news. The bad news is, they never show up for the trial. O.K.?” There are actually fewer than 400 judges dedicated to such work, according to the website PolitiFact. Mr. Trump also tweeted on Friday that Republicans should “stop wasting their time” on the broad House immigration bill, but Representative Michael McCaul, Republican of Texas and chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, said on “Fox News Sunday” that he had spoken to the White House, which had assured him that Mr. Trump was “still 100 percent behind us.” Mr. Trump’s careening from one extreme to another has been a staple of his campaign and presidency, allowing people to hear what they want in what he says — and leaving his White House to sort through a messy pile of conflicting directives and Congress to grasp for clues about which bills he might support. The prospects for the House bill are iffy at best; some conservatives are balking at the citizenship provisions, which critics regard as “amnesty.” If it fails, Mr. McCaul said the House may be forced to consider a narrower measure — a so-called skinny bill — that would address only the issues surrounding detention of migrant families. “I think we at a minimum have to deal with the family separation,” Mr. McCaul said. “I’m a father of five. I think this is inhumane and I think the pictures that we have seen — that’s not the face of America.”

### Ext - impacts

#### Poor health and medical practices in detention centers jeopardize the lives of detainees

PAUL MOSES 06.08.18 The Daily Beast, “The Worst Place Ever’ Is ICE’s Etowah County Detention Center in Alabama” <https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-worst-place-ever-is-ices-etowah-county-detention-center-in-alabama> Paul Moses is a former City Hall bureau chief and city editor at Newsday’s New York City edition and the author, most recently, of An Unlikely Union: The Love-Hate Story of New York’s Irish and Italians (NYU Press, 2015). He is a retired professor of journalism at Brooklyn College/CUNY. (JM)

Damian Reynolds says he saw what the staff at the Etowah County Detention Center had missed—that his fellow prisoner and Jamaican immigrant Miguel Williamson could die in his cell if he didn’t get immediate medical attention. Williamson was a healthy 45-year-old man when he and Reynolds, held by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) pending deportation, arrived at the county-run Alabama jail after a snow-delayed, double-shackled trip from Massachusetts on Jan. 26, 2014. Reynolds said that months later, he brought food to the listless Williamson, propped him up so he could walk to the shower, contacted his ICE deportation officer, made entreaties to sheriff’s deputies and submitted written requests for medical care in his behalf. “IT’S THREE DAYS SINCE I HAVE ASK TO SEE THE DOCTOR,” Reynolds wrote on a request form sent in Williamson’s name on May 21, 2014. “. . . AND I’M PEEING BLOOD. CAN YOU PLEASE HELP ME.” The in-house medical staff eventually gave Williamson a strong antibiotic, but six days later it rejected his complaint that he “is unable to walk and feels funny all over” as “subjective,” according to medical records. Reynolds says a correction officer put it to him another way: “Medical is saying that, he’s—you know, he’s faking it. There ain’t nothing wrong with him.” “That place in Alabama, oh my God. That’s the worst place, that’s the worst place ever.” Reynolds reached out to a captain in the sheriff’s office for help—“I had to literally beg,” he says—and Williamson was held overnight in the jail’s clinic, then sent to a hospital in the morning for “general weakness.” Doctors there found that his urinary tract infection had spread throughout his body: It very nearly killed him. Within the hour he arrived in the emergency room, he suffered a heart attack due to septic shock, according to medical records. “Locked down my kidneys. It locked down my heart, and then it locked down my brain,” Williamson said in a recent telephone interview from Jamaica, where he was deported the week before Christmas last year. He continues to suffer the medical consequences of his time at Etowah, but without the access to health care he’d have in the United States. “That place in Alabama, oh my God. That’s the worst place, that’s the worst place ever,” he said. ‘Not a Bed and Breakfast’ He’s not the only one saying that. Advocates for immigrants have launched a campaign called Shut Down Etowah, calling for the federal government to end a contract begun some two decades ago. Significantly, a high-level Department of Homeland Security office—created by Congress to ensure that the agency upholds the public’s civil liberties—also urged ICE leaders to stop using the Etowah jail because of a long pattern of uncorrected civil rights violations. Located in Gadsden in northeastern Alabama, next to the courthouse where Judge Roy Moore began his judicial career by posting the Ten Commandments in his courtroom, the Etowah County facility is emblematic of much of what’s wrong with the world’s largest immigration detention system. The detainees are isolated from their families and from legal help, 500 miles from the immigration court. They’re held, longer than almost anywhere else in the system, in the wrong kind of facility. Like other jails, Etowah is meant for short-timers who are either awaiting trial or serving minor sentences, and not for civil detention—which is supposed to be non-punitive. So there is no outdoor recreation space. Nor is there space for visitors to meet detainees; that’s done through video from an adjacent building. And pay for a sheriff’s detention deputy is $11.99 an hour, leading to turnover and an inexperienced staff. Now, the Trump administration is poised to ease the 18-year-old standards that county jails like Etowah must agree to maintain—rules that experts say are already weak and outdated. Meanwhile, a federal advisory council led by former FBI Director William Webster has urged ICE to do the opposite: Stop holding detainees in county jails for anything more than 72 hours. “IT’S THREE DAYS SINCE I HAVE ASK TO SEE THE DOCTOR… AND I’M PEEING BLOOD. CAN YOU PLEASE HELP ME.” “I think the Etowah facility should be closed,” Megan H. Mack, who headed Homeland Security’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in the last two years of the Obama administration, told The Daily Beast. “It is not appropriate for housing immigration detainees and may be not for regular inmates either. The facility is inadequate.” A report released in June 2016 disclosed that that the civil rights office of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which includes ICE, had called on the agency to stop holding detainees at Etowah. The office emphasized the gravity of the situation by issuing what it called its first “super-recommendation memorandum.” Mack had sent a May 28, 2015, memo to ICE leadership criticizing the agency for failing to respond to the changes her DHS office called for after on-site inspections of Etowah in 2006, 2008, and 2012. In the three years since the last inspection, her office said, 50 new complaints were under investigation. “We therefore conclude that serious problems persist,” the memo said. Given the findings of previous investigations, which were conducted by experts of national standing, the civil rights office concluded it “has strong reason to believe that many of these complaints identify real and continuing problems at the facility.” (DHS released a highly redacted version of the memo to the Adelante Alabama Worker Center and other non-profit organizations that filed suit for it under the Freedom of Information Act. The suit is continuing at U.S. District Court in Manhattan.) Among these complaints were charges that spoiled food was served, and multiple reports of ICE officers roughing up handcuffed detainees to put their fingerprint on travel documents. Bryan Cox, a spokesman for ICE, said the agency “is aware of that report” and that other “inspections have consistently found the Etowah County Detention Center to operate in compliance with ICE’s rigorous national detention standards.” Even so, the most recent publicly available ICE Office of Detention Oversight compliance report for Etowah, based on a December 2016 inspection, found that the jail met only six of 15 standards surveyed, with deficiencies in food service and telephone access, which was overpriced. The 2016 report listed more more than twice as many deficiencies as the office’s previous report on Etowah, three years earlier. In recent months, the jail’s notoriety grew following disclosures that Etowah County Sheriff Todd Entrekin pocketed jail funding thanks to an Alabama law that allows sheriffs to keep surplus funds for food—money left over from serving meals that detainees say are so skimpy that they’re often hungry. Entrekin said that outside agencies frequently inspect his jail. “We have passed those inspections with flying colors each and every time,” he claimed in a March 23 news conference. Entrekin and his spokesperson have not returned numerous messages and calls seeking comment for this article. At the news conference, Entrekin insisted the food he serves is nutritious and healthy. The sheriff released his tax returns and answered reporters’ questions about his finances to demonstrate his contention that it was legal for him to take $750,000 over three years in “surplus” food money paid by the state and federal governments. “This is not a bed and breakfast,” he said, scoffing at detainees who said they were revolted by the food. Entrekin’s protestations did not impress Etowah County voters, who ousted him by a 2-to-1 margin in a June 5 Republican primary. The winner, Rainbow City Police Chief Jonothon Horton, pledged that he would not take any of the jail money for himself. ICE, however, has not taken a public stand on Entrekin’s use of the jail funds and did not respond to a request for comment . ‘A Step Backwards’ Even setting aside the Etowah County jail’s checkered history, experts say it would still be a poor choice for jailing immigrants long-term. Kevin Landy, a former ICE assistant director who headed the agency’s Office of Detention Policy and Planning, said county jails like Etowah are intended for short-term detention of people awaiting trial or serving misdemeanor sentences, not for years of incarceration. “My opinion is the agency’s use of Etowah as a long-term detention facility is inappropriate,” he said. “Due to its remote location and the conditions at the facility, that jail should at most be used for the short-term detention of individuals apprehended nearby and awaiting transfer to a more suitable facility. That policy would result in a substantially reduced population at Etowah.” While ICE’s use of privately run facilities has drawn much criticism, its deals with county jails have received less attention. But, as an internal advisory council warned DHS in a December 2016 report, many experts and government officials believe that “county jails are, in general, the most problematic facilities for immigration detention.” The Homeland Security Advisory Council, headed by Webster, recommended that ICE “use county jails only for short-term detention (less than 72 hours) before transfer to larger and higher-quality dedicated facilities”—that is, facilities used only to detain immigrants. “It won’t be an improvement overall if we phase out private facilities and it results in a greater use of county detention facilities,” said council member David Martin, former deputy general counsel to the Department of Homeland Security and professor emeritus of law at the University of Virginia. But, he added, “this administration, that’s not a priority for them. They’re looking to expand the use of detention and make more detention facilities available.” A spokeswoman for ICE, Danielle Bennett, said it would be “operationally infeasible” for ICE to limit detention in county jails to no more than 72 hours. In fact, ICE is planning to make it easier for county-run facilities like Etowah to comply with federal standards for holding detainees long-term.

### UQ CP – Judges CP

#### Plan: The USFG should remove immigration courts from under the DOJ and place them in their own system in addition to hiring more judges

#### Removing immigration courts from DOJ and hiring more judges solves for backlog

Melanie Huettman, 2017,,"The Causes of our Immigration Court Backlog, and How We Can Fix It," Niskanen Center, Melanie Huettman is a graduate of Iowa University and is editor in chief at the Journal of Gender, Race, and Justice, <https://niskanencenter.org/blog/causes-immigration-court-backlog-can-fix-2/>, WB

The number of cases pending in the immigration court system is currently at an [all-time high](http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/468/). Immigration judges struggle to get through their overburdened dockets each year, leading to lengthy wait times—in most cases, years—for those awaiting a decision. Rather than working to solve the problems, the Trump administration has exacerbated them. According to the [Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse](http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/) (TRAC), there were nearly 600,000 immigration cases pending at the end of last May. While the case backlog used to be “manageable”—staying under 200,000—it crossed that threshold during President Obama’s first term and has risen quickly since. By expanding enforcement priorities without a corresponding expansion of court personnel, President Trump’s policies are making that backlog worse. As a result, immigration-related arrests have skyrocketed, [increasing](https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/22/immigration-courts-growing-backlog/eP1PUmY7Yez55JCVMKERAJ/story.html) by 38 percent this year, but adjudication rates have remained the same. The overflowing dockets of immigration judges have led to nightmarish scheduling delays. Currently, according to TRAC, the average wait time for a Master Calendar hearing—a preliminary hearing meant to provide a chance to plead and schedule an actual merits hearing—is nine months. After that, many wait upwards of 670 days to have their case heard. Some wait four to five years. The huge backlog of cases is harming immigrants who are stuck in limbo as they wait to learn their fate. It can ruin their chances of receiving pro bono representation, which is usually necessary to win a case. Worse still, asylum seekers have seen their backlog more than quadruple in the last five years. In the years they wait for a decision on their case, witnesses disappear and evidence becomes outdated, drastically reducing their chance of making a successful claim. Meanwhile, family members may be stuck in their dangerous home countries, waiting for the asylum case to be resolved to escape. Additionally, the existing backlog poses a potential threat to our public safety and national security, while also creating negative economic effects. The delays allow immigrants picked up for criminal convictions or charges to roam free in the United States for years afterward without much in the way of supervision. Further, while these individuals wait for their hearings, they often can’t work and have to rely on benefits—especially true for asylees. It is therefore in our interest to reduce the delays and get these cases through quickly. While the number of cases has increased, the main cause of the backlog is the failure to hire enough immigration judges to deal with the influx. There are currently [only](http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/12/politics/immigration-case-backlog-by-the-numbers/index.html) 58 immigration courts throughout the country, situated in 27 states, Guam, and Puerto Rico. There are just 300 sitting immigration judges, 39 percent of whom are currently [eligible](http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/07/04/trump-deportation-push-could-get-jammed-in-bureaucratic-mess.html) to retire. Attorney General Sessions [has plans](http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/12/politics/immigration-case-backlog-by-the-numbers/index.html) to hire 50 new judges this year, and 75 next year, in order to deal with the caseload. However, this modest increase in judges will not be enough to cover the new influx of cases, much less tackle the existing backlog. According to [a report](http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-In-The-Balance.pdf) by Human Rights First, the system needs over 500 judges completing at least 500 cases each year until 2023 in order to end the backlog. Since it currently takes close to two years to hire an immigration judge, it is unlikely that this backlog will be dealt with anytime soon. Solutions There are a few things the Trump administration could do to reduce the backlog and improve the immigration court system. First, the administration should focus its resources on increasing the number of immigration judges. This would not only reduce the backlog, but also help alleviate the pressure on the existing judges, and allow them to focus more on individual cases rather than speeding through them. Second, the administration should ensure that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is prioritizing criminals and dangerous undocumented immigrants rather than targeting all undocumented individuals. By focusing enforcement resources on removing only those who commit crimes and pose a real danger to society, the administration would not only further its goal of making our country safer, it would also reduce the backlog. Third, as the American Bar Association and the President of the National Association of Immigration Judges, the Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, [suggested](http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/314238-our-immigration-court-crisis-will-be-trumps-lasting-headache), it could be beneficial if Congress were to remove the immigration court system from under the Department of Justice and allow it to be its own system, like the current system of bankruptcy courts. This idea was [first introduced](http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED211612.pdf) in 1981 by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. The new system would still handle immigration issues, but the judges would have more control over the system and their own dockets. It would also allow for the creation of both a trial and appellate division to better resolve any errors made during cases, as well as provide national, binding caselaw. Additionally, separating them from the Department of Justice would reduce much of the politicization entrenched within the system. Many of President Trump’s current immigration policies serve only to further strain an already overburdened system. By increasing the number of immigration judges and enforcing removal priorities, the backlog could be alleviated, hundreds of thousands of immigrants could be saved from years of waiting, and we could get dangerous criminals off of the streets. The administration should craft its policies to solve the real problems at hand rather than making them worse

### ---Ext – judges CP

#### The DOJ pressures immigration courts to align with Trump’s political views in addition to increasing the court backlog through bad policy. The CP solves by moving immigration courts out from under the DOJ

Sara Ramey 2018, *Sara Ramey is an immigration attorney and the executive director at the*[*Migrant Center for Human Rights*](https://migrantcenter.org/)*in San Antonio, Texas. The views in this article are not intended to reflect the official position of the organization* "DOJ shouldn't be in charge of immigration courts," http://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/388876-doj-shouldnt-be-in-charge-of-immigration-courts

On April 18 the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a [hearing](https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/strengthening-and-reforming-americas-immigration-court-system) on strengthening the Immigration Court system. Several organizations, including the [American Bar Association](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/HilarieBassStatement-4-18-18.authcheckdam.pdf) and the [American Immigration Lawyers Association](http://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/75657), recommended that Congress make the immigration courts independent courts under Article I of the Constitution. Congress should do so without delay, especially in light of the attorney general’s May 17 decision in [Matter of Castro-Tum](https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1064086/download) eliminating administrative closure. People on both sides of the political divide agree that the immigration courts are overburdened. The approximately [350 immigration judges who work in about 60 courts](https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge-bios) around the country are currently tasked with reviewing close to [700,000 cases](http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/). The Trump administration has made several, mostly misguided, attempts to fix this backlog. However, as Former Chairman of the BIA Paul Schmidt stated recently ‘‘[Nobody… can fix this system while it remains under the control of DOJ](http://immigrationcourtside.com/2018/05/04/read-my-speech-to-the-aba-commission-on-immigration-caricature-of-justice-stop-the-attack-on-due-process-fundamental-fairness-and-human-decency-in-our-captive-dysfunctional-u-s-immigration-cou/).’’ Because the immigration courts, along with the Board of Immigration Appeals, are currently part of the Department of Justice, the attorney general, and others in the executive, not least of all the president, are in charge of agency regulations, case procedures, the hiring and firing of judges, and decision-making. In recent months the administration has made unprecedented attacks on the judicial independence of immigration judges, including policy changes that are in direct contradiction to the recommendations of an [April 2017 Booz Allen Hamilton report](http://www.aila.org/casestudy) commissioned by the Department of Justice. On March 30 the administration instituted a [case completion quota of 700](https://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/04/02/immigration-judges-memo.pdf) a year for a “satisfactory” performance rating. This amounts to each Immigration Judge needing to complete on average three cases every working day. For judges who have dockets with a high number of asylum cases, for example, this arbitrary requirement will push them to expedite cases in ways that are extremely dangerous to due process. As the president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, Judge Tabaddor, testified at the congressional hearing, there has been ‘‘[no quota ever, in any court](https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/strengthening-and-reforming-americas-immigration-court-system); somehow implicit in [designating a quota] is that judges are not doing enough… [However, w]e should focus on [is] how we can support our judges.’’ Over the last six years I have directly or indirectly litigated over a hundred asylum cases, and in 95 percent of the cases the hearing takes about 3.5 hours, or the equivalent of one working morning or afternoon. This does not include the time a judge needs in camera to review the hundreds of pages of evidence in the record. In reality, a judge who completes one asylum case a day, and not three, is already extremely efficient. The real problem is not with how hard-working the immigration judges are. As I explained in a [2016 article](http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/289875-immigration-court-delays-make-a-mockery-of-us-justice), part of the problem lies with understaffing. Instead of hiring a reasonable number of judges and law clerks, and otherwise investing in supporting the work of our Immigration Judges, the Administration is [eliminating administrative closure](http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/editorcharts/USA-IMMIGRATION-COURTS/0H0010P00FP/index.html) and [calling for administratively closed cases to be put back on the docket](https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1064086/download), actions that only serve to raise the number of pending cases. If, for example, the Department of Justice puts all the administratively closed cases back on the docket, it would [increase the court backlog to over 1,000,000](https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1060936/download?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery). These are cases of crime victims and DACA recipients and others where an immigration judge has already determined that it would not be a good use of judicial resources, or in the public interest, to litigate, usually because the person is eligible for some non-judicial form of immigration relief and has a case pending with USCIS. Re-calendaring these cases would not only unnecessarily increase the work of taxpayer-funded DHS Trial Attorneys but it would add more pressure to the already overworked immigration judges. The attorney general has also stepped into managing the immigration courts by [restricting the use of continuances](https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/oppm17-01/download), which in the fast-paced detention context where my organization works are often necessary in order to have time to obtain crucial pieces of evidence and otherwise prepare for trial. While the attorney general is the boss and is responsible for the judges’ performance, he should have a little more faith in the good judgement of his immigration judges, who, unlike the attorney general, are looking at the situation-specific issues in the individual case before them. While the helpfulness of the attorney general’s methods for carrying out his job are questionable at best, the underlying problem remains that, regardless of our political opinion on the administration’s policies, those policies are affecting the judicial independence of our immigration courts and putting due process in jeopardy. What the attorney general says matters to the immigration judges working under him. In one recent case, the immigration judge cited him as [saying there is a lot of fraud in the asylum process](https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review) as evidence that the asylum seeker was lying. Not only was the attorney general’s statement not based on facts — at least not on facts made publicly available, or that anyone even claimed exist, and which statement runs in stark contrast to my six years of on-the-ground experience — but that statement had nothing to do with the truthfulness of the individual asylum seeker present before the court. Additionally, as stated by the former president of the National Association of Immigration Judges Dana Marks, there is a ‘‘[conflict of interest between the judicial and prosecutorial functions](http://nieman.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/pod-assets/Image/microsites/immigration2013/resources/Urgent%20Priority%20FINAL%201-1-08.pdf) [of the Department of Justice that] creates a significant (and perhaps even fatal) flaw to the immigration court structure.’’ It appears that the administration is looking for specific outcomes in cases with little regard to the merits of the claim. The attorney general has [certified an unprecedented number cases to himself for review](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/14/17311314/immigration-jeff-sessions-court-judge-ruling) with the idea that he might change the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. This extraordinary power of one political-appointee to overturn the decision of trained immigration judges is fundamentally at odds with judicial independence. Unfortunately, it appears that not only the review and firing of judges has become political, but their hiring too. Information has surfaced that the [Department of Justice is asking candidates questions about their political party affiliation](https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/politics/article/S-A-congressman-have-grave-concern-that-12842423.php?t=73e1227907&utm_source=email&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=SAEN_express_briefing), their position on same-sex relationships, and their opinion on abortion; preparing internal memos on those whose immigration views that do not align with the administration’s policies; slowing down review of applications where there are ideological differences; and withdrawing employment offers or delaying start dates by up to a one and a half years. Making judicial decisions subject to the political whims of the times, and not dependent on the accurate execution of the law, is a serious risk to the checks-and-balances system underlying our democracy. The need for independent immigration courts has never been clearer.

## Politics DA

### Plan popular

#### Recent polls suggest broad bipartisan support for asylum reform.

Eleanor Acer March 27, 2015 Human Rights First, “Americans Overwhelmingly Support Asylum Reform to Protect Refugees” <https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/poll-americans-overwhelmingly-support-asylum-reform-protect-refugees> As the director of Human Rights First’s Refugee Protection program, Eleanor Acer oversees Human Rights First’s research and advocacy on issues relating to refugee protection, asylum, and migrants’ rights. (JM)

Immigration reform is one of the most debated issues in today’s political climate. And as the 2016 election cycle kicks into gear, politicians on both sides of the aisle seem unlikely to find a lot of common ground on this hot-button issue, as least in the short term. But according to poll results we just released, there’s broad bipartisan support among Americans for reforming the refugee and asylum systems to better protect those seeking refuge from persecution. With the help of Republican polling firm Public Opinion Strategies, we polled voters in twenty-five of the most competitive congressional districts, as well as voters in South Carolina and New Hampshire. The result: voters across nearly every major demographic, including party and ideological lines, believe the asylum and refugee system needs to be improved and strengthened to better protect refugees. Candidates looking to broaden their appeal should study this poll; it found that voters are more likely to vote for candidates who support reform. Independent women—a key target demographic in any congressional campaign in 2016—are more likely to vote for a member of Congress who advocates improving and strengthening the asylum system to protect refugees by a 50 percent to nine percent margin. Voters support not only the idea of reform but also specific proposals. For example, 78 percent of those who responded in targeted districts agree that Congress should increase the number of immigration judges who serve on immigration courts to help ensure fair and timely hearings for those who are fleeing persecution. And 62 percent said that rather than holding asylum seekers in jails and detention facilities, the United States should increase the use of alternatives to detention.

### Plan unpopular

#### Republican party platform is against increased asylum – plan unpopular with republicans.

Jason Dzubow July 20, 2016 The Asylumist “Refugees and the Republican Party Platform” <http://www.asylumist.com/2016/07/20/refugees-and-the-republican-party-platform/> Jason Dzubow is an immigration attorney who specializes in political asylum, immigration court, and appeals. He is a partner at Dzubow & Pilcher, PLLC. (JM)

The Republican Party Platform is finally here (yippee!). While the document does not bind either the party or its candidate, it does tell us something about Republican thinking on a wide variety of topics. Two paragraphs in the 54-page Platform cover asylum and refugee issues, and I want to discuss those here. The RNC Platform would block “the gays” from receiving asylum in the U.S. It would also make it easier for them to get asylum FROM the U.S. Interestingly, the Platform itself does not call for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.” However, it does view asylum through the prism of national security, and it does place extra scrutiny on people coming from “regions associated with Islamic terrorism.” The first paragraph of interest (found on page 26 of the Platform) reconfirms America’s commitment to assisting refugees, but with a few caveats– From its beginning, our country has been a haven of refuge and asylum. That should continue — but with major changes. Asylum should be limited to cases of political, ethnic or religious persecution. As the Director of the FBI has noted, it is not possible to vet fully all potential refugees. To ensure our national security, refugees who cannot be carefully vetted cannot be admitted to the country, especially those whose homelands have been the breeding grounds for terrorism. I take issue with a few points here. First, the Platform seeks to limit asylum to people who face “political, ethnic or religious persecution.” Under our current law, a person can qualify for asylum if she fears persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or particular social group. Presumably, “ethnic” persecution in the Platform refers to persecution on account of race or nationality under existing law, which means that four of the five protected categories are covered in the RNC document. Conspicuously absent from the Platform’s language, however, is protection for people who are members of a “particular social group.” This omission is significant for a few reasons. First, it contravenes our treaty obligations (we are signatories to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which covers all five protected categories). If we seek to modify our obligations under the treaty, other countries may follow suit. This would have an unfortunate ripple effect on refugee protection throughout the world. It would also downgrade our leadership role with regards to refugee resettlement, and may signal a withdrawal of our leadership in world affairs more generally. Second, the change would mean that we no longer offer refuge to many people who we now protect. Those who fear persecution on account of sexual orientation, female genital mutilation, and domestic violence are some prime examples of people we protect because they are members of a particular social group (“PSG”). Indeed, those refugees most affected by this change would be women and sexual minorities. I suppose this is consistent with the rest of the RNC Platform, which–to say the least–is not all that friendly towards women or LGBT individuals. Third, eliminating PSG as a protected category would effectively end any possibility for relief for the unaccompanied minors who have been arriving at our Southern border in large numbers since about 2012. Most of these young people are fleeing violence in Central America. They already have a difficult time obtaining protection in the U.S., but if the PSG category were eliminated, the likelihood that any of them could obtain asylum would become virtually nil. The second paragraph in the RNC Platform related to refugees appears on page 42 of the document– [We] cannot ignore the reality that border security is a national security issue, and that our nation’s immigration and refugee policies are placing Americans at risk. To keep our people safe, we must secure our borders, enforce our immigration laws, and properly screen refugees and other immigrants entering from any country. In particular we must apply special scrutiny to those foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States from terror-sponsoring countries or from regions associated with Islamic terrorism. This was done successfully after September 11, 2001, under the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, which should be renewed now. I take issue with a number of points in this paragraph, but here I will discuss only those related to refugees. First, the paragraph echos Donald Trump, who has claimed that we don’t know where these refugees come from, or who they are. This is utterly false. In truth, we know far more about the refugees who come here than we know about other categories of immigrants or non-immigrant visitors. Refugees are subject to intensive screenings and multiple background checks. Indeed, we probably know more about the refugees (and immigrants) entering our country than we know about our own citizens, and most studies show that such people are less likely to commit crimes than the native born. I also disagree with the Platform’s plan to re-start the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”), which was suspended in 2011. Under NSEERS, men and boys from many Arab and Muslim countries were required to specially register with the U.S. government. The confusing system led to great difficulty for many of these people (and their families), but resulted in no terrorism-related convictions. In other words, there is basically no evidence that NSEERS made us any safer, but there is plenty of evidence that it harmed innocent people who happened to be from Arab or Muslim countries. Finally, there is one point in the Platform that I agree with: We must continue to screen refugees and others who come to our country from regions that produce terrorists (and from everywhere else as well). Of course, we already do this, and I don’t think there is anyone in American who thinks we should do otherwise. The RNC’s implied accusation here is that Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have been letting un-vetted refugees enter our country. That is a lie, and anyone who follows the painfully-slow process of refugee admissions knows it. What little the RNC has to say in its Platform is not good for refugees, and it is especially bad for refugees who happen to be women, children, LGBT individuals or Muslims. If there is a silver lining here, I suppose it is that the Platform devotes only two paragraphs to refugee issues. These days, when it comes to Republicans and refugees, the less said, the better.

#### Republican base oppose immigration all legal immigration if it comes from non-white nations – plan unpopular among voter bases, sways GOP policymakers

PETER BEINART FEB 18, 2018 The Atlantic, “It's Not Illegal Immigration That Worries Republicans Anymore” <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/what-the-new-gop-crack-down-on-legal-immigration-reveals/553631/> Peter Beinart is a contributing editor at The Atlantic and an associate professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York. (JM)

A few weeks ago, the contours of an immigration compromise looked clear: Republicans would let the “Dreamers” stay. Democrats would let Trump build his wall. Both sides would swallow something their bases found distasteful in order to get the thing their bases cared about most. Since then, Trump has blown up the deal. He announced on Wednesday that he would legalize the “Dreamers,” undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children, only if Democrats funded his wall and ended the visa lottery and “chain migration.” He would support a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants only if Congress brought the number of legal immigrants down. There’s an irony here, which was pointed out to me by CATO Institute immigration analyst David Bier. Until recently, Republican politicians drew a bright line between illegal immigration, which they claimed to hate, and legal immigration, which they claimed to love. Florida Senator Marco Rubio launched his presidential campaign at the Freedom Tower, Miami’s Ellis Island. Texas Senator Ted Cruz, who in 2013 proposed a five-fold increase in the number of H1B visas for highly skilled immigrants, declared in April 2015 that, “There is no stronger advocate for legal immigration in the U.S. Senate than I am.” Mitt Romney promised in 2007 that, “We’re going to end illegal immigration to protect legal immigration.” Trump has turned that distinction on its head. He’s willing to legalize the “Dreamers”—who came to the United States illegally—so long as the number of legal immigrants goes down. He has not only blurred the GOP’s long-held moral distinction between legal and illegal immigration. In some ways, he’s actually flipped it—taking a harder line on people who enter the U.S. with documentation than those who don’t. What explains this? Trump’s great hidden advantage during the 2016 Republican presidential primary was his lack of support from the GOP political and donor class. This allowed him to jettison positions—in support of free trade, in support of the Iraq War, in support of cutting Medicare and Social Security—that enjoyed support among Republican elites but little support among Republican voters. He did the same on immigration, where the “legal good, illegal bad” distinction turned out to be much more popular among the party’s leaders than among its grassroots. Cribbing from Ann Coulter’s book, Adios America, Trump replaced the legal-illegal distinction with one that turned out to have more resonance on the activist right: The distinction between white Christian immigrants and non-white, and non-Christian ones. The words “illegal immigration” do not appear in Trump’s presidential announcement speech. Instead, Trump focused on immigrants’ country of origin. “When Mexico sends its people,” he declared, “they’re not sending their best … They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists … It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and Latin America, and it’s coming probably—probably—from the Middle East.” Trump, who often says bluntly what other Republicans say in code, probably realized that “illegal immigrant” was, for many voters, already a euphemism for Latino or Mexican-immigrants. In their book White Backlash, the political scientists Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan Hajnal cite a poll showing that 61 percent of Americans believe that most Latino immigrants are undocumented even though only about a quarter are. “When Americans talk about undocumented immigrants, Latinos or immigrants in general,” they note, “the images in their heads are likely to be the same.” What really drove Republican opinion about immigration, Trump realized, was not primarily the fear that the United States was becoming a country of law-breakers. (Republicans, after all, were not outraged about the lack of prosecution of tax cheats.) It was the fear that the United States—which was becoming less white and had just elected a president of Kenyan descent—was becoming a third-world country. When the Public Religion Research Institute and Brookings Institution asked Americans in 2016 their views of immigration from different parts of the world, it found that Republicans were only three points more likely than Democrats to want to reduce immigration from “predominantly Christian countries” and only seven points more likely to want to reduce immigration from Europe. By contrast, they were 33 points more likely to support reducing immigration from Mexico and Central America and 41 points more likely to support reducing immigration from “predominantly Muslim countries.” What really drives Republican views about immigrants, in other words, is less their legal status than their nation of origin, their religion, and their race. Trump grasped that during the campaign, and in coalition with a bevy of current and former Southern Senators—Jeff Sessions, David Perdue and Tom Cotton—he has used it to turn the GOP into a party devoted to slashing legal immigration. On Thursday, when presented with a bill that traded the legalization of Dreamers for more border security but did not reduce legal immigration, only eight Republican Senators voted yes. However, 37 voted for a bill that legalized the “Dreamers,” added more border security, and substantially reduced legal immigration. But there’s another reason Trump has succeeded in erasing the “legal good, illegal bad” distinction that for years governed GOP immigration debate. He’s made Republicans less concerned with legality in general. In 2012, the GOP—which was then-outraged by executive orders that supposedly displayed President Barack Obama’s contempt for the constitutional limits of his office—titled the immigration section of its platform, “The Rule of Law: Legal Immigration.” The seven paragraph-section used variations of the word “law” 14 times. That emphasis is harder now. In his ongoing battles with the FBI, Justice Department, judiciary, and Special Counsel Robert Mueller, Trump has convinced many Republicans that the “rule of law” is often a cloak for the partisan biases of the “deep state.” As a result, Republicans are now 22 points less likely to hold a positive opinion of the FBI than they were in 2015. What really matters for many Republicans in Trump’s standoff with Mueller and the FBI is not who has the law on their side, since the bureaucracy can twist the law to its own advantage. What really matters is who enjoys the backing of “the people,” the authentic America that resides outside the swamp, a construct that definitely does not include the imagined beneficiaries of “chain migration” and the “visa lottery.” In the Trump era, Republicans now justify their immigration views less by reference to law than by reference to tribe. Which, not coincidentally, is how they justify Trump’s presidency itself.

## Braindrain DA

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#### Skilled Refugees are leaving Syria – Leaves Syria unable to rebuilt critical infrastructure

Starr 17

(Stephen Starr is an journalist who lived in Syria from 2007 to 2012. He is the author of Revolt in Syria: Eye-Witness to the Uprising) The Arab Weekly, Published 11/19/17 https://thearabweekly.com/brain-drain-means-syria-cant-recover-generation JP

A sadly critical fissure has developed in Syr­ian society. Not along the lines of pro- versus anti-Assad, urban versus rural or sectar­ian lines but between those with the skills to sustain the country after the war and those unable to do so. The manoeuvring for major infrastructure contracts to rebuild Syria has been quietly under way since last year when it became clear Syrian President Bashar Assad would take back control of most of the country. The United Nations estimates that putting Syria back together may cost more than $300 billion and the likes of China, Russia, Iran would come up with the money in return for influence with Damascus but once Syria’s towns, schools and hospitals have been rebuilt — no matter by whom — who will run them? Overlooked in discussions of Syria’s post-conflict redevelop­ment is the country’s lack of skilled human capital. Its middle class fled overseas so Syria will probably remain a basket-case economy for at least a generation. The start of the uprising in 2011 saw Syria’s wealthiest families quickly move their assets, busi­nesses and children to Saudi Arabia, Dubai or Jordan. By 2014, a year before the great exodus of Syrians to Europe, UN figures showed that Syria’s per person GDP had re­gressed to $1,820. Companies closed and the value of the Syrian lira fell sharply. This meant that only the wealthi­est and best-educated Syrians could afford to start on the dangerous route from Lebanon to Turkey, then on to the Balkans and from there to central and northern Europe. (Remember the surprise expressed by many Europeans that refugees owned iPhones and were well-dressed?) The cost of plane tickets, smug­glers’ fees and transportation ran into thousands of dollars per person. Families travelling together were forced to part with multiples of that sum, often selling property in Syria to pay for it all and cutting any links with the homeland. Of the countless contacts and friends I’ve made during five years of living and reporting across Syria, an overwhelming number had the means to get to Sweden, Canada, Austria or Germany. Those without access to money that would allow them to leave were forced to remain in Syria. They are the poorest and the least-educated Syrians I’ve encountered. Many are well away from conflict zones and front lines but they are also without passports, jobs or incomes. Among them are young people with unfin­ished degrees, who are unable to enter the professional workforce and develop key skills. It’s worth remembering that not everyone who left Syria was fleeing the war or was staunchly anti-regime. Many were well-to-do urbanites or belonged to religious minority groups that opposed the attempts to overthrow Assad. The regime may have fanned sectarian fears to fuel the war but its conse­quences have been indiscriminate. All sides suffered. Some of the Syrians who left will undoubtedly return home. A large percentage of the worst-off refugees in Lebanon and Jordan and those living along the Turkish border regions will have little choice but to do so once the war ends but the millions of others in major Turkish cities, Europe and further afield will not come back, leaving Syria with­out key human capital, namely its professional class. The result is that Syria will remain a country without experienced professionals for at least another generation. While a country can manage with­out poetry and art, as Syria arguably did pre-2011, it cannot do without professionals who know how to save lives, run financial institutions and build factories. Critical to Syria’s functioning as a state before the war were its well-trained doctors, lawyers and other professionals. They have left and with them any chance of a prosper­ous, post-war future. Recovery cannot happen until a new middle class is established and gains the experience needed to run the country. Much can change for the better but chances are that Syria 20 years on will resemble present-day Yemen more than Lebanon

#### Absence of Doctors leads to medical shortage – More emigration will be tipping point

Schwartzstien 17

(Peter Schwartzstien is a journalist, consultant, and part of the Center for Climate and Security, a non-partisan DC-based think tank) Newsweek ,Published 8/9/17

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It’s been 12 years since Omar Hassan Majed fled Baghdad, but it sometimes feels as if he never left home.Hustling from room to room at his oncology clinic in Amman, Jordan, he jokes with the Iraqi nursing staff and drinks tea with the resident anesthesiologist, a childhood friend. And many of his patients are Iraqis. By the time he stops for dinner at an Iraqi grill—at the corner of Mosul and Basra streets—he’s gone hours without seeing a Jordanian.“It sounds bizarre, I know, but there are so many Iraqi doctors here,” Majed says. “It makes me wonder if there are any still in Iraq.”Since the 2003 U.S. invasion, Baghdad’s intellectual and cultural elite has left its turbulent homeland, fleeing violence, persecution and an economy with fewer and fewer good jobs. Tens of thousands have moved to the U.S., where many have enjoyed considerable success. Over half a million others—including many of the country’s most educated people—have moved elsewhere in the Middle East. And their numbers have increased since the [Islamic State militant group](http://www.newsweek.com/kissinger-warns-trump-isis-keeping-iran-check-he-must-not-let-it-fill-void-647766) (ISIS) conquered up to 40 percent of the country in 2014.ISIS has since been pushed out of most of Iraq, but many Iraqis aren’t returning. In countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and the Gulf states, talented Iraqi émigrés continue to staff hospitals, design roads, extract oil and lecture students. And as the country continues to bound from one crisis to the next, in part due to rampant corruption and mismanagement, its most educated citizens are succeeding in their new homes—and finding life in exile more and more appealing.“We needed a safe environment to work and live, and they needed skilled labor,” says Ali Nawaz, a Saudi-based petroleum engineer, who skipped out of Baghdad after a death threat in 2006. “It’s been a good match.” This isn’t the first time Iraq has been hit with a brain drain. Previous wars—with Iran in the 1980s, for instance—had a similar effect, but the turmoil that followed the American invasion, and the subsequent war with ISIS, has been far more harmful in this regard. Not only is the Iraqi school system in shambles, but the recent flight of professionals has made life harder for those left behind. More than 8,000 doctors have left in recent years, contributing to grave medical shortages, according to Rudaw, a Kurdish TV network.“It is too difficult to be a successful doctor back in Iraq because of the security, because of the fear of kidnapping,” says Nagham Hussein, a Baghdad-trained physician who left more than a decade ago.There are few such fears in her new home—Amman—where Iraq’s loss has quickly become Jordan’s gain.

#### Low Medical Supplies causes Pandemic – Extinction inevitable

Oshitani 08

(Hitoshi Oshitani, Taro Kamigaki, and Akira Suzuki from the Tohoku Graduate School of Medicine) “Major issues and challenges of influenza preparedness in Developing countries” (NCIB) National Center for Biotechnology Information Published 6/14/08

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/ JP

Better preparedness for an influenza pandemic mitigates its impact. Many countries have started developing and implementing national influenza pandemic preparedness plans. However, the level of preparedness varies among countries. Developing countries encounter unique and difficult issues and challenges in preparing for a pandemic. Deaths attributable to an influenza pandemic could be substantially higher in developing countries than in industrialized countries. Pharmaceutical interventions such as vaccines and antiviral agents are less likely to be available in developing countries. The public health and clinical infrastructure of developing countries are often inadequate to deal with a widespread health crisis such as an influenza pandemic. Such an event will inevitably have a global effect. Therefore, improving pandemic preparedness in every country, particularly developing ones, is urgently needed.Avian influenza, caused by influenza A virus (H5N1), continues to cause outbreaks among poultry and wild birds worldwide. It has spread from Asia to other regions, including Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The number of cases of human subtype H5N1 infection also continues to rise. These historically unprecedented outbreaks have raised serious global concerns about the imminent arrival of an influenza pandemic. The World Health Organization (WHO) urges countries to develop and implement national pandemic preparedness plans to mitigate the health and social effects of a pandemic ([1](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R1)). However, the level of preparedness varies among countries. In general, developing countries have limited financial and technical resources to strengthen pandemic preparedness. They also face some unique and difficult issues, which make preparing for a pandemic more challenging. These have not been addressed adequately during planning. Effective and feasible strategies are needed to mitigate the impact of the next influenza pandemic in developing countries.When an influenza pandemic emerges, all countries worldwide will inevitably be affected. However, the impact may vary both between and within countries. The estimated deaths for various countries during the Spanish flu pandemic from 1918 to 1920 shows that mortality rates in Europe and North America were significantly lower than those in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America ([2](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R2),[3](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R3)). A recent study that estimated the global impact of the Spanish flu pandemic indicated that a considerable difference in mortality rates was observed between high- and low-income countries ([4](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R4)). Why the pandemic caused such high mortality rates in developing countries is not entirely clear. Several factors may have been involved, including lack of access to adequate medical care, weak public health infrastructures, social factors such as housing conditions and population density, and host factors such as nutritional status and co-existing medical conditions. Another potential factor likely to influence mortality in a future pandemic is the high HIV/AIDS prevalence in some developing countries. Excess deaths attributed to pneumonia or influenza are significantly higher in HIV-positive persons during influenza seasons ([5](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R5)). HIV co-infection with a pandemic virus can be associated with more severe infections, which may further raise death rates in countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence.For these reasons, deaths associated with a future pandemic may be greater in developing countries than in industrialized countries. One study concluded that 96% of the estimated 62 million deaths in a future pandemic would occur in developing countries ([4](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R4)). The impact of such high mortality rates obviously needs to be taken into account when creating pandemic preparedness plans for developing countries. However, no appropriate model that can estimate the impact of an influenza pandemic in developing countries exists. Models are based on data from industrialized countries ([6](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R6)), which may underestimate the actual impact of a pandemic in developing countries.Several possible interventions can be implemented to control or mitigate the effects of an influenza pandemic, which include pharmaceutical interventions such as vaccines and antiviral agents, and nonpharmaceutical interventions such as quarantine, isolation, social distancing, and personal hygiene ([7](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R7)). Pharmaceutical interventions are needed for mitigating the impact of an influenza pandemic ([8](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R8)). Vaccines for subtype H5N1 viruses are currently being developed, and clinical trials are under way ([9](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R9),[10](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R10)). However, worldwide vaccine production capacity is limited and is primarily in industrialized countries, where most seasonal influenza vaccine is produced ([11](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R11)). A recent WHO report estimated that the worldwide vaccine production capacity for current influenza vaccines is 350 million doses per year ([12](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R12)). That level of production is clearly insufficient to supply vaccines to all countries. Only a limited number of vaccine doses would be available, particularly in the early stages of the pandemic, and most of them would likely be supplied to industrialized countries. Many countries, especially developing countries, will be forced to confront the next pandemic with few or no available vaccines.Antiviral agents are also considered effective for an influenza pandemic. They are particularly useful in the early stages of a pandemic when there is a shortage of vaccines ([13](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R13)). Two groups of antiviral agents for influenza are currently available, including M2 ion-channel inhibitors (amantadine and rimantadine) and neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir). Neuraminidase inhibitors are preferred because some influenza viruses show high frequencies of resistance to M2 ion-channel inhibitors ([14](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R14)). Stockpiling of neuraminidase inhibitors is under way in many industrialized countries as part of national influenza pandemic preparedness ([15](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R15)). However, the stockpiles of antiviral agents available in developing countries are small and limited. WHO has global and regional stockpiles of antiviral agents, which are limited and are specifically used for early response and containment. The stockpile of antiviral agents is insufficient for a global pandemic.The most critical limiting factor for stockpiling of neuraminidase inhibitors in developing countries is their high cost. One treatment course of oseltamivir (i.e., 10 tablets) costs US $15, even at a discount rate ([16](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R16)), which is far too expensive for developing countries. Some industrialized countries have set a target to stockpile oseltamivir to treat 25% of the general population. To purchase adequate oseltamivir for 25% of the total population, only 0.11% of the total annual health expenditure is required in high-income countries. In low-income countries, however, the expense would be 12.9% of the annual expenditure ([Table 1](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/table/T1/)). Therefore, it is not feasible for low-income countries to allocate scarce resources to stockpile sufficient quantities of oseltamivir for an unpredictable influenza pandemic.The recent efforts to increase global availability of vaccines and antiviral agents can contribute to increasing the global availability of these pharmaceutical interventions. However, increased availability alone will not solve all the problems in many countries. Several other issues need to be addressed to implement pharmaceutical interventions. These pharmaceutical commodities, including syringes and needles for vaccines, should be delivered to healthcare facilities throughout the country. That is a difficult logistic challenge for many developing countries. Human resources are also required to implement these interventions. Yet, there are some uncertainties about the effectiveness of these pharmaceutical interventions. Even neuraminidase inhibitors may not be fully effective for a pandemic virus, whose pathogenesis in human hosts differs from that of seasonal influenza viruses. Another potential problem with the antiviral drugs is the risk that resistant strains will emerge. Vaccines may not be effective because of antigenic differences between a vaccine strain and a pandemic virus, or for other reasons. Full-scale implementation of pharmaceutical interventions that requires enormous financial and human resources may not be the best use of limited resources in developing countries. The governments, international organizations such as WHO, and donors should consider various factors when providing support for pharmaceutical interventions in developing countries. Maintaining a balance between pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions is necessary to achieve the best use of limited resources. During an influenza pandemic, morbidity and mortality may be extremely high. Healthcare facilities would be quickly overwhelmed with increased numbers of patients. In the United States alone, an estimated 18–42 million outpatient visits and 314,000–734,000 hospitalizations could occur ([6](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R6)). The surge capacity in healthcare systems will likely be insufficient to cope with this rise in patient numbers, even in industrialized countries ([17](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R17),[18](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R18)). Healthcare resources such as the number of physicians, nurses, and available hospital beds are limited in developing countries. In some countries, resources are insufficient to cope with patients even during normal circumstances. Hospitals and clinics in developing countries will be easily overwhelmed by the increasing number of patients during an influenza pandemic.

Using the method described by Wilson et al. ([19](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R19)), we estimated the number of required hospital admissions for countries of varying economic status. The percentages of available hospital beds occupied by influenza patients at incidence rates of 15% and 35% were calculated by using FluSurge software, version 2.0 ([20](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R20)). (WHOSIS, [www.who.int/whosis/en](http://www.who.int/whosis/en)). Results are shown in [Table 2](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/table/T2/). The percentage of hospital beds required for patients with pandemic influenza is much higher in low-income countries than in high-income countries. With an incidence rate of 35%, up to 79.1% of hospital beds are required for patients with pandemic influenza in low-income countries. In countries like Bangladesh and Nepal, >100% of beds would be required for patients with pandemic influenza, even at the incidence rate of 15% (data not shown). This model is based on data from the United States, and the difference in disease severity among the countries was not considered. This model may underestimate the hospital bed requirements in developing countries, where a pandemic virus may cause more severe infections. Some hospitalized patients will require mechanical ventilation ([17](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R17)), but few mechanical ventilators, if any, are available in many hospitals in developing countries.

During an influenza pandemic, additional essential medical supplies such as gloves, masks, syringes, antipyretics, and antimicrobial agents will also be required. These supplies are insufficient in healthcare facilities in developing countries, even in nonemergency situations. Lack of these supplies may hamper provision of adequate medical care for patients with pandemic influenza. Basic personal protective equipment such as disposable gloves and surgical masks are needed for protecting healthcare workers. Antimicrobial agents are expected to be effective for secondary bacterial pneumonia, which can be a major cause of death for patients with pandemic influenza ([21](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R21)). Therefore, proper treatment with antimicrobial agents can be crucial for preventing deaths. However, in some developing countries, sufficient stocks of essential drugs, including antimicrobial agents, are often unavailable.

In countries with limited healthcare resources, providing routine medical care for other conditions may become difficult during a pandemic. For example, the treatment for tuberculosis or the antiretroviral treatment for AIDS patients may not be provided because of disruption in healthcare systems. Maintaining other public health programs, such as vaccination, may also be difficult when most of public health resources are spent for the response to a pandemic.

To minimize the impact of an influenza pandemic, good preparedness plans need to be developed. With the increasing risk for a pandemic caused by the spread of influenza A virus (H5N1), most countries have started such planning. These national plans were recently reviewed from different perspectives ([15](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R15),[22](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R22)–[24](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R24)). The level of planning in many developing countries is still inadequate to deal with such a major public health crisis. Some plans are based on the available plans of industrialized countries, or follow similar approaches to those of industrialized countries. As described above, the approaches used by industrialized countries may not be feasible or appropriate for developing countries. In addition, each country has specific issues, and therefore it should develop a plan based on its own requirements. This task can be difficult for most developing countries because they have little or no expertise with influenza and pandemic preparedness. For the few infectious disease experts working on infectious diseases in each country, numerous competing priorities exist, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and vaccine-preventable diseases. Feasible, user-friendly tools are needed to assist these countries. WHO has developed several such tools, including a checklist for national preparedness ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R25)). However, these tools describe the general approaches to pandemic preparedness and are not specifically designed for countries with limited resources. For developing countries more practical tools are needed, among them models to estimate the impact of a pandemic in developing countries, a list of feasible interventions to mitigate the impact of pandemic without available pharmaceutical interventions, and planning guidelines for hospitals with limited resources. If the next pandemic occurs in a few years, vaccines and antiviral agents, particularly neuraminidase inhibitors, may not be available as a main intervention in developing countries. Availability needs to be increased to fill the gaps between developed and industrialized countries. WHO recommends an increase in worldwide vaccine production to meet the demand during a pandemic ([12](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R12)). Several countries have initiated projects to improve influenza vaccine production with technical and financial support from WHO and donors. However, improved vaccine production capacity is not sustainable if only used for pandemic influenza vaccines. The use of seasonal influenza vaccines would also need to increase in these countries. However, the cost of the vaccines (US $3–$7 per dose) is a barrier in increasing their use ([12](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R12)). There is also little available evidence on the effectiveness and cost benefits of seasonal influenza vaccines in tropical developing countries. Further efforts should be made to reduce the cost and to collect additional scientific data to increase the use of seasonal influenza vaccines.Some approaches have been proposed and tested to reduce the amount of antigens per vaccine dose for pandemic vaccine so that more vaccines, including adjuvant and whole virion vaccines, can be supplied ([10](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R10)). The world is expected to have an increased capacity to produce vaccines for pandemic influenza viruses by 2010 ([12](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R12)). In some countries, the vaccines for the subtype with a pandemic potential are being produced and stockpiled as a prepandemic vaccine, which can be a useful tool to mitigate the impact of a pandemic ([26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R26)). However, both pandemic and prepandemic vaccines would not be available in developing countries unless an international mechanism exists to share such vaccines with them at a low cost.

Some actions have also been taken to reduce the cost of neuraminidase inhibitors such as oseltamivir. It is being produced in sublicensing companies in developing countries to increase its supply at a lower cost. However, oseltamivir may still not be affordable for many developing countries. In industrialized countries, M2 ion-channel inhibitors are not considered a first choice of treatment because of the high rate of resistance to these inhibitors. However, amantadine is much cheaper than neuraminidase inhibitors and is more widely available. Most subtype H5N1 isolates that belong to clade 1 are resistant to amantadine, but many clade 2 viruses are still susceptible to amantadine ([27](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R27)). M2 ion-channel inhibitors can be a valid option for a pandemic, especially in developing countries ([28](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R28)). The value of M2 ion-channel inhibitors as a treatment option for an influenza pandemic should be evaluated further. The health consequences of a pandemic, including deaths, can be substantially reduced by providing better medical care. Several issues need to be addressed to provide adequate medical care during a pandemic. First, essential medical supplies such as masks, gloves, and antimicrobial agents should be available in hospitals and clinics. The stockpiles of these basic supplies can be more cost-effective in developing countries than the stockpiles of more expensive antiviral agents. Guidelines on the types and quantity of essential items that are required in hospitals and clinics should be developed. Second, healthcare personnel should be trained for infection control measures. Even surgical masks are not commonly used in many developing countries, and hand hygiene practices are not always followed. Basic training on infection control should be provided to improve pandemic preparedness in healthcare settings. Third, healthcare and public health systems need to be maintained to minimize the impact of a pandemic. These systems should be maintained to deal not only with a pandemic but also with other health problems such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV.More feasible and effective strategies should be developed as soon as possible to mitigate the negative impact of an influenza pandemic in developing countries. Since the availability of pharmaceutical interventions in developing countries is less likely, nonpharmaceutical interventions such as social distancing and personal hygiene may be the only available interventions. Public health measures such as school closure and household quarantine have been evaluated by using mathematical models for their effectiveness in mitigating the impact of a pandemic ([29](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R29),[30](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R30)) and may have potential beneficial effects. However, the models suggest that substantial benefits of these measures require implementation with antiviral prophylaxis or vaccines ([29](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R29),[30](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R30)). The evidence for effectiveness of public health measures is limited and is based primarily on experience in industrialized countries ([31](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R31),[32](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R32)). For example, handwashing and hand hygiene have been highly publicized as a core management strategy for avian and pandemic influenza in developing countries ([33](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R33)). Although handwashing is effective in reducing the incidence of common diseases such as acute respiratory infections ([34](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R34)), data on its effectiveness specifically for community-acquired influenza infections are limited ([31](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R31)). Recommendations on nonpharmaceutical interventions have been based on available evidence ([35](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R35)). Accumulation of further scientific evidence for these measures, which can be implemented at a low cost, is urgently required. Many health programs in developing countries depend on financial support from donors. Influenza had little donor interest before the current avian influenza outbreaks. More donor funds are available for avian and pandemic influenza. These funds are often earmarked for specific activities. However, a more general approach is required to improve pandemic preparedness in developing countries. Improving pandemic preparedness without establishing a proper national program for seasonal influenza is unrealistic. For example, increasing the availability of pandemic vaccines without increasing the use of vaccines for seasonal influenza is difficult. It is also difficult to implement infection control measures in hospitals and personal hygiene during a pandemic if they are not routinely implemented for seasonal influenza and other infections.Lack of adequate infrastructure and technical expertise is a fundamental issue for developing countries, not only for influenza pandemic preparedness but also for any other infectious disease threats. Revised International Health Regulations (2005) were adopted at the World Health Assembly in 2005, under which each country is required to have core capacities for disease surveillance and response ([36](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R36)). Strengthening the core capacity in each country should be an essential step to improve preparedness for any public health emergency, including an influenza pandemic. Although some actions should be taken immediately to address urgent issues regarding a pandemic threat posed by influenza A (H5N1), a long-term vision is required to establish such core capacity in every country. An influenza pandemic will spread to every corner of the world; hence, every country must be prepared for such a global event. All human cases of infection with influenza A virus (H5N1) have so far occurred in less industrialized countries, and thus the pandemic virus is likely to emerge from these countries. Epidemiologic models have indicated the possibility of rapid containment of the virus with a pandemic potential ([37](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R37),[38](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R38)). WHO has stockpiles of oseltamivir specifically for the early containment of a potential pandemic. However, the window of opportunity is narrow, and early containment operations should be initiated as soon as the initial sign of a potential pandemic is detected. Timely sharing of the virus strains and relevant information is essential for such containment to be successful.Sharing of the virus stains is also critical to develop pandemic vaccines. However, some countries do not share the virus strains with WHO reference laboratories. These countries argue that the virus strains from their countries would be used to develop pandemic vaccines that would only be available for rich countries ([39](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600290/#R39)). Developing countries have no incentives to share the virus strains if they do not benefit from the vaccines developed from these strains. The gaps in resources, including vaccine production capacity between the developing and industrialized countries, hinder the global effort to respond to a pandemic. Unequal distribution of resources, including antiviral stockpiles, could also be a major international issue when an influenza pandemic occurs. Countries with limited or no antiviral stockpiles and other resources may not be able to cope with the pandemic. A pandemic poses a serious threat to global health security if large gaps in capacity and available resources continue to persist. Large numbers of people may attempt to cross international borders to obtain better medical care, including antiviral treatment, or to escape a chaotic situation. Preparing for a pandemic by simply strengthening preparedness within a single country is not possible. A pandemic is a global issue, and pandemic preparedness should be considered from a global perspective.

### Ext - uniqueness

#### Doctors are leaving Syria now

**Baker 14**

(Aryn Baker is reporter for Time and was correspondent for Middle East) Time “Syria’s Health Crisis Spirals as Doctors Flee” Published 2/4/14

http://time.com/3968/syrias-health-crisis-spirals-as-doctors-flee/ JP

It was the third week of an uprising in Syria that would eventually evolve into a brutal civil war and already the wounded were showing up at the hospital in the Damascus suburb where 29-year-old Ahmed was doing rotations during his medical residency. Ahmed, who asked that only one part of his name be published because he is afraid of repercussions from Syria’s security agencies, had only just started examining a young man with bruises and a deep puncture wound on his right side when two armed security officials burst into the examining room barking questions. Who was the patient, they wanted to know, and how did he get his injuries? When it emerged that the patient had been at a protest that afternoon against the government of Syrian President Bashar Assad the officials hauled the young man outside. Ahmed could do nothing. “I was so angry at myself,” he recalls, as he chain-smokes in a café in Lebanon nearly three years later. “Why didn’t I protect him? I was terrified. I was a coward.” That scene in Ahmed’s examining room would play out hundreds of more times across Syria as regime thugs hunted hospitals for wounded protestors, and then later, for rebels fighting against Assad’s government. When the rebel forces in Douma, the suburb where Ahmed’s hospital is located, grew in number and strength they then took to roaming the hospital corridors, seeking to finish off any regime supporters who had been injured in the vicious street fighting. In July 2012, the Syrian government passed an anti-terrorism law that effectively made it a crime to provide medical care to anyone suspected of supporting the rebels. Ahmed was caught between the Hippocratic oath — a doctor’s promise to treat every patient — and the growing pressure to take sides. “The regime said ‘Why are you helping the Free Army?’ and the Free Army said ‘Why are you helping the regime?’” Once a supporter of the revolution, Ahmed has come to the conclusion that neither side will be able to save Syria. So he is giving up, abandoning his “patient”— Syria— once again, he says with a wry smile. Instead, he has opted for a life in the United States; relatives already there are helping him to emigrate. “Yes, maybe I feel guilty,” he admits. “Maybe I am a coward for leaving Syria. But as a doctor it is impossible to work there. I have to live, I have to eat.” Ahmed is one of an estimated 15,000 doctors who have fled Syria over the past three years, according to a [report released Feb. 2 by Physicians For Human Rights](http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/other/syrias-medical-community-under-assault.html) [PHR], representing half of the certified physicians in a country whose medical system was once the envy of the Arab world. The doctors who have fled have left behind a horrifying medical crisis. According to the [World Health Organization](http://www.who.int/hac/donorinfo/syrian_arab_republic_donorupdate9april2013.pdf), more than half of Syrian hospitals have been destroyed or severely damaged. Syria’s largest city, Aleppo, once boasted 6,000 doctors. According to the PHR report, only 250 remained as of July 2013, serving a population of 2,500,000. In the Damascus suburbs where Ahmed worked, a pre-war population of 1,000 doctors had been cut down to 30 by December, according to the PHR report. Nurses, technicians, ambulance drivers and medical support personnel have been forced to abandon their posts, the report says, unable to provide care in destroyed hospitals and clinics where supplies of life-giving medicine have run out. Even if the war were to end tomorrow, its medical legacy will last a generation. The U.N. estimates that more than half a million Syrians have suffered debilitating injuries that will require long-term care. Outbreaks of communicable disease are on the rise. Manageable chronic conditions, such as diabetes, kidney failure and heart disease, are escalating into life-threatening illnesses. When the war ends, Syria will need more physicians than ever before. Yet the likelihood of doctors returning from exile is slim. The longer the war lasts, the harder it will be for them to give up their new lives. The medical staff who have fled Ahmed’s hospital have settled in France, Germany, Dubai and Saudi Arabia. Some have lucrative contracts with local hospitals; others have set up private clinics. Many are going through the arduous process of getting recertified so they can work in the United States and Europe. “Most doctors will not go back after the crisis,” says Dr. Zaher Sahloul, a Chicago-based pulmonologist and head of the [Syrian American Medical Society](http://www.sams-usa.net/), an organization that raises funds to provide salaries and supplies to doctors still working in Syria. “Once you set up a new practice in a safe country it is a difficult decision to go back, especially since the economic situation will be so bad.” He says that around 1,000 to 1,200 Syrian doctors are already in the process of resettling in the U.S since the conflict started. Though not all will continue in the medical field, it is a significant addition to the 7,000 Syrian doctors who were already in the U.S. prior to the war’s start. “It’s a huge brain drain,” Sahloul says. “I am not sure the Syrian medical system can recover from this.” The shortage of doctors is taking an immense toll. Based on an assessment of mortality rates, hospital intake numbers, population and treatment rates for manageable diseases prior to the war, Sahloul estimates that some 200,000 people have died in Syria because they did not have access to routine medical care, what he calls a “secondary death toll” that is even higher than those killed by bombs and firearms. “These are the women who died in labor because there was no one to do a C-section, or the men who have a heart attack and can’t find a physician, or have complications from diabetes. People are dying of chronic diseases that three years ago would have been completely manageable.” The PHR report has found that 70,000 cancer patients and 5,000 dialysis patients have not been able to receive treatment. Oncologist Michel Abdallah fled for Jordan last year, and is now treating refugees as an employee of an aid group. The situation in Syria, he says, “is really bad. There are situations where a dermatologist might play the role of a dentist or a surgeon. We are losing patients who could have easily survived in normal circumstances. That’s not easy to come to terms with.”As Syria suffers, the American health system may benefit. Many Syrian doctors finished their advanced studies in the U.S. and are already licensed to work there. The U.S., with its high salaries and advanced medical care, has long been a magnet for doctors around the globe. Ahmed isn’t sure yet what he will do once he arrives in the U.S. After three years of war, he says he is tired of blood. “Real estate might be nice,” he muses. Still, he is hedging his bets. Unlike many doctors who fled, Ahmed is applying for official leave from his employer, the Syrian Ministry of Health. He hasn’t told them he is leaving the country, only that he is opening a private clinic. That way, if he does come back, he won’t be penalized. Sahloul thinks it’s unlikely that someone like Ahmed will ever return. That’s why, he says, it is so important to persuade the doctors still in Syria to stay. But he admits it’s a losing battle. “Doctors there not only have to deal with patients and disease, but politics and fighting groups and security. I can see why they are fleeing, but for the sake of Syria’s future, I wish they would stay.”

### Ext - link

#### Absence of Doctors leads to Chaos – Health system in Disarray

**Phillips 16**

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/syrias-compounding-healthcare-crisis JP

(Steven Phillips MD is a research scientist) The Washington Institute “Syria’s compounding Health Care Crisis

A country’s optimal health care infrastructure comprises state of the art facilities staffed by well-trained providers with access to authoritative and current health science information. Prior to the civil war, the Syrian Arab Republic was close to this goal; it had five functioning medical schools, a National Health and Medication Plan, and thirty-seven medical libraries. During the decades preceding the Syrian civil war, access to and delivery of healthcare and healthcare information had steadily improved. According to the World Health organization, the life expectancy of the average Syrian in 2012 was 75.7 years, a leap from an average of 56 years in 1970. Pre-conflict health indicators amassed by the Syrian International Coalition for Health in 2012 noted substantial reductions in the death rate from all causes. The civil war has reversed this trend; average life expectancy has fallen twenty years from the 2012 level. The United Nations now estimates that 12.2 million Syrians—including approximately six million children—require urgent humanitarian assistance. Understanding the on-the-ground medical realities of the Syrian conflict, and how they differ from previous conflicts, is vital for both effective allocation of United States and international resources, and the development of medical plans for the days after the civil war.Throughout the history of modern conflicts, combatants have generally recognized medical personnel and facilities as non-combatants and spared them from attack. The Geneva Convention explicitly states that both military and civilian medical personnel exclusively assigned to medical duties must be respected and protected in all circumstances. Consequently, intentionally directing attacks against identifiable medical personnel and facilities constitutes a war crime.My personal experience in Vietnam supports the idea that the Geneva Convention Rules were, by and large, followed even in intense modern warfare scenarios. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars avoided attacking adequately identified medical facilities, probably due to United States’ military hospitals’ routine treatment for wounded enemy combatants. In 1968, while serving with the 101st Airborne, my medics and I were delivering a medical civic action program (MEDCAP) in a remote village. As dusk approached, the village chief told me a Viet Cong platoon was approaching and requested we leave immediately as the platoon did not want to harm a MEDCAP team. Though we feared an ambushed, we left the village unharmed. On another occasion my medical platoon was assigned to help re-open the civilian hospital in Hue City, which had been devastated by the TET offensive. There, we treated the general civilian population that undoubtedly included many enemies and enemy sympathizers. Our proper identification ensured that we were never harmed or even threatened during that three-month assignment.The Syrian conflict stands in sharp contrast to this model of healthcare during modern warfare. The Syrian healthcare system, public health infrastructure, and health information resources have been devastated by the ongoing civil war, especially in rebel held areas. Health care personnel, health care facilities, ambulances, manufacturers and suppliers of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, including NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders, have been purposely and aggressively targeted on multiple fronts, primarily by the Syrian government. The Syrian government, which controls the skies, is responsible for 88 percent of recorded hospital attacks and 97 percent of medical personnel killed, with 139 deaths directly attributed to torture or execution. Rebel forces and ISIL have also been accused of targeting the health sector. In total, there have been 233 deliberate or indiscriminate attacks on 183 medical facilities. Russia’s entrance into the air campaign has dramatically increased hospital and clinic bombings. In October 2015, the first full month of Russian involvement, twelve medical facilities were purposely targeted and bombed. Early in 2016, Russian bombs targeted three hospitals, killing many and depriving thousands of Syrians access to care. The effects of these bombings have cumulated into a national health crisis. According to the World Health Organization, approximately two-thirds of Syrian hospitals and clinics have been rendered useless or destroyed by the war. Remaining medical facilities are understaffed, poorly equipped, undersupplied, and overwhelmed with trauma care. Restrictions on travel and sanctions have resulted in drug, medical supplies, and equipment shortages. With a shattered infrastructure, both doctors and patients have suffered tremendously. Nearly 700 healthcare workers have been killed or injured, and a full half of the country’s physicians have been forced to flee the country. More than one million Syrians have been wounded or killed, leaving hundreds of thousands with poorly managed chronic disabilities and a tragic lack of access to basic medical services. Deaths from treatable diseases and wounds have skyrocketed. Aside from combat-related challenges, treatments for chronic cardiovascular and renal diseases, cancer, diabetes, and non-urgent routine medical interventions are severely interrupted. “Elective” follow-up care for wounds, amputee prosthetics, infections, and other conditions can no longer be a priority and rarely receive attention. The large-scale displacement of the Syrian population, unsanitary conditions, and contaminated water supply is fueling a resurgence of once-extinct communicable diseases: polio, cholera, typhoid, hepatitis, and parasitic infections. The mental trauma inflicted by this nearly six-year long civil war on the civilian population is incalculable.The Syrian American Medical Society has been actively facilitating the rotation health care volunteers in Syria, but its doctors -- Dr. Samer Atar among them -- are chronicling the horrors of the field and the severe inadequacies of the medical situation that has led to the loss of many savable lives.Healthcare professionals are in many ways at a loss as to how the situation can be alleviated. Leonard Rubinstein, Director at the Bloomberg Center for Public Health and Human Rights at Johns Hopkins University, noted that the situation in Syria “is the worst concerted attack on healthcare in living memory… in places like Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and the Gaza Strip, there has been nothing like what has happened in Syria.”The United States has provided more than $6.5 billion in humanitarian aid since the start of the crisis. This financial effort supports the operations of the United Nations and NGOs to provide emergency relief to Syria and its neighbors, which have been overwhelmed with the burdens of refugee assistance and have periodically closed their borders due to terrorist attacks. Closed borders prevent international medical humanitarian organizations like Doctors Without Borders from treating wounded Syrians. Though unconfirmed, it is reported that the Israeli army has set up a field hospital along the Syrian border on the Golan Heights to treat wounded Syrians.Though it is obvious that the Syrian crisis will not end soon, it is important to start thinking about the major international efforts that will be required to rebuild their public health and health care infrastructure. The Syrian medical community and supporting NGOs will have to shift from a crisis response mode to a strategic planning and recovery mode. The health sector that will be assembled to support this effort will require strong command and control to coordinate efforts, prioritize activities, and develop communication protocols that can accommodate an international task force. Critically important to this effort is the use of real time, open and free access to health information provided by the US National Library of Medicines (NLM) Disaster Information Management Research Center.Throughout the history of warfare, the medical respondents, both military and civilian, have intentionally been spared from attack. Even during the intense combat of World War I and World War II, periodic truces had been called to allow medical teams to evacuate and treat the injured; not so in Syria. The Syrian government has purposefully and intentionally targeted their own medical infrastructure, including humanitarian volunteer teams. This violation of the Geneva Convention has resulted in the nearly complete destruction of a preconflict, modern Syrian health care system. The rebuilding of their devastated health structure will require a herculean effort by the international community, which should commit itself to decades of work.

### Ext – doctors key

#### Health care systems under attack in Syria. Without doctors, entire populations will die from lack of treatment.

**Heisler, 15**

Michele Heisler, M.D., M.P.A., et. al., “Attacks on Health Care in Syria — Normalizing Violations of Medical Neutrality?”, 12/24/15. https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1513512

When health care systems come under assault, the losses are far greater than the toll of health workers killed and hospital bricks and mortar demolished. Safe spaces for injured civilians to seek medical care are destroyed, and whole populations may be denied access to treatment. When these attacks are as widespread as they are in Syria, the consequences reverberate across the country and region. All the doctors we interviewed who remain working in Aleppo explained that if they leave, people will die for lack of medical care. As they risked their lives to treat civilians, including colleagues, whose bodies were shattered by barrel-bomb attacks, these physicians expressed dismay at the international community's failure to enforce the Geneva Conventions. They emphasized that the main obstacle for medical personnel was lack of safety, and the main need was for protection. As one explained, “You must be safe to save others . . . If you kill the physician or destroy the hospital, the medicine doesn't benefit any people. The main problem is the inability to protect the staff.” In particular, all the physicians we interviewed emphasized the priority of stopping the barrel bombs. One told us, “If the barrels stop, doctors will come back. We just need to stop the barrels; it's the first and the last thing we need.” These violations of international humanitarian law have been well documented in real time, yet the international response has been minimal. The United Nations (UN) Security Council — the international body mandated to protect civilians in conflict, enforce international humanitarian law, and refer cases to the International Criminal Court for investigation of possible war crimes — remains paralyzed by politics. It passed a single resolution in February 2014 demanding that all parties to the conflict end attacks on civilians and respect the principle of medical neutrality. Since then, it has watched attacks on civilians and medical facilities increase in Syria without taking further actions. We believe that governments and nongovernmental organizations should call out the Security Council for failing to maintain international peace and security and ensure accountability for perpetrators, and in the event of continued failure these organizations should demand a restructuring of the Council. In addition, individual governments can step up diplomatic pressure and consider imposing sanctions against violators. If the international community does not mobilize to stop the attacks on Syria's medical professionals and infrastructure, civilians will continue to suffer and die. In addition, lasting peace cannot be achieved unless the perpetrators of these crimes are held accountable. The effects of these violations and absence of accountability will go far beyond Syria. The longer the international community fails to enforce humanitarian law, the greater the chance that these violations will become the “new normal” in armed conflicts around the world, eroding the long-standing norm of medical neutrality. Left unchecked, attacks on medical care will become a standard weapon of war.

#### Syria Healthcare System under threat of Collapse

**WHO 3/14**

((WHO) The World Health Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations that is concerned with international public health.) World Health Organization “Seven years of Syria’s Health Tragedy” Published 3/14/18

http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2018/seven-years-syria/en/ JP

After seven years of conflict in Syria, WHO has renewed its call for the protection of health workers and for immediate access to besieged populations. Attacks on the health sector have continued at an alarming level in the past year. The 67 verified attacks on health facilities, workers, and infrastructure recorded during the first two months of 2018 amount to more than 50% of verified attacks in all of 2017. “This health tragedy must come to an end,” said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General. “Every attack shatters communities and ripples through health systems, damaging infrastructure and reducing access to health for vulnerable people. WHO calls on all parties to the conflict in Syria to immediately halt attacks on health workers, their means of transport and equipment, hospitals and other medical facilities.” Health systems are being attacked in the very places where they are needed most. An estimated 2.9 million Syrians live in UN-declared hard-to-reach and besieged locations. WHO is providing health assistance to many of these areas but lacks consistent access. In East Ghouta, nearly 400,000 people have lived under siege for half a decade. Basic health supplies have all but run out, and there are now more than 1,000 people in need of immediate medical evacuation. “It is unacceptable that children, women, and men are dying from injuries and illnesses that are easily treatable and preventable,” said Dr Tedros.Critical medical supplies are also routinely removed from inter-agency convoys to hard-to-reach and besieged locations. Earlier this month, more than 70% of the health supplies intended to reach East Ghouta were removed by authorities and sent back to the WHO warehouse. The items removed are desperately needed to save lives and reduce suffering. Seven years of conflict have devastated Syria’s healthcare system. More than half of the country’s public hospitals and healthcare centres are closed or only partially functioning and more than 11.3 million people need health assistance, including 3 million living with injuries and disabilities. WHO is committed to ensuring that people across Syria have access to essential, life-saving healthcare. Last year, WHO delivered over 14 million treatments across the country, including through cross-border and cross-line services.“The suffering of the people of Syria must stop. We urge all parties to the conflict to end attacks on health, to provide access to all those in Syria who need health assistance, and, above all, to end this devastating conflict,” said Dr Tedros.

### Ext – impact

#### Syria has a history of fast-spreading diseases, even before the refugee crisis, that are far deadlier than the rest of the world.

Alsadat, 12

Alsadat, Reem et al. “Characteristics and Outcome of Critically Ill Patients with 2009 H1N1 Influenza Infection in Syria.” Avicenna Journal of Medicine 2.2 (2012): 34–37. PMC. Web. 18 July 2018.(JTR)

The severe cases of 2009 influenza A (H1N1) infection outbreak in Damascus affected primarily young males conferring a mortality of 51% among critically ill patients compared with 41.4% in Mexico,[7] 17.3% in Canada,[8] 14% in Australia and New Zealand,[6] and 28% in the USA.[9] The age distribution of disease for pandemic 2009 influenza A (H1N1) infection is markedly different from that of seasonal influenza. A history of lung disease, obesity, and cardiovascular disease were the most common comorbidities with almost one third of the patients presented with no predisposing risk factors similar to what has been reported in the literature.[7–10] Presenting symptoms were more often fever, cough, sore throat, and shortness of breath. While gastrointestinal symptoms are observed infrequently (5%) in adults infected with seasonal influenza, more than one-fourth of adult cases in our series reported at least nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, or diarrhea. Critical illness occurred rapidly after hospital admission and was associated with severe oxygenation failure, a requirement for prolonged mechanical ventilation, and the frequent use of rescue therapies, including muscle paralysis. The rate of muscle paralysis use of 79.7% is much higher than what is reported in other studies and may in fact give an idea of the local critical care practices in the country. The higher case fatality rate observed in our study cannot be attributed to sicker patients or to a delay in initiating therapies as the average APACHE II score for those patients was 15.2 on admission to ICU compared with the average APACHE II score of 19.7 in the Canadian study[8] with a mortality rate of 17.3%. It is also much higher than the APACHE II predicted mortality rate of 21% with standardized mortality ratio of 2.4, acceptable 95% confidence interval of 1.7–3.2 and statistical significance with P value < 0.001. This high mortality rate should mandate review of the standards of critical care delivery in the country in relation to the structure and designs of critical care units, available equipment, supplies and maintenance, human resources, staff training and ICU management skills, ICU policies, procedures, and different care processes in addition to quality assurance programs.

#### Pandemics cause extinction

Dhillon 17 – Ranu Dhillon, Instructor @ Harvard Medical School and a Physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston, Works on building health systems in developing countries and served as an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing countries and served as an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic, Harvard Business Review, 3-15-17, “The World Is Completely Unprepared for a Global Pandemic”, https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-world-is-completely-unprepared-for-a-global-pandemic

We fear it is only a matter of time before we face a **deadlier and more contagious pathogen**, yet the threat of a deadly pandemic remains dangerously overlooked. Pandemics now occur with **greater frequency**, due to factors such as **climate change**, **urbanization**, and **international travel**. Other factors, such as a weak World Health Organization and potentially massive cuts to funding for U.S. scientific research and foreign aid, including funding for the United Nations, stand to deepen our vulnerability. We also **face the specter of novel and mutated pathogens that could spread and kill faster than diseases we have seen before**. With the advent of genome-editing technologies, bioterrorists could artificially engineer new plagues, a threat that Ashton Carter, the former U.S. secretary of defense, thinks could **rival nuclear weapons in deadliness**. The two of us have advised the president of Guinea on stopping Ebola. In addition, we have worked on ways to contain the spread of Zika and have informally advised U.S. and international organizations on the matter. Our experiences tell us that the world is unprepared for these threats. We urgently need to change this trajectory. We can start by learning four lessons from the gaps exposed by the Ebola and Zika pandemics. Faster Vaccine Development The most effective way to stop pandemics is with vaccines. However, with Ebola there was no vaccine, and only now, years later, has one proven effective. This has been the case with Zika, too. Though there has been rapid progress in developing and getting a vaccine to market, it is not fast enough, and Zika has already spread worldwide. Many other diseases do not have vaccines, and developing them takes too long when a pandemic is already under way. We need faster pipelines, such as the one that the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations is trying to create, to preemptively develop vaccines for diseases predicted to cause outbreaks in the near future. Poinkt-of-Care Diagnostics Even with such efforts, vaccines will not be ready for many diseases and would not even be an option for novel or artificially engineered pathogens. With no vaccine for Ebola, our next best strategy was to identify who was infected as quickly as possible and isolate them before they infected others. Because Ebola’s symptoms were identical to common illnesses like malaria, diagnosis required laboratory testing that could not be easily scaled. As a result, many patients were only tested after several days of being contagious and infecting others. Some were never tested at all, and about 40% of patients in Ebola treatment centers did not actually have Ebola. Many dangerous pathogens similarly require laboratory testing that is difficult to scale. Florida, for example, has not been able to expand testing for Zika, so pregnant women wait weeks to know if their babies might be affected. What’s needed are point-of-care diagnostics that, like pregnancy tests, can be used by frontline responders or patients themselves to detect infection right away, where they live. These tests already exist for many diseases, and the technology behind them is well-established. However, the process for their validation is slow and messy. Point-of-care diagnostics for Ebola, for example, were available but never used because of such bottlenecks. Greater Global Coordination **We need stronger global coordination**. The responsibility for controlling pandemics is **fragmented, spread across too many players with no unifying authority**. In Guinea we forged a response out of an amalgam of over 30 organizations, each of which had its own priorities. In Ebola’s aftermath, there have been calls for a mechanism for responding to pandemics similar to the advance planning and training that NATO has in place for its numerous members to respond to military threats in a quick, coordinated fashion. This is the right thinking, but we are far from seeing it happen. The errors that allowed Ebola to become a crisis replayed with Zika, and the WHO, which should anchor global action, continues to suffer from a lack of credibility. Stronger Local Health Systems International actors are essential but **cannot parachute into countries and navigate local dynamics quickly enough to contain outbreaks**. In Guinea it took months to establish the ground game needed to stop the pandemic, with Ebola continuing to spread in the meantime. We need to help developing countries establish health systems that can provide routine care and, when needed, coordinate with international responders to contain new outbreaks. Local health systems could be established for about half of the $3.6 billion ultimately spent on creating an Ebola response from scratch. Access to **routine care** is also **essential** for knowing when an outbreak is taking root and establishing trust. For months, Ebola spread before anyone knew it was happening, and then lingered because communities who had never had basic health care doubted the intentions of foreigners flooding into their villages. The turning point in the pandemic came when they began to trust what they were hearing about Ebola and understood what they needed to do to halt its spread: identify those exposed and safely bury the dead. With Ebola and Zika, we lacked these four things — vaccines, diagnostics, global coordination, and local health systems — which are still urgently needed. However, prevailing political headwinds in the United States, which has played a **key role in combatting pandemics around the world**, threaten to make things worse. The Trump administration is seeking drastic budget cuts in funding for foreign aid and scientific research. The U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development may lose over one-third of their budgets, including half of the funding the U.S. usually provides to the UN. The National Institutes of Health, which has been on the vanguard of vaccines and diagnostics research, may also face cuts. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has been at the forefront of responding to outbreaks, remains without a director, and, if the Affordable Care Act is repealed, would lose $891 million, 12% of its overall budget, provided to it for immunization programs, monitoring and responding to outbreaks, and other public health initiatives. Investing in our ability to prevent and contain pandemics through **revitalized national** and international **institutions** should be our shared goal. However, if U.S. agencies become less able to respond to pandemics, leading institutions from other nations, such as Institut Pasteur and the National Institute of Health and Medical Research in France, the Wellcome Trust and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in the UK, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs have done instrumental research and response work in previous pandemics), would need to step in to fill the void. There is no border wall against disease. **Pandemics are an existential threat on par with climate change and nuclear conflict**. We are at a critical crossroads, where we must either take the steps needed to prepare for this threat or become even more vulnerable. It is only a matter of time before we are hit by a deadlier, more contagious pandemic. Will we be ready?

#### Bypasses all defense

Pamlin and Armstrong 15 – Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager, Global Challenges Foundation, Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Global Challenges: 12 Risks that Threaten Human Civilization, Global Challenges Foundation, Feb. 2015, http://www.astro.sunysb.edu/fwalter/HON301/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact-full-report-1.pdf

Infectious diseases have been one of the **greatest causes of mortality** in history. Unlike many other global challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good data exist. Plotting historic epidemic fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to follow a power law; with a small exponent: many plagues have been found to follow a power law with exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are heavy-tailed262 to a significant degree.263 In consequence most of the fatalities are accounted for by the top few events.264 If this law holds for future pandemics as well,265 then the majority of people who will die from epidemics will likely die from the **single largest pandemic**. Most epidemic fatalities follow a power law, with some extreme events – such as the Black Death and Spanish ‘Flu – being even more deadly.267 There are other grounds for suspecting that such a high impact epidemic will have a **greater probability** than usually assumed. All the features of an extremely devastating disease **already exist in nature**: essentially incurable (Ebola268), nearly always fatal (rabies269), extremely infectious (common cold270), and long incubation periods (HIV271). If a pathogen were to emerge that somehow **combined these features** (and influenza has demonstrated antigenic shift, the ability to combine features from different viruses272), its **death toll would be extreme**. Many relevant features of the world have changed considerably, making past comparisons problematic. The modern world has better sanitation and medical research, as well as national and supra-national institutions dedicated to combating diseases. Private insurers are also interested in modelling pandemic risks.273 Set against this is the fact that modern transport and dense human population allow infections to spread much more rapidly274, and there is the potential for urban slums to serve as breeding grounds for disease.275 Unlike events such as nuclear wars, pandemics would not damage the world’s infrastructure, and initial survivors would likely be resistant to the infection. And there would probably be survivors, if only in isolated locations. Hence the risk of a civilisation collapse would come from the ripple effect of the **fatalities and the policy responses**. These would include political and agricultural disruption as well as economic dislocation and damage to the world’s trade network (including the food trade).

**Impact – AT - Burnout**

**No burn out---impact’s extinction**

**Guterl 12** – Fred Guterl, Executive Editor of Scientific American, Former Senior Editor at Newsweek, Professor at Princeton University, The Fate of the Species: Why the Human Race May Cause Its Own Extinction and How We Can Stop It, p. 1-2

Over the next few years, the bigger story turned out not to be SARS, which trailed off quickly, bur avian influenza, or bird flu. It had been making the rounds among birds in Southeast Asia for years. An outbreak in 1997 Hong Kong and another in 2003 each called for the culling of thousands of birds and put virologists and health workers into a tizzy. Although the virus wasn't much of a threat to humans, scientists fretted over the possibility of a horrifying pandemic. Relatively few people caught the virus, but more than half of them died. What would happen if this bird flu virus made the jump to humans? What if it mutated in a way that allowed it to spread from one person to another, through tiny droplets of saliva in the air? One bad spin of the genetic roulette wheel and a deadly new human pathogen would **spread across the globe in a matter of days**. With a kill rate of 60 percent, such a pandemic would be **devastating**, to say the least. Scientists were worried, all right, but the object of their worry was somewhat theoretical. Nobody knew for certain if such a supervirus was even possible. To cause that kind of damage to the human population, a flu virus has to combine two traits: lethality and transmissibility. The more optimistically minded scientists argued that one trait precluded the other, that if the bird flu acquired the ability to spread like wildfire, it would lose its ability to kill with terrifying efficiency. The virus would spread, cause some fever and sniffles, and take its place among the pantheon of ordinary flu viruses that come and go each season. The optimists, we found out last fall, were wrong. Two groups of scientists working independently managed to create bird flu viruses in the lab that had that killer combination of lethality and transmissibility among humans. They did it for the best reasons, of course—to find vaccines and medicines to treat a pandemic should one occur, and more generally to understand how influenza viruses work. If we're lucky, the scientists will get there before nature manages to come up with the virus herself, or before someone steals the genetic blueprints and turns this knowledge against us. Influenza is a natural killer, but we have made it our own. We have created the conditions for new viruses to flourish—among pigs in factory farms and live animal markets and a connected world of international trade and travel—and we've gone so far as to fabricate the virus ourselves. Flu is an excellent example of how we have, through our technologies and our dominant presence on the planet, begun to multiply the risks to our own **survival**.

#### Extinction

**Casadevall 12** – Arturo Casadevall, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The Future of Biological Warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) **infectious disease**. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided **unequivocal** evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has **traditionally** not been associated with extinction **this view has changed** by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of **numerous amphibian species** (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). **Previously**, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many **pathogens required their hosts** and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation **does not apply** to microbes that are acquired **directly from the environment** and have no need for a host, such as the majority of **fungal pathogens**. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off **every last member of a species** without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of **existential threats** environmental microbes could potentially pose a **much greater threat to humanity** than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

**Impact - disease reps**

**Disease reps don’t have deterministic outcomes**

Richardson 8

Alexia -- “Traces of terror : photography and memory of political violence in Argentina and Peru” –as part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. This was the her Dissertation to gain her PhD in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures University of Durham. While pursuing her PhD at Durham University, Alexia Richardson gained much traction on the international conference scene – presenting a paper titled 'Ni un paso atrás: Resistance and Emotion in Images of Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo' at the ‘Public Displays of Affection’ conference at the University of Rochester, New York. Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1898/

Despite the ubiquitous nature of photographic images, their pervasive influence may be hard to pin down. In a sceptical analysis, David Perlmutter (1998) questions the logic of 'visual determinism', which argues for the role of images in policy decisions - the so-called 'CNN effect' which draws elected officials to the television set as they evaluate their ever-changing position in the public eye. According to Perlmutter, icons are selected and confirmed by a small section of society he calls 'discourse elites' - politicians, academics, and workers in the media. Because such privileged professionals work daily with images, control them, study them in broadsheet newspapers and believe in their effects, they tend to assume that the general public does likewise, often overestimating the familiarity of even the most famous images to the untrained or uninterested viewer. Choosing specific examples including Adams' image of General Loan in Tet and other'icons of outrage', he argues that the measurable effect of visual images is small and they do not usually overturn policy, although, by contrast, some examples of decisions influenced by images are given in Taylor (1998: 136). So, while many blamed photographs like those made by Adams for influencing public opinion in the United States against the war in Vietnam, Perlmutter argues for the reverse: that because public opinion was already turning against the war, it seized on the image of Loan as a confirmation of its new values. Perlmutter's warning against an exaggerated or naive trust in the power of the image is important, and he is correct in stating that an objective measurement of the influence of images **on policy decisions** is hard to find. Nevertheless, his analysis does not preclude a more general awareness of certain regularly circulated photographs in society, and influence may also have more general effects than government policy decisions. Accordingly, Hariman and Lucaites (2001: 19) believe that, 'visual practices have long been important yet undervalued constituents of democratic culture precisely because they are media for emotional representation that lead to performative identification rather than rational deliberation'. I would concur that the value accorded to written documents and the official archive of materials is often denied the photographic image which, nevertheless, is so regularly witnessed that its pull on the emotions should not be dismissed. 5 Alongside his scepticism about the influence of photographs, another side of Perimutter's critique is based on the premise that the term icon is sometimes used rather loosely to refer to group of images of important events rather than the single famous image itself. Icons of significant events may circulate widely, in the process losing captions and credits detailing the specificities of their making and becoming instead generalised symbols (Zelizer 1998: 98ý 121). Perlmutter distinguishes between the discrete icons, the unique image (even though there may be many millions of copies of this image) and the generic icon. He expands on one obvious example, that of images of starving African children, to explain that there is no one photograph of malnourished children that sticks in the public memory, but rather it is a generic concept that is pulled out every time a famine appears in the news media. He explains, 'certain elements are repeated over and over, from image to image, so that varying subjects, times, and locations, the basic scene becomes a familiar staple, a visual cliche' (1998: 11). This form of selectivity has been widely recognised by commentators who have criticised the portrayal of Africa as a homogeneous entity known almost exclusively as a site of crippling poverty, disease and frequent natural disasters (**Campbell 2003**). This may lead to an inattention to the specificities of each situation, and tends not to focus blame on the possible causes of, in this case, the famine. Discussion of multiple images often leads to questions about the possible negative effects of visual imagery, often expressed as compassion fatigue (as 6 for example in the title of Susan Moeller's 1999 work on the subject). Does repeated viewing anaesthetise the viewer against further feelings of shock, outrage and pity on seeing images of horror or pain? Perlmutter (1998: 81) speculates that 'icons of outrage' may lead not to moves to right the wrongs depicted, but to a weakened 'compassionspeak' that is merely a language of description rather than action. John Taylor (1998) refrains from blaming the media for compassion fatigue but suggests that a proliferation of imagery alone will not insure society against forgetting traumatic events, even quite soon after their occurrence. In a perceptive examination, Carolyn Dean (2003) notes the tendency to condemn graphic portrayals of dead, injured and dying human beings as 'pornographic', implying that they present an eroticised view of pain and suffering which is morally reprehensible as well as hinting at a prior state of affairs in which the human suffering was treated more respectfully. The classic example of this is the Holocaust, long a subject of polemic over the possibility of its representation even while its key images, of skeletal survivors, do not cease to circulate. According to Dean, **however**, **the usefulness of such blanket condemnations of images** of horror as eroticised and commodified **is limited.** Thus far, I have discussed the origins of icons in general terms, and picked up on the clearest examples of photographic iconicity. In a nutshell, key factors have been identified as the wide circulation of a select few images, their strong emotional pull, and possible religious connotations. I have also pinpointed the lack of attention to the regional which may prejudice the consideration of photographic icons. Where do these remarks take us when we return to Latin America, a region which, Che aside, has been largely absent from the canon of classic images? How do images interact with the issues of memory which, as discussed in the previous chapter, are crucial in post-conflict societies? In my own consideration of iconic images, I will draw on the theories outlined above. One concern, however, is that most examination of significant images has been from the viewpoint of the European or US-based observer. With few exceptions, most images were directed at principally European and North American audiences, and detailed analyses like those conducted by Perlmutter and Hariman and Lucaites are extremely valuable but focus specifically on the North American context, as well as neglecting issues of memory. While the work of Hariman and Lucaites (2007) is explicitly based firmly in the United States, it does cover famous images from Vietnam, Iwo Jima, and Tiananmen Square, but only insofar as they are viewed by and have an influence on an American audience, neglecting issues of their reception elsewhere. The relevance of their findings in Latin America must therefore be evaluated carefully, in part because there is not such widespread access in the region to television, print media and the internet. While there is a small group of images whose fame has reached internationally, each country also has iconic images that are recognised in a national context but may not be well known beyond its borders. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a definitive framework for iconicity in as diverse a region as Latin America, but in my juxtaposition of Peru and Argentina and their points of convergence and divergence, I aim to draw some conclusions about the significance of the icon in the commemoration of violence in Argentina and Peru. Moreover, while each Latin American nation has a specific history and culture, many of them share issues of postdictatorial development, and this project is thus a step towards an evaluation of memory images in the subcontinent. Firstly I would concur, with Hariman and Lucaites, that the right conditions come together to create an iconic image. A composition that is familiar and recognisable to the viewing audience, perhaps involving religious connotations; an emotional appeal and a relatively clear cut moral message all contribute to the strength of the image. Perlmutter (1998) adds another important factor: metonymy. The image must have the ability to stand in for the whole situation it represents: one starving child for the plight of millions in Africa, one heap of skeletal bodies for all Holocaust victims, and so on. It must also appear at an opportune moment and with the ability to be reproduced on multiple occasions, leaving room for an element of chance and the influence of the media and publishing industries. In fact, as will be examined in depth in chapter three of this thesis, Runia (2006) emphasises the significance of metonymy in memory debates, in which iconic images, sites, and people are made to stand in for a whole historical period. The ease with which photographs circulate, often unaccredited, and the ability to assimilate them in many different ways means that they often escape closer scrutiny. Yet **if we are going to credit** some **images with the power to** provoke emotions, **influence decisions, and control memory discourse, they deserve deeper analysis.**

***If* disease reps cause reality, they cause good preparation, *not* securitized responses**

**Saksena 11**

Mita – Former Lecturer, Jai Hind College, Bombay University. Also former Research Assistant University of Madras, Project on Implementation of Regulatory and Distributive Policies in Tamil Nadu Joint Project between University of Oslo and University of Madras. Dissertation was overseen and approved by Professor Paul A. Kowert, Associate Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations Florida International University. This Thesis is written by Mita Saksena – the author now holds a Ph.D. in International Health & Human Rights from FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY “FRAMING INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND U.S. PUBLIC OPINION” A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS – http://search.proquest.com/docview/952533573

Two hypotheses were tested in this chapter. First, frames represented prominently in the media will tend to mobilize public support **for policies associated with those frames**. This study indicates that the biomedical frame was the predominant frame in media reports in the sampled period 2004–2007 (Tables 5.4–5.9 and Figure 5.1-5.3). The study also highlights a strong correlation between the biomedical frame and the American public’s worry about the disease and their concern about the likelihood that the disease would strike the United States. The surveys were conducted mainly between December 2005 and in 2006 and the beginning of 2007. Figure 5.1 clearly indicates that between 2005 and the second quarter of 2007, the volume of stories that discussed the impact of avian flu on the United States and the globe as a whole increased. In the second quarter of 2007 all articles dealt with the impact of the disease on the United States. In February 2005, a news story reported that at the national meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, scientists stated that they believed it highly likely that a virus that has swept through chickens and other poultry in Asia would genetically change into a flu that can be transmitted among people.38 At the same time, Cambodia and Indonesia reported their first human cases of avian flu, which turned out to be fatal.39 By November 2005, the WHO's official count of human cases of H5N1 reached 122, with 62 deaths in Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia.40 This was followed by news reports of the spread of avian flu to countries such as China, the Russian Federation, Turkey, Italy, and many other countries around the globe. This was also a time when the United States President and Congress launched several initiatives. The Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act was adopted by Congress in December 2006. With this law, Congress mandated for the first time in United States history that the federal government prepare a National Health Security Strategy to guide improvement of the country’s public health emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The second hypothesis tested was that when the biomedical and economic frames dominate media coverage, which is the most common scenario, people will be more worried about the disease. They will be likely to support potentially inconvenient policies intended to address the dangers of the disease. The survey reports show high support for **vaccine production** and **research** and willingness on the part of the American public to undertake precautionary measures to deal with the disease. **The public did not see** the human rights and **security frames as relevant**. The security frame was more prominent in media stories about bird flu than it was for SARS. It did not, however, show any significant correlation with worries about bird flu. The human rights frame was not very prominent in news stories about bird flu. Part of the reason for this is that the bird flu did not infect humans in the United States**, and there were no** major **issues arising over** access to antiviral drugs and vaccines or about **quarantine and isolation**.

### AT – no HS immigration

#### Syria Brain Drain to US increasing

**Arabi and Tarbichi 12**

(Mohammand Arabi MD is radiologist and Sankri Tarbichi MD is Wayne State school of Medicine Professor) NCIB “The metrics of Syrian physicians’ brain drain to US” Publish Jan 2012

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/

Brain drain phenomenon is defined as the large-scale emigration of a group of intellectuals and professionals with high qualifications and unique technical skills and knowledge. This phenomenon results in significant socioeconomic consequences as a result of the continuous loss of practitioners and trainees as well as losing their social value and financial support to their country of origin. Many countries suffered from brain drain to variable extents particularly during the second half of the 20th century, following World War II. In contrast, many countries have markedly gained form this movement leading to remarkable development of their economy and educational systems due to the significant contributions made by the immigrating professionals to their respective fields. Physicians’ brain drain had a substantial burden on developing countries over the past few decades due to the significant loss of medical professionals and health care providers in both clinical care and medical education fields. For example, the number of international medical graduates (IMGs) in the United States is estimated at 245,000 according the American Medical Association (AMA) statistics in 2007, representing an approximately 25% of the entire health workforce in the nation[[1](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref1),[2](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref2)] where physicians immigrating from lower income countries constitute 60% of all practicing IMGs. India occupies the first rank among the source countries of IMGs in the United States with an emigration factor of 10.6%. (Emigration factor is defined as the number of physicians from a source nation practicing in a recipient country divided by the total number of physicians practicing in the source country.)[[1](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref1),[2](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref2)] This is followed by a number of countries such as Philippines, Pakistan, and some Latin America and Middle East countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.[[1](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref1),[2](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref2)] Between 2004 and 2008, the data from the AMA records indicated that the total numbers of Syrian physicians practicing in the United States has increased from approximately 3200 to 3900 representing 0.4% of the health workforce and 1.6% of IMGs.[[1](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref1),[2](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref2)] The Global Health Observatory data repository reported that the total number of physicians in Syria was estimated at 31,000, according to the 2008 statistics, with an approximately 15 physicians per 10,000 capita.[[3](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref3)] This renders the emigration factor of Syrian physicians to the United States to be around 13%. A study published in Health Policy in 2007 analyzed the dynamics of international immigration patterns of physicians to the United States and found that Syria has a higher-than-expected physicians immigration rates.[[4](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref4)] In fact, Syria was the sixth country among the top eight countries which have a higher-than-expected rate and the second Arab country after Lebanon when adjusting for the population size.[[4](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref4),[5](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref5)] Recently, the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) indicated in its 2010 annual report that a total of 140 certificates were issued to medical students who graduated from Syrian medical schools representing 1.5% of the total certificates issued in 2010. Also, a total of 240 exchange visiting student visas were issued for Syrian medical graduates in the 2009–2010 academic year.[[6](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/#ref6)] Major factors contribute to this trend on physicians’ immigration from Syria including the large differences in incomes and standards of living, the scarcity and instability of professional and academic opportunities, and the “culture of emigration” among physicians in training. The majority of the recipient countries provide a proper professional atmosphere, better academic freedom, and flexibility with much better overall living conditions. Unfortunately, some of these factors are difficult to counteract in a short-term intervention. Nevertheless, several measures can be done to increase the retention of practicing and graduating physicians or minimize the effect of brain drain on the health and medical education systems. Core modifications in health and education policy and professional atmosphere are essential to achieve broad societal changes and to reduce the rates of physicians’ emigration. Providing better academic and professional opportunities, allowing more flexibility to the health and education systems, promoting research and its infrastructure, establishing networks between professionals inside and outside the country, as well as encouraging the return of the emigrant physicians will minimize the effects of physicians’ brain drain which will ultimately improve the overall rating of the Syrian health and medical education systems.

## Aid CP

### 1nc

#### The United States Federal Government should increase its humanitarian aid and foreign development budgets.

#### Increasing the budget solves security and humanitarian crises

NRC 17

3-16-17 Norwegian Refugee Council. “US foreign aid cuts threaten lives in world’s poorest countries” https://reliefweb.int/report/world/us-foreign-aid-cuts-threaten-lives-world-s-poorest-countries

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is alarmed by US President Donald Trump’s announcement today of his administration’s intention to cut the international affairs budget, which includes humanitarian aid, development and diplomacy, by US$10.1 billion or 28 per cent, to bolster a $54 billion hike in military spending. “The question is not if human lives will be lost as a result of President Trump’s decision to slash spending on foreign aid and diplomacy; the question is how many and how soon,” warned Joel Charny, NRC’s Director in the United States. “Today, over 65 million people are on the move, forced from their homes by war and persecution. A famine was recently declared in parts of South Sudan. Multiple other countries face mass starvation. It’s inhumane to make unprecedented cuts to aid like this, at a time when we are struggling to respond to multiple humanitarian crises.” The United States is the largest humanitarian donor in the world. In 2016 alone, it provided $6.4 billion for emergencies - about a third of the overall $22.1 billion spent globally by aid agencies. This included distributing lifesaving food in South Sudan, preventing HIV/AIDS in Nigeria and rebuilding Afghanistan’s education system so children can return to school. But while the amount of foreign aid the US donates is high, it is less than 1 per cent of its overall federal budget. “The potential savings do not justify the cost in terms of the lives lost and the negative impact on vulnerable people around the world,” said Charny. The Trump budget proposal states that it retains “significant funding for humanitarian assistance,” although it does not provide a detailed breakdown of specific accounts. The one humanitarian account mentioned is the $70 million Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA), a contingency fund for rapid response to displacement crises that the budget proposal eliminates. Even if humanitarian aid spending is maintained but development aid is cut, this will have disastrous effects. Development aid is vital to prevent emergencies and help societies to recover afterwards. It helps create a more stable world. Development aid is a more effective way to make America safer, not increasing military spending, which is already at a level greater than the combined total of the military budgets of the next 11 countries. “We are also deeply worried that the foreign aid cuts are not just about money,” Charny said. “They are about disrupting the global institutions that President Trump does not believe in, like the United Nations. The UN was set up after World War II to make the world a safer place. But as part of the President’s America First agenda he wants to weaken it and condition US support on furthering US national interests.” “This will make America and the world much more insecure.”

### Ext – solvency

#### Foreign aid solves the refugee crisis

Dutta 18

5-2-18 Anashua Dutta, Assistant Campaigner, Amnesty International USA “4 Ways Humanitarian Aid is Linked to the Global Refugee Crisis” https://medium.com/@amnestyusa/4-ways-humanitarian-aid-is-linked-to-the-global-refugee-crisis-71883acacc42

Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees now live in make-shift camps in Bangladesh and the surrounding region, unable to return to Myanmar due to the military’s brutal campaign. Over one-quarter of Lebanon’s population and one-fifth of Jordan’s population is made up of refugees. Somalia and Yemen, countries torn apart by civil war and struck by famine, have two of the largest internally-displaced populations in the world. In the midst of these humanitarian crises, the U.S. has shirked its responsibilities, declaring the lowest refugee admissions ceiling since the modern refugee resettlement program began in the early 1980s and ignoring the importance of funding for humanitarian programs abroad. In February 2018, President Trump issued his budget for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19), titled “An American Budget.” While this budget is merely the starting point for negotiations on the hill, it is the best indication we have of what the President and his administration prioritize. “An American Budget” slashes funding for the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) by $9 billion, a 26% decrease from 2017 funding levels. To put this number in perspective, foreign aid, historically, has only accounted for less than 1% of the U.S. budget. These budget cuts will have an immediate and detrimental impact on refugees in the U.S. and displaced and in-need populations overseas around the world. At a time when millions are displaced due to civil war, violence, ethnic cleansing, and natural disasters, this is the time for the U.S. to sustain, if not step up, its international commitments. Here are four ways that humanitarian aid is implicitly linked to the global refugee crisis: 1) Our humanitarian aid budget designates funds which directly impact refugees and displaced persons not in the U.S. The Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) Program, administered by the Department of State, covers aid to refugees and internally displaced persons. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), which provides protection, shelter, water, health care, and other resources to refugees and internally displaced persons, relies heavily on this account. The U.S., the world’s most powerful economy, is the UNHCR’s largest donor by far, giving almost $1.5 billion to the refugee agency; over three times that of Germany, the UNHCR’s second largest donor. U.S. funding supports programs and institutions which prevent refugees from being forcibly returned to places where their lives would be threatened, works to ensure access for humanitarian agencies to conflict zones, promotes international humanitarian and human rights law, and de-escalates conflicts which engender human displacement. 2) Humanitarian aid also includes significant funding for the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Since its inception under President Reagan in the early 1980s, the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) has taken in more refugees than any other country’s resettlement program. At times of far less need, the U.S. has done much more to address human displacement. In 1980, there were about 9 million displaced people in the world. That year, the U.S. took in 207,116 refugees. This year, as more than 65 million people are displaced around the world, the U.S. has agreed to take in only 45,000 refugees. The U.S. sets an example for other countries: when the U.S. resettles refugees, other countries follow suit. This pattern, however, goes both ways; when the U.S. closes its doors to displaced persons, other countries do as well. The USRAP has historically had a strong bipartisan tradition. Opening our doors to those fleeing persecution is grounded in our country’s very founding. From its earliest years, U.S shores have represented refuge and new beginnings for those seeking safety. Resettlement is often the only option for refugees when voluntary repatriation — return to their home country — and local integration to the country they initially fled are not possible. It is critical that the USRAP continues to receive funding to work in partnership with the UNHCR, bring refugees to the U.S., and to support refugee resettlement agencies in the U.S. 3) Aid goes to countries which are facing unanticipated humanitarian crises; crises which are typically refugee producing. Under the Department of State, the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund is a critically important account for the global refugee crisis. ERMA is a flexible reserve fund and allows the U.S. to support unforeseen humanitarian needs without taking money away from other humanitarian priorities. In past years, the ERMA fund was drawn on to offer aid to those affected by civil unrest in Libya, support those fleeing Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and provide assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. If history teaches us anything, it is that we cannot predict every humanitarian crisis that arises. The least we can do is be prepared to meet these crises. 4) Aid goes to those countries which are disproportionately shouldering the burden of the refugee crisis. The U.S. would have to resettle about 3,750 refugees each month to resettle the embarrassingly low number of 45,000 refugees the President determined the U.S. could resettle this fiscal year. Halfway through FY18, the U.S. is not on track to resettle even half that number this year. Meanwhile, countries like Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Kenya, and Ethiopia host large numbers of refugees, disproportionate to their populations and resources. More and more, refugees are living in towns and cities. According to the UNHCR, two-thirds of refugees now live outside of camps. Host governments are scrambling to find resources to expand housing availability, improve infrastructure, and offer educational and vocational opportunities to refugees. The MRA fund, in conjunction with USAID, addresses the development issues host countries face from protracted, refugee-producing conflicts. These funds recognize the new reality that refugees are likely to be displaced from their homes for generations and must build their lives in a new country. If host countries cannot adequately support their refugee populations, the escalation of economic, social, and political instability is inevitable. Thus, it is critical from both a moral and national security standpoint that the U.S. maintain its international commitments to support these countries. Humanitarian aid has the power to mitigate the global refugee crisis by alleviating suffering, building new homes, and supporting host countries.

#### Foreign aid solves the need for asylum in the US – syria proves

IRC 17

3-16-17 International Rescue Committee “Five ways American foreign aid saves Syrian lives” https://www.rescue.org/article/five-ways-american-foreign-aid-saves-syrian-lives

American aid is a mighty defense against conflict, poverty and despair, especially in countries where war and violence has forced millions to flee from the places they once called home. President Trump has proposed large cuts to foreign aid at a time of desperate need. In Syria alone, 13.5 million people require urgent humanitarian assistance, as do the 4.8 million who have fled to neighboring countries. Yet less than 1 percent of the $4 trillion federal budget is spent on global foreign assistance to help the most vulnerable around the world survive, recover and gain control of their future. The International Rescue Committee is proud to partner with the United States government in helping those whose lives have been shattered by conflict, a mission deeply rooted in America's values and traditions. Here are just a few ways U.S. funds have helped Syrians: 1. Care for the youngest Syrians Millions have no access to health care in Syria, where relentless bombings of hospitals and the tragic attacks on doctors have become a fact of life. It's extremely difficult to manage coughs, colds and other common childhood illnesses. Last year, the IRC and its partners inside Syria reached over 75,000 children under the age of five at clinics and with mobile teams that provide critical medical supplies and equipment funded by the U.S. We also helped deliver more than 13,000 Syrian babies born under bombardment in dangerous cities like East Aleppo. 2. Care for the injured Close to half a million Syrians have died during the six-year-old war; as many as 6,000 people flee Syria every day as attacks on homes, markets, schools and hospitals continue. U.S. funds have equipped and staffed trauma centers where the IRC's local partners provide critical care and emergency surgeries for patients suffering from traumatic wounds from bombs, rockets and gunfire. All told, the IRC and its partners have treated 38,000 adults. 3. A lifeline for women and girls Syrian women and girls living in remote parts of Lebanon have suffered hardship, trauma and tragedy. They bear the physical and emotional scars of the war, and although they have found some respite, women and girls continue to face serious risk of violence at home and in their new, yet unfamiliar communities.  The IRC reaches them with roaming teams of social workers generously supported by the U.S. IRC aid workers travel to villages and makeshift camps to  assess the safety of women and girls and provide therapeutic activities, critical care and support for survivors of assault, and special programs for teenage girls. 4. Investment in the future For the millions of children who have experienced death and destruction, schools are their only means of structure and routine. Education is the most reliable route out of poverty and a critical path toward prosperous societies. Yet, over one third of Syrian children remain out of school. These children have endured violence and neglect that can lead to toxic stress, and they will not have learned the skills they need to support themselves and help rebuild their communities. Parwin fled Syria with her family in 2013 after they were targeted for their politics. They found refuge in Domiz refugee camp where U.S. funds helped construct a school, provide classroom supplies and train teachers. 5. Empowerment of women entrepreneurs Refugees have a tough time starting over after their lives have been stolen from them—millions of Syrians face an unknown future with unanticipated perils. Despite such psychological challenges, not to mention cultural and physical barriers, Syrian women are creating new opportunities in the countries where they’ve found refuge. In Jordan, the IRC partners with the U.S. government to train women to start their own home businesses. Their new ventures increase household income, decrease domestic tension, and build connections with their new neighbors.

### CP popular

#### CP popular – avoids politics da

Schrayer 17

7-31-17 Liz Schrayer serves as President & CEO of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition (USGLC), a broad based coalition of over 500 businesses and NGOs that advocates for strong U.S. global leadership through development and diplomacy. Under her leadership, the USGLC has grown to a nationwide network of advocates in all 50 states and boasts a bipartisan Advisory Council, chaired by General Colin Powell which includes every living former Secretary of State, and a National Security Advisory Council consisting of nearly 200 retired three and four-star generals and admirals. “The politics of foreign aid” https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-politics-of-foreign-aid/

In 2011, as the annual budget resolution hit the Senate floor, multiple amendments were offered to cut the foreign assistance account. Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky offered the most dangerous amendment to cut billions from the International Affairs Budget. While it was defeated, it still garnered 20 votes. In the intervening years, Senator Paul offered similar amendments—but his final effort in 2015 was different. It was soundly defeated by a 96-4 vote. What happened in between—and ultimately over the past two decades—is part of an important storyline of the politics not just of foreign assistance, but of America’s global leadership. LESSONS FROM THE MARSHALL PLAN Stories of U.S. foreign aid are rarely told without a mention of U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, considered the father of foreign assistance with the Marshall Plan. Yet the political acumen of this retired general—who served as both secretary of state and secretary of defense—is often underappreciated. As we recently marked the 70th anniversary of the plan’s announcement, few may remember that, despite its overwhelming success, the initial proposal was wildly unpopular and feverishly opposed by the Senate Majority Leader Robert Taft of Ohio and a war-weary America seeking to benefit from the peace dividend. Marshall and Secretary of Commerce Averell Harriman made it their personal mission to earn the public’s support. Without the benefit of social media, they traveled around the country for months, speaking to everyone from Rotary clubs to chambers of commerce about both the “nobleness” of the plan, but also why it was in America’s self-interest to rebuild a more stable Europe that would be a future market for American goods and a partner for peace. Recognizing the uphill battle, the State Department even established a bipartisan citizen’s commission—comprised of prominent businessmen, industrialists, academics, ambassadors, and clergy—charged with embarking on a nationwide public relations campaign. While early Gallup polls showed that more than 50 percent of Americans opposed the program, the plan eventually passed overwhelmingly in Congress. Not only was the Marshall Plan unpopular, it also suffered from two tough labels—namely “foreign” and “aid.” Yet with strong political leadership, an engaged cadre of credible messengers, and a clear message about how the policy impacted voters’ interests, the outcome was successful. Seventy years later, these political lessons still ring true. THE COLD WAR POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID During the Cold War, American support for robust engagement in the world held steady, with polls showing that a vast majority of Americans supported overseas programs like famine relief. Unfortunately, this was the same era when negative stereotypes arose—a reminder of past aid to authoritarian rulers who were nominally allies against the Soviet Union. Interestingly, as the Cold War came to an end, it was President Ronald Reagan whose “peace through strength” foreign policy platform fostered strong support for foreign assistance among conservatives. While Reagan may be best known for his military buildup, he recognized that “the ultimate importance to the United States of our security and development assistance programs cannot be exaggerated.” Under his leadership in 1985, the U.S. spent close to 0.6 percent of the nation’s GDP on civilian international affairs programs—the high water mark for foreign assistance spending since the Marshall Plan. THE PRE-9/11 ERA AND THE ISOLATIONIST WINDS By the mid-1990s, policymakers were eager to reap a “peace dividend” after the end of the Cold War. As isolationist winds were blowing through Washington, some members of Congress openly stood on the floor of the House of Representatives and bragged that they did not own a passport. And the House Budget Resolution for Fiscal Year 1996 called for cutting more than 20 percent from the foreign assistance account, then totaling only $20 billion. In the Senate, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, a self-avowed aid skeptic, proposed a radical shrinking of America’s footprint around the world—including the elimination of the U.S. Agency for International Development. Between 1990 and 2000, foreign assistance spending declined by 20 percent, thousands of State Department and USAID positions were eliminated, and 70 USAID missions and diplomatic posts were shuttered. USAID was ultimately saved with the concession to eliminate the U.S. Information Agency. The threats to foreign assistance and America’s global leadership during this time were a wake-up call. With the exception of the pro-Israel community, led by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, there was no organized effort to educate, engage, and mobilize around foreign assistance on a national scale. While there were unique efforts on specific issues, no one had tried to engage the broad array of citizen voices who cared about America’s global engagement and could convey strong domestic support for global development and diplomacy. But soon this would change. THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN AID During these tumultuous years, several important efforts were born. Through the late 1990s, the faith-based community led the wildly successful Jubilee 2000 campaign to secure debt relief for developing countries. And in the mid-2000s, Bono launched the ONE Campaign, creating a worldwide grassroots movement that, along with dozens of nongovernmental organizations, has had a critical impact in galvanizing voices in support of poverty-focused development aid. In 1995, a broad-based coalition of “strange bedfellows”—eventually known as the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition (USGLC)—took a page out of Secretary Marshall’s playbook and began to transform the politics of foreign aid. In the early years, the USGLC sought to counter the isolationist tides and stop the hemorrhaging of the international affairs account. Today, the USGLC works around the country building broad support for America’s global leadership, development, and diplomacy with a coalition of more than 500 businesses and NGOs; a bipartisan advisory council chaired by former Secretary of State Colin Powell that includes every living secretary of state; nearly 200 retired three- and four-star generals and admirals; and advocates in all 50 states. While the community has weathered numerous efforts to scale back America’s civilian forces, the current proposals in Washington to slash the State Department and USAID by 32 percent present the most serious threat to America’s global leadership since the 1990s. And what many may not realize is that the historical and bipartisan groundswell of opposition that has unfolded over the past few months was actually years in the making. Here are some of the lessons learned from two decades changing the politics of foreign aid: 1. Messengers matter While many forceful voices have advocated for foreign assistance over the years, top generals and admirals have perhaps been the most powerful. These seemingly unexpected allies promoting the need for civilian power have been a game changer. Years ago, General Anthony Zinni, a former Commander of the U.S. Central Command, helped launch a network of now nearly 200 three- and four-star military leaders with the likes of Generals David Petraeus and Michael Hagee, Admirals James Loy and James Stavridis, and many others. These battle-tested leaders have not only lent their names, but also testified to Congress, penned op-eds, and spoken out around the country. Their national security credibility has been unmatched. Today, one of the most oft-cited quotes in support of our civilian forces is from then-General Jim Mattis who testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013: “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.” 2. Message matters There is no silver bullet to ensure support from a policymaker, but what is clear is that members of Congress need the issue to be relevant back home. While lawmakers can believe that supporting America’s engagement overseas is the right thing to do, they also need the facts and figures to explain why it is the smart thing to do for our security and our economic interests. On the frontlines of creating jobs and driving exports, the voices of business leaders and state chambers of commerce have been central to capturing the attention of lawmakers around the country. The economic message combined with a security and values-driven agenda has proven highly effective. A few samples of the three-pronged message: National security: “The military alone cannot keep us safe.” Jobs and the economy: “95 percent of consumers live outside the United States.” Moral leadership: “America is that shining city on the hill.” 3. Leadership matters As Secretary Marshall and President Harry Truman demonstrated, leadership matters. Few have showed this better on development assistance than President George W. Bush. As a candidate who ran on a platform against “nation building,” he went on to be one of the greatest champions for global health, helping to save more than 13 million lives by launching PEPFAR (the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) and the malaria relief program. His leadership in establishing the Millennium Challenge Corporation raised the bar for strengthening foreign assistance effectiveness. The Obama administration built upon these successes, deepening our investments in public- private partnerships, aid effectiveness, and transparency, and ensuring country commitments through presidential initiatives on food security and energy. The nominated USAID administrator, Ambassador Mark Green, is well known for his leadership on smart aid reform. Leadership on these issues also includes the legislative branch. In the past two and a half years, Congress passed eight significant pieces of bipartisan legislation on global development, ranging from food security to aid effectiveness to rights for women and girls, with sponsors from across the political spectrum. 4. Local voices matter A junior member of Congress from the Midwest made a name for himself on local talk radio prior to being elected with the common refrain: “Why should we be building schools over there, when we should be building schools here at home?” Yet after this Tea Party conservative visited a USAID agriculture program in Africa, he became a staunch believer and vocal advocate for the foreign assistance budget. The congressman’s decision to go on this overseas education trip did not come from his staff, but instead from a top CEO from his state. As House Speaker Tip O’Neill once said, “All politics is local.” In the past decade, the most consequential and lasting shifts in policymakers’ support for foreign assistance has come as the groundwork spread far outside the beltway. In the last election cycle alone, nearly 200 candidates met with foreign assistance advocates—groups of local business, faith, NGO, veteran, and community leaders—in their home districts. These meetings, led by highly influential supporters of foreign assistance, have been critical in both educating skeptics and reinforcing champions, showcasing the strength of constituent support for global development. 5. Local platforms matter Members of Congress not only need to hear this support, but they also need to feel it tangibly. A decade ago, the USGLC launched what has become a signature program—local statewide events that provide a platform for lawmakers to engage directly with their constituents on how America’s role in the world directly impacts their communities. Several years ago, the USGLC hosted an event for a newly elected senator in his home state. The room was packed with hundreds of his constituents. Just before he was introduced, the senator leaned over to me and said, “My constituents don’t like foreign assistance.” Once on stage, sandwiched between a prominent retired four-star general and a well-respected former diplomat, the senator found a different voice. With the political cover to his left and right, he started singing off of our song sheet, boldly telling the supportive crowd why aid was directly in America’s national security, economic, and humanitarian interests. Time and again, these local programs have provided an opportunity for policymakers to speak out and the words spoken outside the beltway have translated into positives votes and action back in Washington. While isolationist winds may have returned to Washington in recent days, there are very different speeches being made on the House floor compared with two decades ago. In fact, more than 200 members of Congress from the Freedom Caucus to the Progressive Caucus have gone on the record opposing the proposal to cut the State Department and USAID by a third. There is no shortage of political challenges in the coming months and years. In addition to the proposed cuts, polls taken year after year still underscore the misinformation about the size of the small 1 percent of the federal budget that is dedicated to foreign assistance. Most surveys suggest that Americans believe aid accounts for more than a quarter of the federal budget, and polling in the Heartland showed deeper concerns just last year. But what has changed is that the many voices in our society who understand the stakes of America’s global leadership and the value of foreign assistance are speaking up—educating, engaging, and mobilizing. Members of Congress are not naïve—they see the complexities of the world, from threats of pandemics to famine to terrorism. Yet sometimes they also need a political embrace and a “thank you” for their leadership. And it is clear that today there is a growing chorus of voices doing just that.